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Abstract
Inner experience is a frequent topic in psychotherapy and in psychology more broadly, yet very
little research has carefully and systematically observed the naturally-occurring experience of
psychotherapy clients. The current study begins to fill that gap by using descriptive experience
sampling (DES) to survey the inner experience of a small sample of individuals seeking
psychotherapy. DES is a method that uses a random-interval beeper to signal participants to pay
attention to their pristine inner experiences

the thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so on that are

direc

and describe them in high

fidelity. We used about eight days of DES with each of six clients presenting themselves for
psychotherapy at a community mental health clinic. We had no hypotheses, preferring to allow
characterizations and speculations to arise from the data. For example, three of our six
participants had anomalous inner seeings containing features like arbitrary demarcations, explicit
backgrounds or borders, and innerly-seen words, all of which are highly unusual among nonclinical DES participants. Such anomalous inner seeings have previously been observed in
patients with schizophrenia. While none of those three participants had a serious mental illness,
one dropped out of the study prematurely for fear that she was having a mental episode and
needed psychiatric medication, and another had a family history of schizophrenia. These data
suggest that atypical inner experiences

and maybe especially anomalous inner seeings

may

be a marker or precursor of mental disorder. One participant had experience that was, in general,
unclear and almost uniformly lacked a central feature or target of experience, also uncommon
among non-clinical DES participants. Even more extreme, one participant did not confidently
apprehend a single experience, suggesting that she may not have pristine inner experience at all.
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psychotherapy.
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Exploring the Pristine Inner Experience of Individuals in Psychotherapy
Chapter 1: Introduction
It seems man has always been fascinated by his own inner experience (thoughts, feelings,
images, sensations, and the like) and inner experience lies at the heart of matters from spirituality
to literature to everyday conversation Some have argued that it is the conscious inner world of
humans that sets them apart from other animals. Though many are interested, few agree on how
to reliably measure inner experience such that disparate groups can reach a shared understanding.
This is an ever-present obstacle facing those interested in inner experience:
tends to be a nebulous entity, something assumed-but-not-truly-understood.
Psychological science is among the many interested in inner experience. The founding
father of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, spoke about inner experience: [the purpose of
facts of consciousness, its combinations and relations, so that it
).
Fifty years later, Aaron Beck, the creator of cognitive therapy, spoke about inner experience in
terms of automatic thoughts:
uoted in Beck, 2011, p. 137). Different sectors within
psychological science have pursued their interest in inner experience differently. Cognitive
psychology has done so mostly by inferring cognitions rather than actually observing them
(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a), whereas clinical psychology has done very little to advance its
understanding of inner experience and continues to rely on assumed-but-not-truly-understood
conceptions of inner experience, such as through the use of retrospective questionnaires (Trull &
Ebner-Priemer, 2009). A mature science of psychology ought to value the study of inner
experience and hold inner experience

to the extent possible

1

to the same scrutiny and

standards of objectivity as

A maturing of this kind will

require, first, that we no longer accept assumed-but-not-truly-understood conceptions of inner
experience and, second, that we develop and rely on sophisticated scientific methods for
exploring inner experience.
, as opposed to inner experience broadly defined, is wellsuited to scientific study. Pristine inner experiences are any thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so
forth that take place in the natural, unaltered environment and are directly apprehendable
the footlights of consciousnes

s, 1890/1918; Hurlburt &

Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011)

here in the same way that we would use it in saying that a forest is pristine: unspoiled by
civilization. We recognize that a pristine forest contains things that are clean and dirty,
simple and complex, healthy and rotting; however, it does not have the clearcut stumps
and plastic bottles that are the signs of human exploitation, and it does not have the parkservice maps and visitor centers that tell you how to see and therefore interfere with the

periences in their natural state, not
disturbed by the act of observation, unplanned, unmapped, ununinterpreted, un-heuristicized real experience. (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006, pp. 272-273)
Pristine inner experience is grounded in several key features. First, inner experience
inheres, or is expressed, at moments (Hurlburt, 2011).
experience while watching a single point in a tennis match. During that single point, there is the
potential for a wealth of distinct inner experiences: one might closely attend to the bend in the

2

for the monitor displaying the serve speed, then be drawn to the smell of popcorn nearby, then
think,

. This example illustrates that inner experiences

are typically short and fleeting

measured in seconds or fractions thereof. However, they can

sometimes be quite enduring (see the hours-long or even days-long examples
experience described by Hurlburt, 1993). Inner experiences are defined not by physical time but
by the experience itself. If the tennis point lasted fifteen seconds, for example, it does not
necessarily mean a spectator will have a fifteen-second experience of the point. He may have a
two second experience of the player -bend-in-the-back and a splitwonder-how-fast-that-

-

As such, to access any one of these individual inner

exp

your

experimenter must isolate moments.
Second, inner experience is private, created for/by/according to the manner of the
experiencer (Hurlburt, 2011). At any given moment, there exists a

(Hurlburt, 2011;

Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011b, p. 215) of potential internal and external stimuli available to
the individual. Out of that welter emerge thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so on of which the
individual becomes directly, or thematically, aware (Heavey, Hurlburt, & Lefforge, 2010).
Consider, for example, a husband and wife riding together as passengers in a car. Both are very
likely processing the cars, street lights, pedestrians, and so on in front of them, but at a given
moment perhaps the husband notices the poor grammar of the lyrics of the song playing on the
radio, whereas the wife innerly sees a friend she has been missing (entirely ignoring the song on
the radio). Individual differences abound in inner experience because inner experiences are
created for/by/according to the manner of the experiencer.

3

Third and finally, Hurlburt (2011) argued that pristine inner experience is radically nonsubjective (p. 329). Radically non-subjective is intended to mean that pristine inner experience
is

Hurlburt (2011)

reviewed psyc
esponses/observations that are impressionistic and
do not refer to directly apprehendable phenomena. For instance, a psychological study might ask
alcoholics to complete the Stages of Change Readiness and Treatment Eagerness Scale
(SOCRATES; Miller & Tonigan, 1996) that asks respondents to rate on a scale of 1 (strongly

Responses to SOCRATES are, indeed, subjective. Respondents are not asked to attend to any
apprehendable phenomena and thus, their ratings are global impressions of their change
behaviors (as compared to objective descriptions of their change behaviors). Consider, in
contrast, the pristine inner experience of a client who fills out the SOCRATES. At a particular
moment, the client may be reading and comprehending the words on the questionnaire, but those
words and their meaning may not be salient in his or her inner experience. Rather,
inner experience may be of a feeling of intense desire to leave the situation. He may experience
this desire primarily in his chest which feels tight as if about to burst and also in his legs which
feel energized and eager to move.

pristine inner experience is not subjective in

e word and is at least as informative of his readiness as are the
subjective impressions he provides on the SOCRATES. His experience is radically nonsubjective in that it refers to directly apprehendable phenomena (tightness in his chest and energy
in his

The client

is actually experiencing an intense desire to leave.

4

The science of inner experience has a problematic history (Benjamin, 2014; Chalmers,
1996; Danzinger, 1980; Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, & Kühn, 2017), which is not
surprising considering the difficulties inherent in exploring such a topic. Some of those
difficulties have been noted already: the construct of inner experience is often assumed-but-nottruly-understood; inner experiences can be brief and fleeting, and they are private and
unavailable to the external observer. Whereas many in the field of psychology are skeptical of
first-person reports, some have argued that there is promising potential for research in inner
experience and introspection if careful and adequate methods are used (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006;
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001, 2004).
Descriptive experience sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993, 2011; Hurlburt & Akhter,
2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a) is a method designed to be well suited to the study of pristine
inner experience. DES aims to submit to the many constraints that the careful examination of
pristine inner experience imposes (Hurlburt, 2011) and to apprehend and describe pristine inner
experience in high fidelity. Aiming for

descriptions acknowledges that the

method will undoubtedly fall short of perfection, that all descriptions will be approximations of
true inner experience, but that methodological considerations can be incorporated such that
descriptions point to truly apprehended experience (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). In DES,
participants wear a random interval beeper while going about everyday activities. When the beep
occurs

tend to and jot down notes regarding their ongoing-at-the-

moment-of-the-beep experience. Within 24-hours, the participant and a team (at least two,
usually more) of DES investigators meet for

during which they work

to explore and describe each

s. The principles and

5

procedures of DES have been elaborated elsewhere (Hurlburt, 1990, 1993, 2011; Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2006a) and will be considered in greater depth below.
This study used DES to study the naturally-occurring inner experience of a small sample
of individuals seeking psychotherapy services. Our aim was to survey the waterfront of pristine
inner experience in psychotherapy clients, to take the necessary first step of studying rigorously
and in high fidelity the experience of those with whom clinical psychology concerns itself.

6

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
The History of Inner Experience in Psychology
The scientific study of inner experience has roots in

use of

Introspection, a method for studying systematically and directly the elements of consciousness.
Many of the early psychological laboratories in what Hurlburt et al.
- 1925) used Introspective methods
for example, participants were rigorously trained to observe and describe the mental processes
that were stimulated by the presentation of a word (or other stimulus). Participants might
describe experiencing another word, seeing an image, or having some kind of emotional
response to the stimulus (Benjamin, 2014, p. 83; Titchener, 1915).
The demise of Introspection occurred at least in part because the several labs were unable
to agree on what are the fundamental elements of consciousness. According to Leahey (2014), a

Introspection labs centered largely on the question of whether imageless thought existed. Külpe
(and others in Germany) reported that they had discovered instances of imageless thought,
whereas Titchener (and others in the United States) denied the possibility of imageless thought
on the
(Greenwood, 1999, p. 12; Leahey, 2014). Monson and Hurlburt (1993) examined data from the
two labs and determined that participants in both labs actually gave very similar descriptions of
the experience of imageless thought; it was only in the interpretations of those experiences that
the two labs disagreed.

7

Introspection (coming to be considered unreliable) fell to the rising tides of
psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Psychoanalysts maintained that important psychological
processes were unconscious and could not be studied using introspective methods, whereas
behaviorists revolted against any mentalistic (unobservable and nonphysical) measures of
behavior (Skinner, 1977).
history (roughly 1925 -1970) as characterized by the radical exclusion of first-person reports of
inner experience. During this time, behaviorists were the majority. Though behaviorist B. F.
Skinner did not deny the possibility of self-observation or self-knowledge or its possible
usefulness (Skinner, 1974), he held that the scientific study of private, subjective events was
severely problematic. In fact, Danzinger (1980) contended that the behaviorist tradition is
responsible for the very

:

proponent of introspection as the basic method of psychology ever called himself an
(p. 241). Psychoanalysis and behaviorism drove underground reports about
conscious introspective experience, and Introspection as a method mostly ceased to exist.
- present) ushered in the
rowing opinion that psychologists could never fully
explain behavior while continuing to ignore mental processes (Benjamin, 2014). With the
cognitive revolution came a renewed interest in the mind and in mental elements and processes
(Hurlburt et al., 2017) and naturally, the birth of a sector within psychology known as cognitive
psychology. Early cognitive psychology included theories on information processing (Newell,
Shaw, & Simon, 1958; Simon & Newell, 1970), inductive reasoning (Morgan, 1944), grammar
(Miller, 1962), and much more. Hurlburt and Heavey (2006) argued that, whereas cognitive
psychology purports to study cognitions, it has done so only by inferring them and not by
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actually observing them, such as through introspection. Others (including Skinner, Moore, and
Boring) were of the same opinion
often hypothetical constructs invented by the observer (see Uttal, 2000). For instance, Simon and
Newell (1970) proposed a theory of human problem solving that held
internal experiencer)

(a sort of

(mental representations of the problem) by

sequentially applying heuristics (e.g., basic algebraic principles) until the solution is reached.
Simon and Ne

-solving was largely inferred from earlier research

findings from the Logic Theorist, a computer program they had developed to solve human
problems such as chess (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958; Simon & Newell, 1970). As Hurlburt
and Heavey (2006) critiqued years later, there

-

solving in the formulation of this theory; any observation was casually inferred, occasionally
be their inner experience
under laboratory conditions.
Today the study of inner experience in psychology has come to a stalemate. Hurlburt and
-person
accounts of inner experience cannot be trusted and thus should be excluded entirely from
investigation; on the other side of the chasm are those who believe first-person accounts of inner
experience are valuable aspects of the human experiment and thus should be investigated with
great care. Because contemporary psychology has not historically valued carefully studying inner
experience as it naturally occurs, psychologists specializing in clinical issues lack an
understanding of their clients

a disservice to both client and clinician. Trull and

Ebner-Priemer called for clinical psychologists to value ecologically-valid, everyday descriptions
of inner experience:

9

Clinical psychologists and clinical researchers are interested in the emotions, thoughts,
behaviors, and experiences of patients in their day-to-day life. Such an understanding is
necessary in order to provide an accurate evaluation of the relevant clinical problems, to
recommend appropriate treatment or intervention, and ultimately to adequately evaluate
treatment response. Assessment of patients in their natural environment serves to increase
the construct, ecological, and external validity of our assessments. (2009, p. 460)
Hurlburt and colleagues (e.g., Hurlburt, 2011) take this further in calling for high-fidelity
glimpses of clients pristine experiences, such as are attempted in the present study.
Methodological Difficulties in Exploring Inner Experience
Many have called into question the validity of self-reports (Bernard, Killworth,
Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984; Stone & Shiffman, 2002) and introspective reports (Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2007; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; for a review of classic arguments against
mentalism, see Uttal, 2000, pp. 64-109). Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007) noted that critics
often dismiss introspective reports on the a priori assumption that attempting to capture inner
experience will inevitably disturb the experience. William James famously captured this
difficulty:
As a snow-flake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal, but a drop, so,
instead of catching the feeling of a relation moving to its term, we find we have caught
some substantive thing, usually the last word we were producing, statically taken, and
with its function, tendency, and particular meaning in the sentence quite evaporated.
(1890/1981, p. 158)
The type of introspection James referred to is sometimes called
although Siewert (2011) preferred self-
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experience . An armchair introspector
Hurlburt and Schwitzegebel (2007) have argued that
armchair introspection should be abandoned, but that the exploration of inner experience is (in
the case of Hurlburt) or may be (in the case of Schwitzgebel) still be possible. Hurlburt (2011;
Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007) has highlighted several methodological guidelines to follow to
avoid the problems of armchair introspection, including: disturbing the experience as little as
possible, avoiding hypotheses and pre-determined questions, and targeting specific, concrete
moments.
Many of the contemporary criticisms of introspection and the study of inner experience
are informed by Nisbett and Wilso

(1977) review, which concluded that

subjective reports of their own behavior were frequently inaccurate. For instance, Nisbett and
Wilson reviewed a study (Zimbardo, Cohen, Weisenberg, Dworkin, & Firestone, 1969) in which
participants received painful shocks while performing a learning task. Participants were provided
either sufficient (e.g., the research is very important) or insufficient (e.g., the research is mostly
for curiosity

) justification for receiving the shocks. Participants who received insufficient

justification showed lower physiological reactions to the shocks and completed the learning task
more quickly. Zimbardo et al. (1969) interpreted this finding to mean that participants with
insufficient justification sought to justify receiving the shocks and did so by subjectively
evaluating the shocks as less painful (even though all participants received the same shocks).
Later, Zimbardo recalled some of the verbal reports given by participants when questioned about
their be
238). Examples such as this led Nisbett and Wilson to conclude that, when participants
subjectively report on their mental processes, they are frequently inaccurate because they rely,
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not on faithful introspection, but on unfettered confabulations and/or explanations with no
reference to the situational factors (e.g., sufficient or insufficient justification) that may have
influenced them.
Hurlburt and Heavey (2006) argued that Nisbett and

criticisms have been

overzealously and uncritically accepted by those on the side of the chasm believing the study of
inner experience is impossible, whereas they have been ignored by those on the other side of the
chasm who continue to inquire about inner experience mostly through casual means (e.g.,
retrospective questionnaires). Furthermore, Hurlburt and Heavey noted that Nisbett and Wilson
themselves actually conceived of an introspective method that might overcome the perils of
subjective reports:
We also wish to acknowledge that the studies do not suffice to show that people could
never be accurate about the processes involved. To do so would require ecologically
meaningless but theoretically interesting procedures such as interrupting a process at the
very moment it was occurring, alerting subjects to pay careful attention to their cognitive
processes, coaching them in introspective procedures, and so on. (1977, p. 246)
DES is one method that heeds the call for Nisbett and
procedures by doing what Hurlburt calls genuinely submitting to the constraints that the
2011, p. 49). A list of one hundred constraints can be
found in the Appendix of Hurlburt (2011). Heavey, Hurlburt, and Lefforge (2010) highlighted
ten of these constraints, which they termed hazards, to introspection:
1. A reliance on retrospection, especially long after the event, is known to contribute to
memory distortions (Bradburn, Rips, & Shevell, 18987; Tourangeau, 2000; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973).
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2. Presuppositions belonging to either the investigator or participant may inaccurately
color reports of inner experience.
that is taken for gran

thout

controversy as being true

a, p. 151).

3. Semantic memory (recall of general facts) may override episodic memory (recall of
specific, personal facts).
4. Participants may resort to describing processes or hypothetical constructs they believe
to be ongoing (but are difficult to faithfully apprehend) rather than focusing on the
ongoing experiential phenomena (that are apprehendable).
5. Investigators may intentionally or inadvertently objectify their human participants,
failing to appreciate their individual accounts of experience.
6. Participants may be reluctant to describe truthfully their inner experience, especially
if they believe it is embarrassing or confrontational.
7.

leads people to believe they are describing
experience when their words are actually poorly-discriminated (i.e. people use the
same words to describe different things).

8. Investigators may assume their laboratory observations are similar to ecologically
valid observations.
9. To faithfully apprehend the inner experience of another, investigators must be welltrained. Though there will be individual differences between investigators, all should
be evaluated for quality.
10. Participants are not likely to be skilled apprehenders of inner experience upon first
attempt, so methods should allow for gradually

13

Experience Sampling Methods
Experience sampling methods attempt to address many of the methodological difficulties
of studying inner experience and are, in some important ways, successful in doing so (Barrett &
Barrett, 2011). Most notably, experience sampling methods attempt to limit retrospective and/or
reconstructive reporting of memories and thus, are less susceptible to memory errors and
cognitive heuristics. According to Christensen, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Lebo, and Kaschub
(2003)

-

allow respondents to document their thoughts, feelings, and actions outside the walls of a
Several common experience sampling
methods are described next.
Experience sampling method. The Experience Sampling Method (ESM;
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) uses a signaling device (a
pager, a palmtop computer, a programmable wristwatch, a smartphone, etc.) to cue (usually at
random intervals) participants to report their activities, thoughts, and inner states while going
about everyday activities. When they are cued, participants typically record their responses on an
Experience Sampling Form (ESF), which is a self-report questionnaire designed to take roughly
two minutes to complete. Questions on the ESF vary d
typically include open-ended questions about location, social context, activity, content of
thought, time of report, as well as a number of Likert scales that assess the respondent s
situation, including his or her affect, activation (e.g., alertness), cognitive efficiency (e.g., level
of self-consciousness), and motivation. ESM is typically carried out over the course of one week.
ESM has demonstrated high correlations with diary records of time budget studies (r =.93), good

14

test-retest reliability (r

acceptable internal consistency on scales

of affect (a = .57) and arousal (a = .58) (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987).
Advantages of ESM include: a reduced risk of retrospective errors due to the limited
window of time between signal and response; increased ecological validity due to repeated
sampling in the par

; and the potential to observe patterns in

activities, feelings, thoughts, etc. over time thanks to repeated sampling and some variety (openended and Likert scale) of questions. Disadvantages of ESM include: reliance on self-report data;
significant time commitment from participants which may influence self-selection bias and
attrition; potential for reactivity and self-presentation bias (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983);
i & Larson, 1987).
Ecological momentary assessment. Ecological momentary assessment (EMA;
Shiffman, Stone, & Huffard, 2008; Stone & Shiffman, 1994) refers to a collection of methods in
which participants are repeatedly sampled in their everyday environments to assess current
behaviors and experiences. Whereas ESM relies primarily on self-report checklists, EMA
typically includes more objective measures such as heart rate and other physiological measures
(Stone & Shiffman, 2002). EMA participants respond to self-report questionnaires using a
variety of devices ranging from written diaries to electronic diaries and physiological sensors.
EMA

feelings (or very recent
(Shiffman et al., 2008, p. 4). Moments can be event-driven (selected based on

environmental or psychological features, such as after consuming an alcoholic drink, or when
feeling angry) or at random. Sampling schedules vary in EMA studies. At one extreme,
participants can be assessed as often as every 30 minutes over a period of days; at the other
extreme, participants can be assessed once daily for as long as a year. Studies examining the
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correlations between aggregated EMA data and recall-based measures are inconclusive
(Shiffman et al., 2008). However, there is substantial support for correlations between EMA
measures and measures of positive and negative affect as well as reports of pain (Moskowitz &
Young, 2006). Several studies support the incremental validity of EMA data (e.g., Kamarck,
Muldoon, Shiffman, & Sutton-Tyrrell, 2007; Stone, Shiffman, Atienza, & Nebling, 2007) and
others have found EMA data to be more sensitive to change and less prone to error as compared
to recall-based measures (e.g., McKenzie et al., 2004).
Advantages of EMA include: a reduced risk of retrospective errors due to the immediacy
of reporting; increased ecological validity due to repeated sampling in the particip
environment; evidence of excellent user compliance and satisfaction (e.g., Stone et al., 2003);
potential to observe patterns in activities, feelings, thoughts, etc. over time thanks to repeated
sampling and richly complex data due to the flexibility in assessment measures. Disadvantages
of EMA include: reliance on mostly self-report data; significant time commitment from
participants which may influence self-selection bias and attrition; potential for reactivity and
response sets (Stone & Shiffman, 1994); and potential for noncompliance/deception from
participants regarding when reports were completed (Stone & Shiffman, 2002).
Diary studies. The systematic use of diaries for research began in the 1940s (Shiffman et

quoted in Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003, p. 580). Since that time, the form of
diary studies has evolved (from paper-and-pencil to electronic diaries including PDAs and
eDiaries), but the aim has remained the same

to examine events and experiences in their

natural context. Diary studies have examined a wide variety of psychological phenomena and are
particularly well-established in health and pain research (Stone, Shiffman, & Atienza, 2007). In
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typical diary studies, participants respond to the diary at a fixed time or times throughout the day
or, often, in one sitting at the end of the day in what are known as end-of-day (EOD) diaries
(Stone & Shiffman, 2002). Participants may also respond to the diary according to a random
signal pattern unknown to them (such as with ESM) or on an event-based schedule (e.g., in
intimacy studies, reporting after any inte

, which is preferable for

studies of rare or highly specific experiences (Bolger et al., 2003). The duration of a diary study
depends on the research question of interest, but most studies typically span several weeks. The
diary itself is usually a short instrument. F

,

which used electronic diaries to explore the experience of individuals with chronic pain,
participants responded to the same diary questions for two weeks, always begi
-100 visual analog
scale) and then 17 additional questions regarding context, affect, etc.
Advantages of diary studies include: reduced retrospective errors (e.g., by 33%;
McKenzie et al., 2004); potential to observe within-person change and variability; potential to
observe between-person differences in experience and in variability of experience; potential to
observe temporal dynamics (e.g., fluctuations from morning to night); high participant
compliance, especially when using eDiaries (Stone, Shiffman, Schwartz, Broderick, & Hufford,
2002). Disadvantages of diary studies include: potential for skewed reporting, as research has
shown that participants tend to attribute more significance to peak levels of experience (e.g., pain
intensity) and more recent events (Bolger et al., 2003; Stone et al., 2007); inability to make
strong causal assertions regarding data; potential for selection bias in any non-random response
schedules; necessity of extensive training for participants.
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Thought-listing and think-aloud methods. Thought-listing (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981)
and think-aloud (Ericsson & Simon, 1984, 1993) are similar methods that are often more

Thought-listing methods are frequently used in clinical and counseling psychology to study such
topics as phobias, social anxiety, depressed mood, and more (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst,
1997). In the 1980s and beyond, think-aloud methods were frequently applied among computer
scientists as a way to explore the critical thought processes of experts (e.g., chess masters) to be
used in building computer simulations (e.g., chess-playing computers) (Ericsson & Simon,
1998). Think-aloud methods remain widely used in the computer industry and also play an active
role in educational research as a means for studying
Van Keer, 2014).
A typical thought-listing study requires participants to list their thoughts during a
situation of interest. Depending on the research question, participants may be asked to list
(verbally or written) a set number of thoughts, all of the thoughts they had, or to list their
thoughts until a predetermined amount of time lapses. Though Cacioppo and colleagues (1997)
wrote that thought-

ul when one either has no predetermined ideas

about the cognitive dimensions that are relevant or has only a few untested hunches (p. 929), the
literature is replete with thought-listing studies in which situations are highly manipulated (e.g.,
following mood induction, just before giving an impromptu public speech) or founded on
theoretical assumptions (e.g., comparison of thoughts before and after a cognitive behavioral
therapy intervention)
content, object (e.g., self vs. others), and valence (e.g., positive, negative) and, when the data is
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epressed
vs. non-depressed) or normal/control individuals.
Glass and Arnkoff (1994) reviewed support for the criterion-related and concurrent
validity (e.g., the number of negative thoughts from thought listings associated with lower selfevaluations: Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979) in roughly four studies concerned with social
anxiety and social phobia. Their review reported mixed results for the validity of thought-listing
in differentiating known groups (e.g., social anxious vs. non-anxious), but positive results for the
differentiation of social phobia from other anxiety disorders. The convergent validity of thoughtlisting is questionable (Caicoppo et al., 1997; Glass & Arnkoff, 1994; Heinrichs & Hofmann,
2005; Sturmer, Bruch, Haase, & Rivet Amico, 2002), though nearly all of this research has been
limited to the comparison of thought-listing with self-report measures of self-statements. Finally,
there is tentative support for the use of thought-listing as a measure of pre- to post-treatment
clinical change (Cacioppo et al., 1997).
A typical think-aloud study requires participants to verbalize their thoughts during a
situation of interest (e.g., while solving a problem). The situation is usually simulated (Fonteyn,
albeit under at
least minimal control (e.g., during golf performance; Whitehead, Taylor, Remco, & Polman,
2015). In nearly all think-aloud studies, participants undergo some practice in thinking aloud
prior to data collection (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Ericsson and Simon (1993) stressed that the
think-a

that is quiet and free of influence from

surrounding stimuli (p. 179). Further, to minimize reactivity, participants must be allowed to
maintain undisrupted focus on the task at hand. They are to attend fully to the task, verbalizing
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verbalizations are usually collected via video or audio recording and there are occasionally
follow-

nking (Fonteyn et al., 1993). A protocol

analysis procedure (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) is then followed in which verbalizations are coded

The validity of think-aloud methods has been called into question, largely due to
concerns regarding the potential reactivity of the method (Leow & Morgan-Short, 2004).
Specifically, think-aloud methods may interfere with cognitive processes, affect speed of task
performance, and/or entirely a

Ericsson and Simon (1993)

maintain that their think) the
quoted in Fonteyn et al., 1993, p. 432); however, there is evidence
to suggest that not all experimenters follow Ericsson and
minimize reactivity (Gill & Nonnecke, 2012). There is some support for the concurrent validity
of think-aloud methods; moderate to high correlations have been reported between think-aloud
data and self-report data
van Hout-Wolters, Veenman, & Meijer, 2012). Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, and Glaser (1989)
reported that thinkphysics problem. Recently, Whitehead and colleagues (2015) provided tentative support for the
ecological validity of thinkAdvantages of thought-listing and think-aloud methods include: a greatly reduced
reliance on retrospection (and no retrospection when using think-aloud methods); participants are
not required to report motives or causes for their mental activity (Cacioppo et al., 1997); can be
used to differentiate between two or more groups of interest; valuable for describing what
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information is used and how it is processed during expert or problem-solving tasks (Fonteyn et
al., 1993); relatively inexpensive in terms of time and money; can be administered in
ecologically-valid settings (Whitehead et al., 2015). Disadvantages include: potential for the
reporting to interfere with the process being studied; potential reactivity due to simulation (e.g.,
following mood-induction); reliance on the assumption that meaningful inferences can be made
based on verbalized data (Fonteyn et al., 1993); lack of ecological validity due to reliance on
simulation studies (Cacioppo et al., 1997); questionable validity of coding schemes (Sturmer et
al., 2002).
Can traditional experience sampling methods capture pristine inner experience?
Traditional experience sampling methods like those mentioned previously often appear to
inquire about pristine
Of interest is whether or not they can be said to capture pristine inner experience. Of course, as
Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) wrote, pristine inner ex
most important kind of experience,

might be important in some situations, and therefore a

mature science of inner experience would keep pristine inner experience distinct from anything
else that might be cal

150), which includes distinguishing methods that do aim

to submit to the constraints inherent in the exploration of pristine inner experience (such as DES)
from those that do not. Such a distinction must consider how methods address: participant
training, language for inner experience, timing and moments, retrospection and heuristics, and
the influence of theory.
Participant training. A fundamental problem in traditional experience sampling
methods is the lack of participant training. ESM, EMA, and diary studies typically provide
minimal training. Usually, participants are given instructions during a single introduction
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session.
Shiffman, 2002, p. 241); however, this training is aimed at understanding and complying with
the method (e.g., responding within the time limit) as opposed to understanding what is meant by
precision about the moment of interest. Hurlburt and Heavey
criticized this approach based on decades of research examining pristine inner experience using
DES:
The skilled DES interviewer gives those definitions and exhortations with the full
knowledge that almost no participant will follow them

the participant comes into the

study with idiosyncratically and presuppositional misapprehensions, ambiguities, and
blindness about experience, and those presuppositions will not likely be altered by
definitions and exhortations. (2015, p. 8)
Such minimal training fails to respond to many of the hazards of exploring pristine inner
experience. Most notably, consider Hazard #10, which states that participants are not likely to be
skilled apprehenders of inner experience upon first attempt (Heavey et al., 2010). Hurlburt
(2009, 2011) and colleagues (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015) contend that iterative training (on-thejob training that progressively builds skills; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015, p. 152) is necessary to
build skill in apprehending and describing moments of inner experience. Iteration allows
participants to attempt the task afresh on subsequent occasions with an improved understanding
of the moment of interest, improvement in the actual apprehension of experience, and improved
skill in what it is to describe pristine inner experience (as compared to generalities, impressions,
presuppositions, and the like).
Language for inner experience. Inner experience is an assumed-but-not-trulyunderstood concept; therefore, investigators inquiring about inner experience must be careful to
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come to a shared understanding with the participant regarding what, exactly, they mean by inner
experience and the terms used to describe it. Traditional experience sampling studies rarely do
so. For example, in an experience-sampling study of military veterans suffering from
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Kashdan, Julian, Merritt, and Uswatte (2006) asked
participants to provide daily ratings (on Likert scales) of six positive affect adjectives (e.g.,
happy, proud), six negative affect adjectives (e.g., anxious, frustrated), and a variety of other
items. According to Kashdan et al. (2006), the experimenter went over each item on the daily
.
Thus, participants were apparently expected to have a shared understanding of the momentary
affect adjectives they rated after only a one-time explanation. That is, it was apparently assumed
whatever that
was) would be adopted by (or already understood by) the participant. There was no consideration
of the possibility of fine
experiences as

or even huge

distinctions between and within such affective

.

Furthermore, recall Hazard #7, which states that participants tend to believe they are
describing inner experience when their words are, in fact, poorly-discriminated (Heavey et al.,
2010). DES research has found that participants frequently refer to their inner experience as
cognitive thought was experienced or not (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007,
Box 4.1, p. 61
innerly saying something to herself, whereas when another particip
; when another participant

cognitive aspect at all (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015). Thus, language for internal events, in general,
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is problematic, though Hurlburt (in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007) has argued language is a
blindly a
) terminology as accurate, and both parties must be given repeated opportunities to
improve or clarify their meanings to the extent possible. Such methodological efforts are rare,
including in experience sampling studies and in studies relying on self-report questionnaires.
Timing and moments. Traditional experience sampling methods fail to adequately
isolate moments of experience, and therefore (because pristine inner experience inheres only in
moments; Hurlburt, 2011) they cannot be said to capture pristine inner experience. Typical
experience sampling

arm
, Coffey, Povinelli, & Pruett,

proble
obvious and unambiguous, but Hurlburt (2011) argued that participants actually have a wide
variety of interpretations of such instructions. Despite the initial instruction to pay attention to
was ongoing in experience at the microsecond just before
early in sampling frequently report experiences well before or after the beep or describe
experiences that do not exist at any time.
Furthermore, sometimes experience sampling questions expressly require participants to
reflect over a longer period.
Retrospection and heuristics. Though experience sampling methods are lauded for their
reduced reliance on retrospection, few adequately reduce retrospection and many explicitly
require participants to report over long periods of experience. For example, in a diary study by
Vranceanu, Gallo, & Bogart (2009), participants responded to a diary of Likert-type items
assessing their affect and the nature/content of their social experiences within the last 40 to 50
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minutes. A time period of 40 to 50 minutes may contain upwards of 1,500 moments of inner
experience (if each experience lasts about two seconds), some of which were positive, some
negative, some involved social interaction, and others did not, and so on. As Hurlburt and

representative instan

to cleave to a precise moment of experience.
Furthermore, retrospection leaves participants susceptible to cognitive heuristics when
supplying their answers. Reis and Gable (2000) outlined several processes that commonly
influence accuracy in experience sampling studies: Recency refers to the finding that more recent
events are more readily recalled; Salience refers to the finding that more distinctive events (e.g.,
more unusual) tend to be more influential; Sense-making refers to the finding that events tend to
State of mind refers to the finding
at the time of reporting may affect his or her report.
For example, in an ESM study of self-talk by Brinthaupt, Benson, Kang, and Moore
(2015), participants responded to a modified online version of the Self-Talk Scale (STS), which
assesses the frequency of self-talk in 16 situations during which someone might be reasonably
expected to engage in self-talk. Participants were to report the frequency of their self-talk over
the last two hours. It is quite possible participants who had recently engaged in self-talk (e.g.,
within the last few minutes) reported more self-talk over the last two hours than actually
occurred (Recency). It is also possible that participants over-reported the frequency of their self-
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talk because their State of Mind (so to speak) at the time of reading the STS items seemed to
involve self-talk (e.g., if they were innerly speaking the STS items as they read them).
Presuppositions and the influence of theory. Hurlburt has described a presupposition as

(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a, p. 151) and, in fact, resists examination by characteristically
turning away from evidence that might counter that view
208). Most experience-sampling studies are based on theoretical assumptions that often reflect
the

presuppositions (see Hazard #2: Heavey et al., 2010). This is evidenced in a

quote by Ericcson and Simon, originators of the think-aloud protocol:
The primary focus of our work has been to identify the circumstances where individuals
could verbalize their thoughts without any, or at worst with minimal, reactive influences
on their thinking. Perhaps the single most important precondition for successful direct
expression of thinking is that the participants are allowed to maintain undisrupted focus
on the completion of the presented tasks. Hence, participants are explicitly instructed to
focus on the task while thinking aloud and merely

rather

than describe or explain them to anyone else. (1998, p. 181)
In this quotation, the investigators presuppose that (1) at least some portion of thinking can be
directly put into words; (2) naturally-occurring thoughts can discovered without distortion by
asking someone to speak them aloud in an undisturbed environment; and (3) thinking while
deliberately, explicitly focused on the task is the same as thinking while naturally engaged in the
behavior simulated in the task.
also be implied by the study itself. For example,
required participants with PTSD to rate daily
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their experience of positive and negative affective adjectives, which implied there was something
potentially important about the affective experiences of individuals with PTSD. As a result,
participants may have answered based on their notions of what affective experiences should be
like if they have PTSD. That is, participants

knowing they were recruited based on their

diagnosis of PTSD and knowing they would be interrogated about their emotion

may very well

have rated their daily affect based on the affective states they believed to be most congruent with
PTSD (e.g., high anxiety and irritability) regardless of whether those emotions were ongoing and
apprehended by the participant at particular moments.
ions, for example,
et al., 2013)
Burns, Chont, & Jamison, 2012). Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) argued that even open-ended
the presuppositions of the participant:
thoughts
are easily describable. The instructions pass those presumptions along to the participants with an
. Closedproblematic; they presume pain will be ongoing in experience throughout the day and thus,
should be readily quantifiable for the participant. As a result, participants may be susceptible to
forming response sets in which they routinely over-report phenomena related to the question
(e.g., thinking) and fail to notice and report other ongoing phenomena (e.g., sensory awareness)
even if they are actually more prominent (Hurlburt, 2011).
Participants have their own presuppositions regardless of the investigation or
investigator. These often arise insidiously in the form of self-theories, or deeply-held beliefs
about the way

(Hurlburt, 2011). Because people are
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devoted (usually blindly) to their own presuppositions, inquiring about experience necessitates
some methodological

, or reducing the influence of, those presuppositions

(see Hurlburt, 2011, p. 33). One aid to bracketing

presuppositions is to randomly

sample experience. Random sampling says
because Juanita or the investigator thinks, in some presuppositional way, that this experience is
important, significant, or interesting, but merely because it was selected by a neutral,
Another aid is to iteratively
train participants in the skill of bracketing their own presuppositions. For example, if Alice, a
self-

self-talker,

-aloud task while completing a math problem,
self-talk/inner

speech) and may even knowingly or unknowingly resist phenomen
presuppositions (e.g., visual imagery). If Alice does report frequent inner speaking during the
task, how can the investigators be confident that these reports are true of

actual

experience (i.e., Alice has frequent inner speech) and not merely the result of her self-theory (i.e.
Alice believes that she has frequent inner speech)? Only investigations that genuinely emphasize
are able to confront this difficulty.
Descriptive Experience Sampling: Capturing Pristine Inner Experience in High-Fidelity
Descriptive experience sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990; 1993; 2011; Hurlburt & Akhter,
2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a) was designed to submit to the many constraints inherent in the
exploration of pristine inner experience. Thus, whereas DES might be called an introspective
method, it has learned from the failure of earlier introspective methods; it aims to apprehend

(Hurlburt, 2011, p. 50) and to describe those experiences in high fidelity. By high fidelity,
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High fidelity descriptions aim at phenomena, but high fidelity descriptions do not expect to
achieve perfection in that aim; DES recognizes that it, like all scientific methods, falls short of
the truth. High fidelity apprehensions are possible to the extent that DES investigators genuinely
submit to the constraints inherent in exploring pristine inner experience and cleave to directly
observed phenomena occurring at precise moments in time (Hurlburt, 2011).
In DES, participants wear a random beeper as they go about everyday activities in their
natural environments. The beeper delivers a signal through an earphone; when that beep sounds,
participants are to attend to the experience that was ongoing at the moment of the beep. By
before the
beep occurs,

Heavey (2002, pp. 6-12) have elaborated on how use of a beeper can help avoid many of the
hazards to introspection. One notable advantage of the DES beeper is that it signals participants
randomly; random sampling is expected in most scientific investigations and avoids
presuppositional expectations about which occasions are most interesting/meaningful. Another
advantage is that the beep has a rapid onset and is easily detectable, thus unambiguously
identifying the single moment of interest and minimally disturbing evanescent phenomena.
Participants wear the beeper for roughly three hours or however long it takes to collect
(typically) six beeps, or samples.
Prior to wearing the beeper, participants meet with investigators for an instruction
meeting during which the DES procedure is described. Unlike traditional experience sampling
methods in which participant and investigator meet only once (if at all), the DES instruction
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meeting is the first of many of several occasions in which sampling skills are trained. DES
investigators recognize that most of what is taught in the instruction meeting will be ignore or
distorted during the actual sampling.
Instructions during the DES instruction meeting are intentionally vague so as not to
influence the participant. For example, many participants will ask, prior to sa

typical response sounds
n general I mean thoughts, feelings, perceptions, sensations, observations of the world,
tickles, urges, itches, pains
& Heavey, 2006a, p. 78). Note that in this instruction meeting DES investigators do not suggest
categories o
it could be a feeling or it could be an image, etc.

It is also during this instruction meeting that investigators begin to establish an honest,
collaborative footing with the participant. Participants are assured that

unlike many

psychological studies in which they are (usually) considered subject matter and (sometimes)
even intentionally deceived

DES engages participants in what Hurlburt and Heavey (2006)
-

investigators in the project; they are promised 51% of the vote in any confidentiality or
procedural matters, such as: the choice to sample at all; when to cease sampling; whether or not
to discuss any one particular sample; whether or not to video record interviews; any future use of
the DES findings, etc. Additionally, according to what Hurlburt and Heavey (2006) called the
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does tell the investigators about his experience, he
should tell the truth, the whole truth, and
as much detail as possible with as little confabulation as possible (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel,
2007). Together, the investigators and participant establish a date for the participant to wear the
beeper and within twenty-four hours of wearing the beeper, the participant and investigators
schedule the first expositional interview with a team of two or more DES investigators.
Despite the instructions discussed at the initial interview, this first sampling will typically
reflect faulty technique: Actual experience is forgotten or misconstrued. Subsequent sampling
days and their expositional interviews will help to make and solidify important distinctions, such
as what is meant by inner experience and wha

The

expositional interview is an ina, p. 86) and to create faithful descriptions of the
. DES expositional interviews are limited to some variation of the

elaborations and clarifications (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007).
This and most all questions in a DES interview are open-beginninged (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel,
2007). Traditional experience sampling methods typically rely on forced-choice probes (e.g.,
questionnaire items) or open-ended probes in which only the end of the question is spontaneous
whereas the beginning of the question is entirely specified (e.g., Tell me about what you were
seeing) (Hurlburt, 2011). Open-beginninged prompts, on the other hand, leave all ends of the
now what the features of your experience are; I
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presents itself directly to you including
nothing at all (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 161).
The long history of skepticism surrounding introspective reports forms the foundation of
DES, which was developed explicitly with the problematics of introspection in mind.
Investigators recognize that participants are not likely to be skilled apprehenders of their pristine
inner experience upon first attempt and are likely to describe their experiences in ways that are
somewhat false or misleading. For this reason, the first one or two (or more) sampling days are
typically considered training; during that time, investigators work carefully to help the subject
come to grasp what is meant by the moment of the beep and to cleave to pristine experience as
neralities about

remember things, I usually see it all play again in my head like a movie
one would be sad when they get that
news

perspective during the

expositional interview:
A metaphor that appeals to me is that I am standing under the chute of a thresher with
wheat and chaff pour

not interested in the extra-sampling general statements, almost always there eventually
becomes more wheat and less chaff

that is, more talk about moments and less about

general characterizations. (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 23)

the idea of bracketing presuppositions is not new (e.g., Husserl, 1913/1982), it is rare among
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traditional experience sampling methods. Hurlburt and colleagues have established that
relentlessly bracketing presuppositions about experience is one of the main requirements for
obtaining high fidelity descriptions of pristine inner experience (Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2006a, 2015

descriptions; rather, it is cultivating a mild counter-pressure to any phenomena that may have
piqued your interest. In the DES process, if those interest-piquing phenomena are genuinely
-pressure;
without the counter-pressure, they may continue to be expressed only because the participant has
been reinforced by the investigat

Hurlburt (2011) commented: The bracketing of

presuppositions is also a skill, a personal set of coordinations that must be relentlessly sensitive
and powerful enough to be able to counter the deeply rooted and taken-for-granted
presupposition skill. It is an ongoing battle (p. 181).

and what is chaff. It means holding all possibilities (both wheat and chaff) in hand until
questioning reveals that some pretty clearly are irrelevant (chaff) and others are pretty darn
faithful descriptions of experience (wheat). These pretty darn faithful descriptions of experience,
as Hurlburt (2011) argued, are
with

and/or

as psychology certainly does (p. 6).
DES is a fundamentally idiographic procedure that results in a written characterization of

each

-four hours of

each interview, an investigator prepares a contemporaneous written description of the
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ongoing inner experience at each sampled moment. This draft is circulated to any
other investigators present at the interview for tracked-change commentary, clarification,
disagreement, and so on. When deemed necessary for clarification, the investigators may choose
to review the video of the original interview. Any remaining ambiguities or disagreements are
intentionally left unresolved with comments and tracked-cha
differing viewpoints can be considered later (Hurlburt, 2017). After all sampling days are
completed, the investigators (first independently and then collaboratively) survey all the
identify any salient characteristics that emerge. The art
of the process then becomes describing these characteristics in all their detail and nuance such
that what is privately available to the participant comes alive for an outside observer.
Inner Experience and Psychotherapy in General
Psychotherapists are interested in inner experience, broadly defined. In fact, a central
skill of the psychotherapist is to

private experience so as to enter into those

experiences and gain a deeper understanding of who the client is and what his or her problems
are (Chang, Scott, & Decker, 2012). Carl Rogers famously described the process of entering into
to perceive the internal frame of reference
of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto
as if one were the person, but without ever losing the as if

1957, p. 140).

Experientially oriented psychotherapies are fundamentally aimed at private inner
experience

. Gendlin, a student of Carl Rogers,

provided the following description of experiential psychotherapy:
The crux of experiential psychotherapy is the richer, fuller experiential process that
occurs when one lets a felt sense form, when one lives and stays with that until the next
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step of speech or action emerges from that and when one then returns again to the level of
the felt sense to take still further steps. (1974, p. 239)
Experiential psychotherapists view humans as dynamic beings who function optimally
when they assimilate/integrate/make meaning of incongruencies between their psychology
(identity, emotions, cognitions, and so on) and their felt experience. Experiential psychotherapies

Greenberg & Van Balen, 1998, p. 52). This involves an exploration of the
. Focusing (Gendlin, 1981) is arguably the most well-known experiential
therapy technique for exploring inner experience, the goal of which is to help clients accurately
represent their internal felt sense; the technique involves guiding clients in turning their attention
to their inner experience and checking whatever they say or do against their own concretely felt
experiencing. Thus, experiential psychotherapists view inner experience as the primary content
of psychotherapy.
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) relies on introspection-like questions such as
a). In CBT,
clients are taught that thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are interrelated, each influencing the
others; the primary task of a typical course of CBT, t
experience

identifying and challenging dysfunctional thoughts and emotions. Mindfulness-

mindful engagement is non-directive and non-evaluative. Kabat-Zinn (1994), a leader in the

way: on purpose, in the present moment, and

4). Mindfulness is employed

within a wide variety of psychotherapy approaches; for example, mindfulness is one of the four
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core skills
[in life] without awareness is characteristic of impulsive and mood dependent beha
(Linehan, 1993), therefore, DBT teaches clients to be mindful, to increase awareness of feelings
and other internal states so that they can notice and change vulnerable states of being and choose
more effective behaviors.
Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) noted that, while many psychotherapies proclaim an interest
in inner experience, few demonstrate the care required to apprehend pristine inner experiences
adequately. For example, consider the common
First, because clients are not adequately trained to apprehend their inner experience, they
are likely to answer according to the presuppositions they hold about experience (e.g., All inner
experience is thinking or

m supposed to tell him

feeling) rather than according to the experience itself. Second, answers to
may have no connection to actual experiential phenomena.
ctual experiential details of particular instances of immediate

interested in a restricted range of experiential phenomena, typically emphasizing thoughts and
feelings (Beck, 1963; Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009; Knaus, 2006). Furthermore, clinical
psychologists sometimes prefer to use certain types of experiential phenomena (namely, inner
speech or self-talk) in therapy. For example, Knaus encouraged psychotherapists to infer the
phenomena of selfSometimes depressive thoughts are described as feelings. Tammy feels hopeless. Andy
feelings are viewed as part of the self, they can seem
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permanent. But if the feelings were to speak, they would represent depressive thoughts.
(2006, p. 172)
Rather than attempting to apprehend carefully and systematically the actual phenomena of
inner experience, Knaus encourages what he called

her experience, based

on the assumption that it is present phenomenologically as selfI tell myself

(p.

172, italics added).
Other psychotherapeutic techniques also seem fundamentally to rely on inner experience.
For instance, guided imagery and imaginal exposure engage with inner seeings (also known as
visual imagery, mental pictures, imaginary seeings, etc.). Beck encouraged therapists to first
educate their clients about imagery:
Some patients can identify images, but do not report them because their images are

their anxiety and makes it more likely that they will be able to identify their images.
(2011, p. 279)
Identifying images usually occurs in-session using casual armchair introspection; for instance,

unaware of images initially, and many therapists, after a few tries, abandon the
2011, p. 280).

seem to assume that everyone has visual imagery, that visual

imagery occurs frequently, and that clients fail to report visual imagery only because they
overlook it. Beck apparently does not consider the possibility that clients may not report visual
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images because they are not actually having them. In this manner, the reports of images may not
qualify as high fidelity descriptions of pristine inner experience; they are, at best, a combination
of an actually-seen image + retrospective error + presuppositions and, at worst, complete
confabulations or inducements by the therapist. Nonetheless, they are common targets in
treatment (e.g., for depression: Beck, 2011; for obsessive-compulsive disorder: Franklin & Foa,
2014; for posttraumatic stress disorder: Monson, Resick, & Rizvi, 2014).
Furthermore, techniques like guided imagery may overestimate the frequency of
experiential phenomena. High frequency claims of mental imagery are common: for instance,
Hirsch an
hallmark feature is the presence of recurrent sensory images of a past trauma, known as

(p. 161). Whereas the self-reported experience of flashbacks is common in those with PTSD
(e.g., 47% of participants with a current PTSD diagnosis: Holowaka, Marx, Kaloupek, & Keane,
2012; 24 flashbacks in a one-week period using electronic diaries: Priebe et al., 2013), there is
evidence to suggest these figures may overestimate the frequency of the pristine inner experience
of flashbacks. In two studies using DES, Raymond (2011) and Reger (2014) reported flashbacks

using casual methodologies (e.g., self-report) because of their vivid nature and emotional
content, and whereas addressing the emotionality of such experiences is certainly valuable, it

Although it seems psychotherapists ask straightforwardly about inner experience, they do
not ask straightforwardly about pristine inner experience. To ask straightforwardly about pristine
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inner experience would require that psychotherapists submit to the constraints inherent in that
exploration: to ask about specific moments, to ask about experiential phenomena, to work at
communicating carefully about inner experiences, and to actively bracket presuppositions about
experience throughout. Thus, it is not that psychotherapy fails to explore the inner experience of
its clients, but rather that they fail to explore inner experience carefully. Whether pristine inner
experience is of any value to psychotherapy and whether psychotherapy should be concerned
with pristine inner experience are largely unknown at this time, though answers may emerge in
studies such as the present one.
The Value of Pristine Inner Experience to Psychotherapy
It is possible

though not likely that the actual frequency and phenomena of pristine

inner experience will prove to be of no value to psychotherapy. Some have argued for this
(Schlinger, 2017; for a review, see Uttal, 2009). However, the field will not reach a conclusion
on that matter until it first comes face-to-face with discrete moments of directly apprehended
inner experience while genuinely submitting to the constraints inherent in the exploration of
inner experience.
Consider the following descriptions obtained using DES. The first is of Jessica, a 22year-old university student suffering from bulimia nervosa (BN):
Jessica 2.4 [second sampling day, fourth sample]. Jessica was in class and was directly
experiencing about ten simultaneous, chaotic unworded thought/feelings. These
experiences were in her head, were all jumbled together so that none was clearly
differentiable or separable. Jessica knew them to
paper is due, about the final exam, wanting her teacher to shut up, wanting the class to be
over, realizing that she was going to be late to her sampling appointing, wanting to leave
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the class. These experiences were neither thoughts nor feelings, or perhaps were both
thoughts and feelings, or were somewhere between thoughts and feelings, and were
apprehended as simultaneo

(Jones-Forrester & Hurlburt, 2011, p. 30;

for a more complete review of Jessica

Jones-Forrester & Hurlburt,

2011, Chapter 2)
From this description and others like it, Hurlburt and colleagues (Doucette & Hurlburt,
1993; Jones-Forester, 2006, 2009; Jones-Forrester & Hurlburt, 2011) concluded that fragmented
multiplicity (experience that is divided among multiple distinct, simultaneously occurring
phenomena) is a frequent phenomenon in the inner experience of women with BN, occurring at a
frequency of more than 50% across participants. Fragmented multiplicity is uncommon
(estimated <4% of all samples; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) among non-clinical samples. It has not
yet been adequately described in the eating disorder literature.
The second description is of Jimmy, a healthy nine-year-old boy:
Jimmy was in his bedroom playing with his cars. The DES interview revealed that
instead of paying attention to the cars that were arrayed on the floor in front of him, he
was at that moment seeing in his imagination an image of a big hole he had been digging
for the last several da

toys in it. If you had beeped me in a couple minutes, I would have had time to finish the
picture

.

)

From this and other samples with children and adolescents, Hurlburt (2011) and
colleagues (Akhter, 2008) concluded that inner seeing may be a gradually acquired skill. That is,
children may take many minutes to construct an image
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(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a, p. viii) until they become more skilled at having this type of inner
experience

ry is the same as adults (e.g.,

Wimmer et al. (2015) concluded that children as young as age four can generate and maintain
-

and basic science has made little or no effort to

further evaluate that assumption. The question at hand is whether these (arguably) high fidelity
descriptions of Jessica and Jimmy have something to offer to clinical psychology and
psychotherapy. The present study intends to begin answering that question.
We see at least four reasons why the phenomena of pristine inner experience,
apprehended in high fidelity, may be of value to clinical psychology and psychotherapy. First,
these experiences challenge theoretical assumptions that may lead to important insights and
ultimately, more accurate theoretical models. Psychologists ought to heed the constraint
judge others by yourself
the world in the same way adults do. DES sampling with children and adolescents suggests
organized inner experiences (specifically, inner seeing and the experience of emotion) may be
gradually-acquired skills (Akhter, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a; Hurlburt, 2011). Hypotheses

color or black-and-

and so on (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 136).

Second, knowledge of pristine inner experience may help identify which clients would be
expected to have better outcomes in certain treatment paradigms. For instance, if a mature
science of psychology were
that answer might help determine which clients would be best-suited for a
guided imagery protocol, that is, those who have reached the typical developmental age for
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imagery. Knowledge of pristine inner experience may even explain why techniques like emotive
imagery (e.g., in which a child imagines him or herself in a feared scene but with the support of a
favorite superhero: Cornwall, Spence, & Schotte, 1996) have not been effective for the treatment
of nightmares in children younger than six-years-old (Ducasse & Dennis, 2015). Additionally, if
psychotherapists knew the characteristic pristine inner experience of their individual clients, they
might select guided imagery as a treatment for those with frequent imagery but not for those with
no, little, or unclear imagery just as they might select self-instructional training (Meichenbaum &
Goodman, 1971) as a treatment for those with frequent self-talk but not for those with little or no
self-talk experiences.
Third, knowledge of pristine inner experience may help explain the etiology of certain
disorders. For instance,

about the etiological impact

of pristine inner experience in BN. His speculation goes as follows: the experience of fragmented
multiplicity leads to nausea (perhaps by upsetting the circuitry of the inner ear, for example) and
individuals with fragmentedly multiple experience come to engage in bulimic behaviors (like
self-induced vomiting) during which they learn they can
providing momentary peace. He offers the following narrative:
Suppose that teenaged Bonnie learns that inducing vomiting eases her nausea, leaves her

feeling and lack of fragmentation; all she needs to have discovered (perhaps by accidental
observation, as in illness) is that vomiting leads to an inner peace that lasts for a while. So
Bonnie starts to induce vomiting

how to do it, when to do it, how to hide it, who to tell
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and not tell about it, how to lie about it, and so on. That is, she learns the bulimic
behaviors (Hurlburt, 2011, p. 41)
Thus, rather than BN maintaining as a result of preoccupation with weight and shape (as the
eating disorder literature suggests: Fairburn & Cooper, 2014), individuals with fragmentedly
multiple inner experience are predisposed to feeling nauseous that they then learn to relieve
through bulimic behaviors like self-induced vomiting. Because Bonnie presumes that everyone
r experience is just like her own, she has no way of recognizing that her inner
experience may be contributing to her vomiting and so, she accepts that she must be preoccupied
with weight and shape

a reasonable explanation for why someone would self-induce vomiting

(Hurlburt, 2011).
fundamentally different from her own; instead, she assumes that other (non-bulimic) people must
be less preoccupied with weight and shape. It is important to note that Hurlburt (2011) was in no
way wedded to this theory. That is, he did not offer the theory to suggest what eating disorder
theorists ought to believe but rather, as an illustration of how high fidelity descriptions of pristine
inner experience may prove valuable to a mature science of eating disorders.
Herein lies a fourth reason why the phenomena of inner experience may be of value to
psychotherapy: The phenomena of inner experience can become important targets in treatment.
For instance, Enhanced CBT (CBT-E) for the treatment of eating disorders (Fairburn & Cooper,
2014; Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003) targets the following aspects of BN: extreme attempts
to restrict eating; over-evaluation of shape and weight; and tendency to eat in response to adverse
events and negative moods. Relevant targets are identified for each client in part by employing
what
thoughts, feelings, a

-theThou
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are capturing ongoing, in-the-moment inner experience, their method fails to genuinely submit to
the constraints of such an exploration. First, clients are not taught to identify precise moments
(Hurlburt, 2011); instead, they are given the instructions
soon as possible

ritten down as

Fairburn & Cooper, 2014, p. 684). One-time instructions are rarely sufficient

(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015) and

hat will likely

result in great variation in response times (Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009), including the
potential for substantial retrospection (Hazard #1: Heavey et al., 2010). Second, clients are not
taught how to apprehend experiences in those evanescent moments through iterative training
(Hazard #10: Heavey et al., 2010). Thus, the

(Fairburn & Cooper,

2014, p. 685) clients report surrounding behaviors like vomiting are not high fidelity glimpses at
pristine inner experience and are unlikely to reveal all potentially important phenomena.
Were CBT-E to involve a real-time self-monitoring method that genuinely submitted to
the constraints inherent in the exploration of inner experience, psychotherapists might find
phenomena like fragmentedly multiple inner experience to be widespread and influential in the
maintenance of BN. These uncovered phenomena may then become important targets in
treatment. For instance, treatment may involve use of DES or other methods to monitor the
frequency and function of fragmented multiplicity or may involve developing skills for coping
with fragmented multiplicity.
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the process of DES may be therapeutic in and of
itself. The more than four decades of DES sampling have, at times, involved: participants with
diagnoses of psychological disorders; participants in psychological distress; and/or participants
who were in or had been in psychotherapy. In several, perhaps many, of those cases, DES
sampling seemed to ha

For example, in the
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study mentioned before, all 24 of the women suffering from BN reported fragmentedly multiple
inner experience; however, none knew, prior to sampling, about this salient characteristic of their
own experience (Hurlburt, 2011; Jones-Forrester, 2009). By the end of sampling, each of the
women came to believe that fragmented multiplicity was indeed a prominent characteristic of her
experience and professed that this new understanding explained many of her daily living
characteristics and difficulties, and most held that that understanding had therapeutic benefit
(Jones-Forrester, 2009).
Though the therapeutic utility of DES has never been systematically studied, Turner
(2015) took a step in that direction in
experience of participating in DES. He found that, of the 12 participants, 50% reported a
substantial decrease in self-reported psychological symptoms with a moderate effect size (d =
0.61) following only five days of DES sampling.
purpose is not explicitly therapeutic; the purpose of DES is always to describe pristine inner
experience in high fidelity. How that fidelity-description proces
psychological improvement is not known and would require additional research.
Amy is one example of a participant in psychological distress who seemed to improve
after DES (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006, pp. 13-30. Amy was a 22-year-old student who had
sought therapy from her university counseling center to help her deal with what she described as
a compulsion to lie. Amy believed she lied all the time and could not keep herself from telling
untruths. Furthermore, she often did
her. Additionally, Amy believed she worried obsessively about lying, a belief that was confirmed
by her scores on the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989).
Amy was
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interest in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Amy experienced much more difficulty with
the sampling task than do most participants; specifically, she struggled to understand the
distinction between ongoing-at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience and experience before or

presented with little confidence; as the days wore on, it became increasingly unlikely that this
was merely a result of not understanding the sampling instructions.

hat
moment the beep actually took place. Her reports were much more definite and non(p. 18). Whereas her earlier reports had been predominantly about thoughts, she
began to report more feelings and bodily sensations with relative clarity. After the day five
ES reports continued to be
feels clearer, both in the sampling task and in general. Furthermore, she feels better about herself
2006a, p. 21
seemed to have improved; she reported that she still lied sometimes but was now aware of when
she was lying.

to have experience (it was nonexistent before); (2) she had finally begun to acquire the skill of
observing her experience; (3) her inner experience itself had undergone some transformation so
that it was now easier to report; (4) she had finally learned how to report experience that had

Hurlburt and Heavey (2006) argued that explanation (5) was unlikely given that there is no
reason to believe Amy would know how to sound clear and that such a sudden shift on day five
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would be unusual for someone who was merely motivated to sound clear. Amy favored
explanation (3); she reported that it seemed the experiences themselves had become clearer, not
just that her way of apprehending or reporting experience had become clearer. Hurlburt and
Heavey (2006) conceded that they could not know which explanation was best but, regardless,
some
from

eculated that the

sampling task
more accurately observing herself and others as well as the details of actual experience.
As further evidence of the therapeutic benefit of DES, Hurlburt has described Fran, a
woman with borderline personality disorder who partook in DES sampling (Hurlburt, 1993;
Hurlburt, 1997; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2

nner experience was frequently of

multiple visual images (sometimes as many as ten) occurring simultaneously in a physical

could last as long as hours or days nonstop without interruption, which is highly unusual (images
in healthy participants typically only last a moment). Notably, Fran had no figure-ground
phenomenon in either her inner image perception or her external perception. That is, she could
take in an entire scene without focusing on any of its aspects. This was corroborated by informal
-vase picture did not alternate) and external
observation (Fran had three TVs in her living room that she watched simultaneously

not one

after another but all at the same time; she was shocked to learn others were unable to do the
same). For an account of the idiographic validity of these descriptions, see Hurlburt (1997).
Like Amy, Fran seemed to experience a therapeutic-like breakthrough as the result of
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remarkable improvement in her borderline symptoms: her exterior disorganization and chaotic
). Her samples after this improvement were now much
less complex and even included the experience of figure-ground phenomenon. This was reflected
in her external behavior as well; For instance, Fran found she could no longer simultaneously
watch three TVs

(Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, p. 35).

ten seems to

impart some benefit: nearly all report enjoying the procedure; most report learning a great deal
about who they are; and still others express becoming more attuned to their inner experience
both as it occurs and in how they share it with others (e.g., how they answer the question

Current Study
Psychology has largely ignored the careful and systematic description of ongoing-at-amoment inner experience, opting instead for an assumed understanding of what inner experience
is. Clinical psychologists and psychotherapists regularly dive into the waters of inner experience
without much knowledge of the actual phenomena in which they will be swimming. The present
study intends to provide preliminary knowledge of those phenomena by using descriptive
experience sampling (DES) to survey the waterfront of pristine inner experience in a small
sample of individuals seeking psychotherapy services.
The study of inner experience faces substantial methodological hazards, and while other
experience sampling methods have been used to study the experience of individuals with
psychological disorders, none is aimed at high fidelity descriptions of experience. DES was
chosen because it is a method which genuinely submits to the constraints inherent in the
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exploration of inner experience (Hurlburt, 2011). Additionally, DES is fundamentally suited to
study pristine inner experience

the thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so on which are directly

apprehendable before the footlights of consciousness and unspoiled by the act of observation or
reflection (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011).
From more than four decades of DES sampling across a wide range of individuals, there
is reason to believe pristine inner experience may be a valuable element for understanding
psychological disorders and psychological distress in general. The primary aim of this study is to
honor that value

to understand the inner experience of a handful of individuals in psychological

distress. Further, there is tentative evidence to suggest DES itself may impart therapeutic benefit
to participants, and the current study further explores that possibility. Six participants were
recruited from a community-based mental health clinic where they were all seeking
psychotherapy services. Each participant was asked to complete eight days of DES sampling,
though the option to forego or prolong sampling was ultimately a collaborative decision made by
the participant and DES investigators.
The current study had no specific hypotheses; the aim was simply to describe in high
fidelity the inner experience of a few individuals who were seeking psychological services. As
such, DES investigators remained blind to the participants

and/or presenting problems

until the cessation of sampling. When sampling was finished, DES investigators were made
aware of each
consent, were allowed

-report outcome measure results which

allowed for additional comparisons between any characteristics discovered by DES and
changes/outcomes in the therapeutic process. If the participant allowed, DES investigators also
had

psychotherapist to discuss diagnostic impressions, the
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psychotherapy that
discovered by DES. The DES investigators also shared with the therapist what was discovered

Ultimately, the present study results in six idiographic characterizations of pristine inner
experience apprehended in high fidelity. These characterizations include descriptions of the

characteristics of those phenomena as well as examples. Thanks to the virtue of random and
repeated sampling, we were also able to derive estimates of the frequency of salient phenomena
for each individual participant. Finally, within eac

characterizations, we integrated

relevant information from his or her
impressions of the
-reported understanding of their experience before and
after sampling (as measured by the NIEQ). We also considered themes that emerged across
participants; for example, half of the present participants had anomalous inner seeings, highly
unusual experiences that may be indicative of mental disorder; and, as another example, despite
mostly presenting to therapy for emotional distress, our parti
that they experienced feelings infrequently, a finding with important implications for the choice
of therapeutic emphasis/intervention.
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Chapter 3: Method
Phase I: Recruitment
Participants
The present study, which is part of a larger study with the same aim, recruited
participants from the The PRACTICE, a community-based mental health clinic located at the
University of Nevada Las Vegas. The targeted sample size was six participants. Participants
were not compensated for their participation.
Inclusionary criteria. Participants were eligible to participate in the current study if they
were 18 or older and were eligible for and seeking psychotherapy services at The PRACTICE.
Exclusionary criteria. Though there are no psychological conditions that should
necessarily be excluded from DES sampling, we followed the exclusionary criteria used by The
PRACTICE. Clients are not accepted for treatment at The PRACTICE if they: (1) have a current
eating disorder severe enough to require immediate medical monitoring; (2) are actively
engaging in substance or alcohol abuse; (3) are currently experiencing psychotic symptoms; or
(4) are at imminent risk of harm to themselves or others. Screening for exclusionary criteria was
conducted by The PRACTICE staff during the intake process.
Procedure
All study procedures were approved by the University of Nevada Las Vegas institutional
review board.
During their initial intake process, all adult clients were given a consent form, asking
whether or not they consent to be contacted by a DES researcher regarding the present study.
Clients who consented were approached by a DES researcher and informed of the study either
(1) in-person at their follow-up intake meeting or (2) over the phone. The DES researcher
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described the study briefly (2-5 minutes) and, if the client expressed potential interest in
participating, an instruction meeting was scheduled. Even at this early stage of recruitment,
participants were informed that their participation was fully optional, that they were only ever
agreeing to the next step in the process

in this case, the instruction meeting.

Phase II: Consent and Instruction Meeting
Participants
For the entire study (recall, the present study is part of a larger study with the same aim),
20 participants (14 women, 5 men, 1 gender-fluid) participated in the consent and instruction
meeting.
Procedure
During this meeting, which was conducted with each participant individually, the DES
investigator showed the participant to the DES lab (often walking him or her there from another
agreed-upon location) where future interviews would be conducted. There, the investigator fully
and forthrightly described the details of the study, including potential risks and benefits.
Consent. The investigator explained that consenting to participate in the study included
allowing the DES investigators to access his or her diagnosis and outcome tracking results
collected by The PRACTICE upon completion of sampling. Participants were also asked to
provide consent to videotape expositional interviews, though this was optional and other
arrangements (e.g., audio-recording) could be made. Finally, participants were informed that, at
the conclusion of the study, they would be asked whether the DES investigators could meet with
their therapist from The PRACTICE to discuss
to the therapist regarding

therapy and to provide feedback

DES findings. Acknowledging that participants were

unable to know whether they would be comfortable sharing the details of their sampling (which
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had not yet occurred) or their therapy (which was likely just beginning), they were not asked to
provide consent at the instruction meeting but rather, were told that this discussion would come
again at the end of sampling.
All potential participants were assured that their information would be kept confidential
and that participation in any part of the study would be entirely optional and would have no
effect on their services at The PRACTICE. DES is a fundamentally collaborative procedure in
which the participant is considered a co-investigator (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a) who is free to
discontinue the procedure at any time; thus, consent was described as a living, evolving part of
the DES process to be discussed anew at each expositional interview.
DES instruction. Those who agreed to participate were provided the usual DES beeper.
The DES investigator
The investigator also described and answered questions about the logistics of the beeper: how to
turn it on and off, how to respond to a beep, how to adjust the volume, how to apply the
-saving mode that initiates when participants
fail to respond to the beep after an extended period of time), and so on. The investigator
instructed participants to wear the beeper within 24 hours of the scheduled expositional interview
and to wear the beeper until having collected six beeps (approximately 3 hours). The investigator
reiterated the aim of DES: to describe in high fidelity inner experience as it naturally occurs the
).
As is typical for DES studies, the investigator e

rticipants had
other questions, the investigator answered those questions to the best of her ability and reminded
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participants that the vast majority of DES participants are not skillful at the task on their first one
or two (or more) sampling days, but that skill can be (though is not always) built through
iterations of the task. DES recognizes that one-shot instructional meetings will always fall short,
therefore, this meeting was considered the first of an ongoing conversation about experience,
generally, and DES, specifically.
Measures
Demographics form. The demographics form was created for this study and included the
following information: age, gender, marital status, highest level of education, work status (fulltime, part-time, or unemployment), and type of psychotherapy received at The PRACTICE
(individual psychotherapy, group psychotherapy, no therapy).
Nevada inner experience questionnaire (NIEQ). The NIEQ (Heavey, Moynihan,
Brouwers, Lapping-Carr, Krumm, Kelsey, Turner, & Hurlburt, 2019) is a self-report
questionnaire designed to measure the extent to which a person believes that each of the five
frequent phenomena of inner experience (5FP; Kühn, Fernyhough, Alderson-Day, & Hurlburt,
2014) are features of his or her inner own inner experience and of the general inner experience of
others. The 5FP are the phenomena that have been identified by DES investigations as frequently
occurring aspects of inner experience: inner speaking, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking,
sensory awareness, and feelings (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). The NIEQ is a 10-item set of
visual-analog scales with one pair of items (a Frequently and a Generally item) for each of the
5FP. The Frequently

0 (Never) to

100 (Always) whereas the Generally
rated on a scale from 0 (None) to 100 (All). Ratings for each item pair are averaged to produce
subscale scores for the frequencies of each of the 5FP. The NIEQ has demonstrated sound factor
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structure for all five scales and concurrent validity for the inner speaking subscale (Heavey et al.,
2019).
Phase III: Sampling
Participants
For the entire study (recall the present study is part of a larger study with the same aim),
20 participants (14 women, 5 men, 1 gender-fluid) engaged in at least one day of DES sampling.
Of those 20, six (4 women, 2 men) dropped out prematurely. Nine (7 women, 2 men) of those 20
were participants for the present study. Three (2 women, 1 man) of the

nine

participants dropped out prematurely due to busy schedules (one after his first day of sampling,
one after her second day of sampling, and the other after her third day of sampling).
One participant dropped out after her fourth day of sampling due to concerns about her
mental health and a desire to prioritize seeking psychiatric treatment over any other outside
engagements. However, this participant (Emma; See Chapter 7; all names are pseudonyms) is
still included in the analysis because we obtained a usable number of samples (18) and because
there were clear and striking characteristics of her inner experience that had emerged during
those four sampling days. Another participant (Ingrid; See Chapter 10) ended participation after
five days of sampling; her results are also included in the analysis because we obtained a usable
number of samples (21) and because we agreed we had reached a point of diminishing returns
with respect to understanding her inner experience.
Materials
Beeper. Participants were

eper typically used in DES

studies (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a). The beeper delivers a 700 Hz tone (beep) at uniformly
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distributed random intervals (mean = 30 minutes) through an earphone. The beep cues
participants to attend to their current ongoing experience.
Notebook. Participants were

-bound notebook in which to jot down

notes regarding each experience.
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete eight days of natural environment DES sampling,
days was reviewed and reconsidered at each sampling day. The
extended if all parties were in agreement.
Participants followed the standard DES sampling procedures described more completely
above and elsewhere (Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006a). Participants were instructed
to wear the beeper while going about everyday activities until they collected six beeps, or
samples. When the beeper sounded, participants were
undisturbed

before the onset of the beep

that

and to jot down any notes regarding that experience in
the provided notebooks (or on their phones or whatever).
Within 24 hours of collecting the six beeps, the participant met with between two and
five DES investigators (one of whom was a seasoned DES researcher and licensed clinical
psychologist; another was the present author) for an expositional interview. All expositional
interviews were video recorded. The expositional interview aimed to describe in high fidelity
guided by the open-beginninged prompt:

disambiguating questions. An open-ended

X; tell me
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about how X

-beginninged

interested in your experience, whatever that experience might be (including nothing); tell me
about your experience in as complete detail as possible. As is typical in DES studies,
participants were informed they could decline to respond to any beep for any reason.
DES is a necessarily iterative procedure, and, thus, the expositional interview also aimed

clarifying language, reducing ambiguities, bracketing presuppositions, cleaving to experience (as
opposed to impressions, generalities, etc.), and so on. Because participants were learning a new
skill, the first day of interviews was considered an opportunity for training rather than for data
collection and (as is usual in DES studies), any samples discussed on the first day were discarded
from analysis.
Within 24 hours of each expositional interview, one of the DES investigators (A.
Krumm) wrote
These descriptions were circulated to all other investigators present at the interview for trackedchanges editing, commentary, disagreement, etc. When necessary, investigators returned to the
videotape of the interview for review, clarification, and discussion. Consensus was not valued;
differences of opinion were
(Hurlburt, 2017). This natural-environment-sampling followed by expositional-interview
followed by contemporaneous-description-writing was typically repeated seven more times for a
total of, on average, eight natural-environment sampling days for each participant.
Upon completion of sampling, participants were debriefed and encouraged to ask any
questions they have about the task, their experience, or anything else. DES investigators
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acknowledged that they had asked participants to be honest and forthright throughout sampling
and agreed to extend the same courtesy if participants had any questions for them.
Phase IV: Characterization
Participants
We included any participants for whom we obtained a usable number of samples
(approximately 4 days of sampling), resulting in a total of six participants for the present study.
Five of six (83.3%) participants were women. The sample was ethnically diverse: Two (33.3%)
self-identified as Hispanic/Latino, one (16.7%) as Filipino, and three (50.0%) as Caucasian. The
mean age of participants was 30.67 (SD = 20.0); however, excluding one participant, Ingrid, who
was an older adult, the group was much more homogeneous with respect to age (M = 22.6, SD =
3.51). We anticipated obtaining 42 (6 per day for days 2-8, discarding day 1 data as training)
usable samples of experience for each of the six anticipated participants (42×6 = 252 total usable
samples). Participants collected on average 31.8 samples each (SD = 10.0, min = 18, max = 41)
for a grand total of 191 useable samples.
Measures
Depression, anxiety, stress scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS
is a 21-item self-report measure comprised of three scales
with seven items for each scale.

depression, anxiety, and stress
over the past week and are rated

on a scale from 0 (Never) to 3 (Applied to me very much or most of the time). Raw scores are
multiplied by two to calculate the final score; therefore, scale scores range from 0 to 42. The
DASS-21 is intended for use in clinical settings to help clarify the locus of emotional disturbance
and the severity of symptoms. Among clinical samples, the DASS has demonstrated good
reliability and factor structure and moderate sensitivity to change (Page, Hooke, & Morrison,
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2007) as well as ability to distinguish between anxiety and mood disordered respondents (Brown,
Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). Clients at The PRACTICE (including the present
participants) routinely complete the DASS roughly every four therapy sessions. It is
administered on a computer and takes roughly five or 10 minutes to complete.
Outcome rating scale (ORS; Miller, Duncan, Brown, Sparks, & Claud, 2003). The
ORS is an ultra-brief
outcome in clinical settings, specifically, in psychotherapy. The ORS consists of four visual
analogue scales assessing different domains of functioning: Overall (general sense of wellbeing), Individually (personal well-being), Interpersonally (family, close relationships), and
Socially (work, school, friendships). It has demonstrated good reliability and feasibility (Miller
et al., 2003) and clinical utility as compared to longer, more established measures (Campbell &
Hemsley, 2009). Clients at The PRACTICE (including the present participants) routinely
complete the ORS before each therapy session. It takes less than one minute to complete.
Session rating scale (SRS; Duncan, Miller, Sparks, Claud, Reynolds, Brown, &
Johnson, 2003). The SRS is an ultra-brief measure intended to measure the working alliance in
psychotherapy. It consists of four visual analogue scales assessing different domains of the
alliance: Relationship (feeling heard, understood, and respected), Goals and topics (working on

y,
concurrent validity, and feasibility (Duncan et al., 2003) as well as clinical utility as compared to
longer, more established measures (Campbell & Hemsley, 2009). Clients at The PRACTICE
(including the present participants) routinely complete the SRS at the end of each therapy
session. It takes less than one minute to complete.
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Procedure
Sample review.
been

had
met to review each individual sample of experience

and identify what idiographic phenomena, if any, were present for each. The data of interest at
this meeting were the experiences themselves, not the descriptions of the experiences.
Investigators reminded each other to consider the experience as they remembered it from the
interview and as they saw it reflected in the description but not simply to look for phenomena
spelled out in the description. DES recognizes that descriptions, while they can be high fidelity,
are not the experiences themselves. Descriptions are useful in that they point to the experience
but are imperfect alone

reliant on language and subject to misinterpretation.

In addition to identifying the idiographic experiential phenomena, investigators noted any
other relevant findings or themes (for example, if experience seemed to differ appreciably after a
certain day, if or how participants seemed to have difficulty with the task, and so on). Any
discrepancies in understanding were addressed, occasionally by returning to the videotape of the
interview. Investigators aimed for a shared understanding of experience at each moment but,
when this was not possible, the disagreement was explicitly reflected in the review.
Independent characterizations. Within 24 hours of the sample review, each
investigator independently wrote a brief informal characterization of the

idiographic

inner experience and then circulated his or her characterization to the other investigators. The
investigators independently compared these informal characterizations, and major discrepancies
and/or ambiguities were discussed, returning to the sample descriptions or videotape as needed.
The present author then reviewed and consolidated each of these characterizations to produce a
combined characterization of salient idiographic characteristics. This characterization typically
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included a table that helped highlight the idiographic characteristics that all investigators noted
(and the various ways different investigators described or emphasized them) as well as those
characteristics that only one or a minority of investigators noticed (which helped to ensure that
none were missed).
Therapist meeting. When participants completed sampling, we asked their consent to
meet with their therapists at The PRACTICE. Note that (1) one participant had never
matriculated as client at The PRACTICE and (2) another participant was only in therapy for a
very brief time. In those cases, we asked to meet with (1) the clinician who conducted the intake
interview and (2) her previous therapist. We ensured participants that the meeting would not
affect their standing at The PRACTICE and that it was not an evaluation of them as a participant
nor of the skill of their therapist or the quality of psychotherapy. Our goal remained as it had

inner experience and, if we could learn something more from his or her therapist, we wanted to
do that. All participants consented to allow this meeting; one participant requested to speak with
her therapist before we met with him and asked her therapist not to discuss a particular day of
therapy (we do not know the nature of this sensitivity). We fully accepted and encouraged her to
do so.
Therapists were approached by the present author and the purpose and nature of the
meeting was briefly described. More detailed information was provided in a formal consent
form. All therapists consented to participate. The meeting did not follow a script or agenda; all
meetings included the present author and RTH. We typically began by describing DES, the
purpose of the study, and the purpose of the meeting. We reiterated our goal: to learn something
that the meeting was not
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intended to be an evaluation of his or her therapy or of him or her as a therapist. In no particular
order, all parties shared their impressions of the participant

DES investigators shared salient

characteristics of the participan
diagnoses, symptoms, progress, treatment goals, and so on. The meeting was conversational in
nature; both parties were welcomed and encouraged to ask each other questions, to clarify
perceived misunderstandings, and to share freely anything they thought might be relevant.

experience. For example, if we learned that a participant was diagnosed with bulimia nervosa,

characteristics of experience that had previously been discovered by DES as highly salient for
individuals with bulimia. Thus, information from the therapist meeting became integrated into
the rest of the characterization procedure.
DASS,
ORS, and SRS data for the time span during which the participant was engaged in DES
sampling.
Coding. Using the combined characterizations table and any other useful information
(e.g., from the therapist meeting) as a guide, the present author created an Excel file that
contained as columns all relevant idiographic phenomena/characteristics that had been identified
in the sample review and independent characterizations. Each sampled experience was entered in
its own row in the Excel file. The present author circulated a blank Excel file that followed this
pattern of rows and columns to all investigators who had been involved in that
sampling. Each investigator independently entered a coding in each cell of the Excel file
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expressing whether the sample contained the idiographic feature. The coding scheme to be used

independently by referring to
memory, the written descriptions of experience, or returning to video if necessary.
Note that, though the coding process was fundamentally reliant on 1s and 0s, the numbers
were not particularly important and were certainly not the most important thing. The most
important thing was always the experiences themselves; therefore, coding was useful to the
extent that it meaningfully helped explain or elaborate the experiences. Moreover, the coding
process was fundamentally categorical (indeed, the columns on the Excel file were treated like
categories), but inner experience is not neatly categorical, therefore, the columns were useful
only to the extent that they meaningfully characterized a type of phenomenon or salient
characteristic. We occasionally discovered in the process of coding that it was not at all virtuous

-evolving;
categories were abandoned or added as was useful.
Rectification. When all investigators had completed their independent codings, they
returned the completed Excel files to one of the investigators (either the present author or RTH),
who then created a rectification file

disagreement between coders. Then all

involved investigators met for what we called the rectification meeting. During this meeting,
investigators reviewed each sample where a disagreement in coding had occurred. These
discussions invited investigators to defend their thinking (e.g., Why did you rate a 0.5 instead of
a 1? What about this experience led you to that conclusion?). Thus, the rectification discussion
was a valuable step in the process of clarification and the solidification of themes. As with
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coding, the numbers were not the most important thing; the most important things were the
experiences themselves and we were mindful not to become too invested in the descriptions or
categories but to continually point back to the experiences themselves. Often, investigators were
convinced by

thinking or realized they had been mistaken or were reminded of some

detail of the experience they had forgotten or distorted. However, consensus was not always
reached so easily. Lack of consensus was considered informative of the experience itself and was
characterizations.
Characterizations. The final step of the characterization process was to write a detailed
profile, or sketch

er experience. DES aims for
-occurring (as opposed to laboratory-

based) experiences, by randomly selecting moments of interest, and by repeating the procedure
multiple times across different days to improve skill and obtain an adequately sized catalog of
experiences. These characterizations
lived inner experience by describing and providing examples of salient phenomena, themes, and
other findings, as well as approximate frequency estimates whenever possible. The
characterizations focused predominantly on directly-apprehended inner experience but also
integrated relevant information gained in interactio
participants themselves when that information added value to the understanding of the
.
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Chapter 4: Results by Participant
Summary of Participants
Table 1 shows a summary of all participants, including: age, total number of DES
samples collected, presenting problem(s) for therapy, and scores on the DASS (the therapy
intake measure of depression, anxiety, and stress). Participants are presented in order of their
entry into the participant pool such that Sophia was the first participant to begin this study,
Daniel the second, Emma the third, and so on.

Table 1
Summary of Participants

-21 Raw Scores (and

Percentiles)
Agea

Samps. (Days)b

Presenting Problem(s)

DASSc-Dd

Severity

DASS-Ae

Severity

DASS-Sf

Severityg

Sophia

21-29

38 (8)

N/A due to early
termination

22 (95h)

Sev.

28 (>99)

Ext. Sev.

40 (>99)

Ext. Sev.

Daniel

21-29

33 (8)

Stress related to family

14 (88)

Mod.

6 (81)

Norm.

16 (83)

Mild

Emma

18-20

18 (4)

Anxiety, emotion
disturbance

22 (95)

Sev.

20 (97)

Ext. Sev.

32 (97)

Sev.

Laura

21-29

40 (8)

Generalized anxiety

6 (70)

Norm.

8 (89)

Norm.

12 (70)

Norm.

Maya

18-20

41 (8)

Bulimia nervosa

26 (97)

Sev.

20 (97)

Ext. Sev.

32 (97)

Sev.

Ingrid

60+

21 (5)

Depression, interpersonal
conflict

40 (>99)

Ext. Sev.

18 (96)

Sev.

22 (70)

Mod.

Mean

30.7

31.8 (6.8)

SD

20.0

10.0 (1.8)

Min

18 (4)

Max

41 (8)

a
b

Total number of DES samples, excluding day 1 samples as training (Number of days of DES
sampling)
c
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
d
DASS Depression subscale
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e

DASS Anxiety subscale
DASS Stress subscale
g
Severity levels from Lovibond & Lovibond (1995): Norm. = Normal; Mild = Mild; Sev. =
Severe; Ext. Sev. = Extremely Severe
h
N=
1,771) non-clinical sample [Similar normative data were not available for clinical populations]
f

Five Frequent Phenomena
Table 2 shows the frequency (percentage) of each of the five frequent phenomena (5FP)
broken down by participant.

Table 2
(Percentages) of the Five Frequent Phenomena
IS

ISee

U

F

SA

Sophia

30.3

0.0

10.5

19.7

19.7

Daniel

7.6

47.0

19.7

7.6

3.0

Emma

2.8

36.1

13.9

11.1

30.6

Laura

2.5

1.3

5.0

5.0

25.0

Maya

2.4

57.1

23.8

4.8

38.1

Ingrida

?

?

?

?

?

Mean (SD)

9.12 (12.04) 28.30 (26.31) 14.58 (7.42)

9.64 (6.17)

23.28 (13.23)

Min

2.4

0.0

5.0

4.8

3.0

Max

30.3

57.1

23.8

19.7

38.1

H & H (2008)b

26

34

22

26

22

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness.
a
Ingrid
P
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b

Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) overall frequencies from a stratified non-clinical sample (N = 16)
for comparison

A Note on Interpreting DES Results
The primary output of a DES investigation are the idiographic characterizations of
participants inner experiences. The six chapters that follow are the characterizations of the six
participants (all names are pseudonyms): Sophia (Chapter 5), Daniel (Chapter 6), Emma
(Chapter 7), Laura (Chapter 8), Maya (Chapter 9), and Ingrid (Chapter 10).
All individual samples are labeled by participant name, sampling day, sample within that
day, such that Sophia 5.1 refers to

first experience sample on her fifth sampling day.

Contained within those characterizations are some of the full descriptions of samples of
experience (the descriptions generated during the contemporaneous-description-writing portion
of the method). In all sample descriptions, anything that was not directly in experience (context,
commentary, etc.) is in square
When relevant t

characterizations may refer to the five

frequent phenomena and their abbreviations are as follows: inner speaking (IS), inner seeing
(ISee), feelings (F), sensory awareness (SA), and unsymbolized thinking (U).
The reader will notice that DES idiographic characterizations include some nomothetic
categorization, for example, focusing on the 5FP or grouping phenomena thought to be relevant
to a particular disorder. However, the spirit of DES is fundamentally aimed at idiographic
description, not nomothetic categorization, and thus, categories are used sparingly and somewhat
begrudgingly. Categories can be useful; for example,
housing emotional experiences. H

be a useful category for
necessarily
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hold shared experiential phenomena across participants; for example, some participants
experience feelings primarily bodily (e.g., in the heart) whereas others experience feelings as
.
Moreover, categories may actually be destructive to the apprehension
inner experience by

perientially messy. There is a strong

urge in science to clean things up, for example, by using objective definitions and coming to
definitive conclusions. In DES, we resist that urge as much as possible and to the extent
necessary. We explicitly keep thin

(Hurlburt, 2017) throughout the process. For

example, in interviews, we are pleased with and encourage the
equally pleased to arrive at a phenomenon
more than just

diligently to keep that ignorance and/or disagreement alive throughout the entire process,
including in the written descriptions, and if never resolved, in the final characterizations.
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Chapter 5: Sophia
Background
Sophia is a Hispanic female. At the time of her participation in the study, she was a
young adult (20-29 years old), had just

-

time.
Sophia
presented to the clinic, she completed a self-report questionnaire of depression, anxiety, and
stress symptoms. Her scores indicated severe depression, extremely severe anxiety, and
extremely severe stress.
She completed eight days of natural-environment DES sampling spanning approximately
g all day 1 beeps as
training (7 days × approximately 6 beeps per day = 38 total beeps).
Upon completion of her sampling, Sophia gave us permission to have a conversation with
her therapist, during which we discussed Sophia

ience as

discovered by DES. The therapist reported that Sophia had attended two sessions of individual
psychotherapy during the early part of our sampling. After those two sessions, she requested to
transfer to a different therapist but then, in the interim, called to say she was no longer in need of
services. Because she was in treatment for so short a time, Sophia
presenting problem(s) were not yet defined, nor was she ascribed a diagnosis.
Difficulty apprehending experience
Sophia evidenced some difficulty in apprehending her experience early in sampling
(specifically days 2 and 3), occasionally providing impoverished metaphors of experience
instead of straightforward experiential descriptions. For example, at 3.3, Sophia was late for a
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meeting and was hurriedly looking through a PowerPoint presentation trying to find a particular
slide that she would need for the meeting. She was feeling rushed and, when asked what, exactly,
she felt, she answered with phraseology that sounded like metaphor
for an important meeting

that it was like being late

but yet was not illuminating in the way metaphors can be. Here is an

excerpt from the interview for 3.3:

SOPHIA: Yes. Yeah,
RTH: And do you feel frustrated as well? Or are you just frus, frustratedly scrolling
through?
SOPHIA
exactly how frustrated [inaudible] omigod I have to go. [Inaudible] not going to be
here. That kind of feeling.
RTH: And understand

or know that I
how that feels?

SOPHIA

find someone that always has to talk and they just, like, they just keep talking and you
feel really bad because you really, really do have to go. Like that thing that I have to get
out. That kind of feeling.
[This gives the appearance of a metaphor, where the experience is I feel late for a
meeting because I am looking for a slide and the metaphor is I feel late for a
meeting because someone who talks a lot is talking to me. The distance between
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the experience and the metaphor is quite small and the metaphor provides
essentially no further insight into the experience itself.]
RTH: So, the, the problem is

the

what makes this a difficult thing is that the way I

would experience that situation might not be at all the same as you would. So, it

it

it

Trek. You a S
[RTH employed a metaphor of his own to help Sophia understand our interest in
the phenomenon, the feeling. His intention was to be careful to confront Sophia
uninformative metaphor (not simply accepting it as an adequate description of
experience) while also remaining sensitive to Sophia
experience and budding skill at the sampling task.]
SOPHIA

was

he was [to AK], y-you know who Mr. Spock was?

RTH: He - he was a ple

what

people told him, so he could be in that situation and have absolutely no, none of the same,
so you ca

tell

[This is RT
own metaphor, that is, of modeling the behavior he wanted from Sophia.]
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tell me to the

SOPHIA

like the feeling that I get when I really really am like,
e to, like, and you just run into

you [RTH1] feel late, and RTH has said

Sophia
tha

-feeling might be very different from Sophia

feeling. Sophia
ng to describe her
feelings. However, Sophia response here provides no insight into the characteristics of her
late-feeling; it is a tautology: I feel late the way I feel late; she provided no further description.
Most DES participants who feel rushed are able to describe something about the phenomenon
heart beating fast, or shortness of breath, or jumpy mind, or whatever. Sophia was never fully
able to do so, even though she did maintain that the rushed feeling was predominantly bodily.
Thus, it was never clear in the interview whether Sophia felt rushed (in direct experience) at the
moment of the beep or was merely in a state of being rushed (not in experience) at the moment
of the beep.
We suspect that these impoverished metaphors early in sampling were a reflection of
Sophia
speculate that Sophia had unclear or no experience at the moment of 3.3, and therefore it was

tion is not important here.

1
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difficult to provide an informative metaphor to describe the experience (or lack thereof). An
alternative speculation is that Sophia
difficult (or perhaps impossible) for her to clearly apprehend and distinguish all that was in the
jumble. Thus, she was unable to provide clear description or effective metaphor to characterize
with granularity of all that is going on.
Sophia
3, she was consistently able to provide clear descriptions of her experience mostly without
reliance on metaphors. When she did use metaphors, they were quite skillful and informative of
her experience. For example, at 8.1, Sophia used the metaphor of a weight (the plate of a barbell)
in her chest as a metaphor to describe her feeling of overwhelmingness. We understood the
barbell-weight metaphor to be an illuminating, useful, informative metaphor for her
experience

she actually felt heaviness under the surface of her chest, something (like a barbell-

weight) in the way of her ability to breathe deeply.
We speculate that Sophia
therefore leading her to become more able to describe her experience and less reliant on
uninformative metaphors. That is, we speculate that, early in sampling, Sophia had either no or
jumbled experience and therefore had difficulty describing experience; as the result of repeated
sampling and the effort at describing, Sophia

more

organized and simplified. This reduction in granularity would conceivably make it easier for her
to describe her experience in descriptive detail as opposed to abstractions and metaphors.
Indeed, Sophia

improve. For

had just received an exciting email telling her that she was invited to interview with a graduate
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program.] In her experience were multiple [more than one, less than one-hundred, but the
number was not clearly specified in her experience] simultaneous sentences ongoing about this
interview. The sentences were not worded nor clearly articulated; however, she knew the general
idea of several of them, including things like How am I gonna afford this [graduate school]?
The multiple
simultaneous sentences were, to Sophia, overwhelming, and she felt overwhelmed (an emotional
experience) as well. She felt overwhelmed as heaviness and tightness in a palm-sized region in
the center and just under the surface of her upper chest. Heaviness and tightness were two
separate bodily sensations, though both aspects of the same feeling of overwhelmingness. [The
heaviness and tightness were likened to a barbell-weight (similar to day 3) in her chest that
impedes her breathing].
It is possible that, had the 8.1 experience occurred earlier in sampling (for example, day 2),
Sophia would have been unable to describe it in all its complexity and with all its separate
simultaneous phenomena. However, perhaps thanks to improved skill at apprehending her
occasionally-jumbled experience, Sophia is able to beautifully make difficult and careful
distinctions about this highly complex, multiple experience on day 8.
Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
38 experience samples.
Each characteristic will be discussed below.
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Table 3
Sophia Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience

Count1

IS

ISee

U

F

SA

SAb

Fb

Emo. w/o F

Doing F

Style

Eval.

11.5

0.0

4.0

7.5

7.5

4.5

5.5

9.0

6.5

8.0

6.5

0.0%

10.5%

19.7%

19.7%

11.8%

14.5%

23.7%

17.1%

21.1%

17.1%

Frequency2 30.3%

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness; SAb = SA bodily; Fb = F bodily; Emo. w/o F = Emotional state without
feeling; Doing F = Doing of intended feeling; Style = Matters of Adornment or Style;
Eval. = Self-evaluative
1
Number of samples containing that phenomenon (Recall that phenomena can be coded 0.5
when they are possibly but not confidently present)
2
Frequency = Number of samples containing phenomenon ÷ Total number of samples, expressed
as a percentage
Emotion
Feeling. Sophia experienced emotion (which DES calls feelings) relatively frequently
(7.5 of 38 total samples, or 19.7%). Most of Sophia
all feelings) had bodily characteristics.
Sophia

clear and straightforward. A comparison of samples

8.1, 8.3, and 8.5 offers a look from three different angles at Sophia
feelings. We believe these samples were relatively skillfully apprehended.
At 8.1 (described above), Sophia has just gotten good news about graduate school and
felt overwhelmed. In her experience she thought multiple (dozens) of simultaneous non-worded
thoughts about graduate school. She apprehended these multiple simultaneous wordless thoughts
as overwhelmingness. In addition, she felt heaviness and tightness in her chest which was also
part of the overwhelmed feeling. Thus, at 8.1, Sophia
clearly apprehended, and complex. She had a multi-phenomenon experience of feeling
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overwhelmed; there was the overwhelmingness of thoughts and the overwhelmingness in her
body.
At 8.3 (apparently some short time later), Sophia still felt overwhelmed about graduate
school. Similar to 8.1, she felt overwhelmed as heaviness and tightness in her chest. However,
unlike 8.3, she was also simultaneously innerly speaking with an extremely anxious tone of

there was no simultaneity of thought experience in 8.3. Thus, 8.1 and 8.3 are quite different
experiences, which Sophia
At 8.5, Sophia was trying to recall a comforting conversation she had had previously in
the hopes that it may calm the overwhelmingness she had been feeling. That is, Sophia was
attempting to manipulate her feelings by engaging in a specific act (trying to recall a
conversation). Her attempt appeared to be successful: at this moment, Sophia felt relieved
[apparently a re-experiencing of the relief this conversation originally brought her], which was in
part an absence2 of overwhelmingness (cf. 8.1 and 8.3), that is, the heaviness and tightness were
gone, as were the multiple thoughts. Separately and simultaneously in 8.5, Sophia felt the

The relief (absence of overwhelmingness) at beep 8.5 points to another difficulty in
characterizing Sophia
presence of a feeling as either entirely or including the absence of a feeling. In the interview, we
could not always tell whether there was a feeling present with its own characteristics (bodily,
mental, and so on) or only the absence of some specific feeling. For the purposes of
characterizing her experience, we grouped these absence-of-feeling experiences with feelings
broadly; however, this does not do justice to the important distinction between the two
phenomena. Indeed, feeling the presence of something vs. feeling the absence of something
seem to be two importantly different phenomena. Such a distinction should be of interest to the
psychology of emotion. Here are four more instances of the doing of intended feeling: in 6.1, she
was listening to an uplifting song because the message encourages her; at 2.4 she was mindfully
coloring to achieve calmness; and at 8.2 and 8.4, she was reading a book about anxiety to calm
her own anxiety.
2
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presence of something good, some comparative sense that the absence of these overwhelming
things felt good and/or relieving. DES calls the phenomenon of purposefully manipulating an
experience the doing of, here the doing of intended feeling. Sophia is intentionally recalling a
past conversation in the hopes of bringing about a feeling of relief or comfort. This kind of doing
of intended feeling was fairly common for Sophia (6.5 of 38 total samples, or 17.1% of all
samples, at 3.5 of 7.5 Feeling experiences, or 40% of all Feelings).
These three samples (8.1, 8.3, 8.5) reveal some of the salient characteristics of Sophia
feelings: they were frequently bodily; they could be of multiple simultaneous phenomena; her
experience of the same feeling word could differ dramatically; and she often deliberately
manipulated her experience of, particularly negative, feelings.
The frequency of feelings was consistent with Sophia
therapist noted that she was usually emotional and expressive in session and that she had
described herself as emotional throughout her life.
Emotion without feeling. Slightly more frequently (9 of 38 total samples, or 23.7%),
Sophia was in an emotional state

a specific emotion was ongoing

but she did not feel

anything. For example, at 6.4, Sophia was unable to find her hair pins and was innerly saying in

experience; in particular, she did not feel frustrated. Thus, at 6.4, Sophia was in a state of
frustration and was innerly speaking in a frustrated tone, yet she did not feel frustrated, did not

Often, an emotion was expressed in Sophia

For example, at 2.5, she

had just read a quote she liked; her body was reacting with pleasure to the quote (she smiled),
and she was aware of the smile as a facial sensation, yet she did not feel pleased, happy, or any
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other feeling. At 3.1, she had just discovered that a professor she would like to work with shares
her crafting interest; Sophia
.] with giddy excitement, yet
she did not feel giddy, excited, or any other feeling. Her voice clearly reflected excitement and
yet excitement was not experientially present. At 4.2, she was annoyedly looking for her lost
markers. Again, the emotional experience, annoyance, was enacted in Sophia

her body

and its sharp movements, the way she was looking, conveyed that she was annoyed

yet she did

not feel annoyed in any way beyond the fact that she was annoyedly looking.
There was a continuum to this experience. At most of these samples, Sophia was not at
all feeling anything despite the emotions conveyed in her body whereas, at a few other samples,
it seemed she was almost or possibly feeling the corresponding emotion. For example, at 5.5, she
was innerly hearing a conversation she had had earlier, was reher voice expressed happiness

and she may have been

feeling happy at the moment of the beep, though it was difficult for us and Sophia to ascertain if
or to what extent happiness was present and, if so, how. At 5.4, she was singing and dancing
along to a song

her body would certainly suggest she was enjoying herself

and, indeed, in her
ence was not

difficult for us and Sophia to grasp.
Inner Speaking
Sophia
samples, or 30.3%). Her inner speakings were often commentary; for example, looking at party
preparat
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were in Sophia

ple, at 4.3, she was innerly
-painted nails); in

contrast, at 5.3, she was innerly saying in a neutral matter-ofshe silently practiced giving a presentation).
Sensory Awareness
Sophia also had relatively frequent (7.5 of 38 total samples, or 19.7%) sensory
awarenesses across a wide range of senses (bodily, visual, scent, auditory, tactile, and taste).
Bodily sensory awareness was by far the most common (4.5 of the 7.5 sensory awarenesses, or
60%), including two experiences (2.5, 8.4) in which she was attending to the feel of her own
smile. Though these beeps occurred six weeks apart, at both instances, Sophia was confident that
she only experienced the right side of her smile despite the likelihood that the left side of her
mouth was also upturned.
At one beep, Sophia
4.4, she was not only drawn to the sparkly pattern of dots moving along the floor but was also
intentionally moving her feet so that the glitter on her shoes would create this sensory
experience.
At least at one beep, (6.6), Sophia had a meta-awareness of her sensory awareness: she
was eating mindfully (indeed, this was her intention), noticing the taste, feel, texture, and
temperature of the chicken dish she was eating and simultaneously, in a cognitive way, she was
noticing herself to be doing so, was noticing her mindfulness. [We learned from Sophia
therapist that, if she was, in fact, attempting to practice mindfulness, it was of her own accord;
they were not doing mindfulness work in treatment.]
Matters of Adornment and Style

79

Sophia

related

to matters of adornment or style. For example, at 4.3, she was commenting on her nails which
were painted in a kitty design. At 4.4, she was deliberately creating and attending to the glittery
pattern created by the sparkles on her shoes (an instance of sensory awareness). At 5.1, she was
seeing the scarf she had just put on. At 5.2, she was thinking about her bunny slippers as she slid
across the floor in them. At 6.3, she was innerly speaking, reassuring herself that she could wear
a skirt because it was not yet winter. Sometimes the adornment was not of the styling of Sophia
but of how she had styled food, decorations, and other arrangements. For example, at 6.5, she
was showing her mom a box of cookies that she had carefully arranged and styled and asking her

of the cookies.
Self-Evaluation
Sophia
self-evaluative. [Her therapist also noted that she could be self-critical and had high expectations
of herself.] Her self-evaluation was sometimes critical; for example, at 6.5 described above, she

In contrast, her self-evaluation was sometimes self-assuring. For example, at 7.3, she was
looking at all the many food dishes and decorations she had prepared for a Christmas party and
Did I go overboard with all of this

that she felt reassurance at this moment, an example of the emotional-state-implied-but-not-felt
(described above). Similarly, at 6.3, she was looking at herself in a mirror and was wondering
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st

reassure her, though, also like 7.3, she does not feel reassurance, or even insecurity, at the
moment.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Sophia had some (4 of 38 total samples, or 10.5%) unsymbolized thinking. The details of
her first unsymbolized thinking (3.2) were markedly difficult to clarify (as is typically the case
for DES participants who experience unsymbolized thinking), though that difficulty did not
persist throughout sampling.
Inner Hearing
Sophia had occasional inner hearings (3 of 38 total samples, or 7.9%), which varied
considerably in their characteristics. For example, at 5.5, she was remembering a conversation

oke the same
words aloud before. In contrast, at 3.4, Sophia was innerly hearing a list of things she needed to
do that day; she heard her own voice, but her voice was speaking not in a conversational tone as
might be expected but rather, was reciting a list, was in some noticeable way listing as opposed
to speaking.
Sophia had one creative inner hearing at 2.3 when she was innerly hearing her mentor

erience was definitively of hearing her mentor but yet, the voice was not
Sophia

red or

distorted (not intended to imply negativity) in some way. In reality, it would be theoretically
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impossible for Sophia
these limitations do not apply to inner experience, so Sophia was able to creatively hear her

Singing and Dancing
Singing and dancing were sometimes (3 of 38 total samples, or 7.9%) in Sophia
experience. In all three instances, Sophia was singing aloud and dancing along to music;
however, her experience of doing so varied. For example, at both 5.4 and 7.4, her experience was
of having fun singing except that, at 5.4, the funness was aimed at the rhythm whereas, at 7.4, the
funness was aimed at the musicality and vocal range. At 5.4, Sophia was possibly but not
confidently also experiencing the bodily movements/sensation of singing and dancing. At 6.1,
her experience was confidently of the bodily movement and sensations of singing and dancing,
which were, to her, one experience, a coordination of body and voice signing-dancing. Also at

-dancing along with it in order to feel good, to embody
the message, to be encouraged by the message. Thus, 6.1 is also an example of the doing of
intended feelings described above.
Infrequent Phenomena
Sophia had no inner seeings (visual imagery), which is somewhat uncommon; in an
ethnically-diverse sample of the general population stratified across psychological distress, inner
seeing was found to occur in approximately oneHurlburt, 2008).
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Other Notable Findings
Bilingual Experience
Sophia is a bilingual Spanish and English speaker. We encountered an example of her
bilingualism at 8.2, during which Sophia was reading a book about anxiety in an attempt to calm
the anxiety she was currently feeling (an instance of the doing of intended feeling described
above). The book was in English. Sophia was innerly speaking the words as she read them;
however, she was not innerly speaking with the same inflection she would use if she were
reading aloud; that is, she was innerly speaking without inflection and was not pausing for
periods or commas within paragraphs but would only pause at the end of a paragraph. An
imaginary inner listener would hear, essentially, a monotonous run-on sentence with very
occasional pauses.
[Sophia believes this to be the way she always silently reads in English, though we did
not see enough samples (for example, a sample of her inner experience while reading in Spanish)
to know whether these beliefs are justified.]
Hearing versus Innerly Hearing
During the interview for 2.3, we discovered that Sophia innerly hears in a way that is
qualitatively different from how she externally hears (i.e., perception). Sophia explained that,

(simultaneously and contiguously) in a space stretching from the speaker to outside of her ears
and on both sides of her head. This was, she said convincingly, not a metaphorical description
(as if she hears that way) but rather, she actually hears the speaker in two regions (or one
elongated region) that stretches from where the speaker is to around her ears. In contrast, Sophia
inside
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(mental). We did not encounter any sampled moments during which Sophia was externally
hearing and therefore, were unable to corroborate her explanation; however, it points to what is
quite possibly an important phenomenological distinction that we do not believe has been made
in the perception or inner experience literature.

Figure 1. A visual depiction of where RTH understood Sophia to hear his voice.

Questionnaire (NIEQ) Results
-reported frequencies of each of the 5FP before
(far left bar in each column) and after (middle bar in each column) sampling and compares those
frequencies to her frequencies of the 5FP discovered by natural-environment DES sampling (far
right bar in each column).
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Figure 2.
Frequencies (%) for the 5FP. IS = Inner speaking; ISee =
Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling, SA = Sensory awareness.

DES sampling percentages for all of the 5FP. This discrepancy is typical of nearly everyone who
takes the NIEQ, regardless of whether or not they are psychotherapy clients.
scores are somewhat lower after her participation in sampling, also a typical result.
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Chapter 6: Daniel
Background
Daniel is a Filipino male. At the time of sampling, he was a young adult (20-29 years
old)

-time.
Daniel

eight days of natural-environment DES sampling spanning approximately five months (longer
than expected as Daniel was a student and our sampling period was interrupted by a holiday
break)
(7 days × approximately 6 beeps per day = 33 total beeps).
For days one and two of sampling, Daniel
the earphone. DES participants typically find it is much more difficult to be precise about the
moment of the beep when using the onboard speaker and therefore we encouraged him to use the
earphone. When Daniel attempted to wear the earphone, he found the sound of the beep to be
much too loud even on the lowest volume setting. Dr. Hurlburt, the originator of the DES
method who has used DES with hundreds of participants, noted that this was the first time he had
ever heard this complaint. We tested the beep with Daniel during an interview, playing the
lowest volume, which he maintained was too loud

jarring, he said, when heard through the

earphone. For his fifth through eighth sampling days, we provided Daniel a volume adaptor

with the dongle, he was able to find a manageable volume and wear the earphone.
Daniel completed approximately four DES sampling days before he began individual
therapy at The PRACTICE. Upon completion of Daniel
have a conversation with his therapist during which we inquired about his treatment, shared
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about his inner experience from DES, and discussed anything else of relevance. Daniel
therapist reported that he did not meet criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis but that he was seeking
services primarily to learn skills for coping with family stress. This stress stemmed largely from
Daniel attended
eight sessions of individual therapy spanning two months. He ended therapy at approximately the
same time he completed sampling.
Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
Table 4 below summarizes the salient phenomena of

33 experience samples.

Each characteristic will be discussed below.

Table 4
Daniel Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience

Count1

IS

ISee

U

F

SA

ISeea

ISeeprev TV

2.5

15.5

6.5

2.5

1.0

4.0

4.0

Frequency2 7.6% 47.0% 19.7% 7.6% 3.0% 12.1% 12.1%

4.0
12.1%

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness; ISeea = Aerial inner seeing; ISeeprev = Inner seeing of something previously
seen; TV = Watching TV
1
Number of samples containing that phenomenon (Recall that phenomena can be coded 0.5
when they are possibly but not confidently present)
2
Frequency = Number of samples containing phenomenon ÷ Total number of samples, expressed
as a percentage
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Inner Seeings
Daniel
samples, or 47.0%). In about one-quarter (4 of 15.5 ISee samples, or 25.8%) of all inner seeing
samples, he innerly saw from an aerial perspective. Additionally, some of his inner seeings were
dark or dimly lit (3 of 15.5 ISee samples, or 19.3%) and some included sound (2 of 15.5 ISee
samples, or 12.9%). Daniel

s existed on a continuum of clarity; at some moments,

inner seeings were apprehended clearly with specific details, whereas, at other moments, his
inner seeings were vague or undifferentiated.
Daniel

25.8%) things he had

previously seen in reality. For example, at 2.5, Daniel saw his cowork schedule and innerly saw a photograph of Jessie that he had, in fact, seen previously on a
webpage that contains profile photos of employees. As another example, at 7.3, Daniel had just

skit about the Amazon Echo starring actress Kate McKinnon. He had, in fact, seen this skit on
TV and was, at the moment of 7.3, re-seeing the skit, watching it play out as he had seen it
before.
Daniel was sometimes had difficulty describing the details of his inner seeings when they
involved things previously seen. We inquired carefully about this during the interview, noting
that it would often take us an unusually long amount of time to arrive at relatively simple details
of inner seeings. This was especially unusual given that inner seeings were a phenomenon Daniel
frequently experienced and was, at times, able to apprehend and describe without problem. These
discussions revealed that Daniel
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discern whether the things innerly seen were identical to the things that existed in reality and that
he was apparently being very careful not to mislead us if there were any differences.
Daniel

-than-concrete about his

inner experience. For example, we arrived at the following description for beep 6.4:
Daniel 6.4

[Daniel was watching Film Theory, a YouTube webseries. The episode

was reviewing the Disney movie The Incredibles. The opening cinematic presented an

At the moment of the beep, Daniel innerly saw the four characters in front of
a blue backdrop and was wondering who could be the strongest [he knew that question
was the center of his wondering but the question itself was not explicitly in experience,
such as in a voice. Perhaps the seeing itself was the experienced question; perhaps there
was an unsymbolized wondering that was behind the question; we never sorted it out.]
It took us an unusually long time (10 minutes of interviewing or more) to arrive at the
details of what came to be a fairly straightforward, clearly-seen image of the four characters. It is
possible that the inner seeing (if present) was not at all straightforward or clear at the moment of
the beep, thus lending to Daniel

hesitancy in describing it. It is also possible that

after 10 minutes of interviewing, the in-the-interview inner seeing (the one he had seen in the
opening cinematic) replaced the vaguely or incompletely or not at all inner seeing that had
actually taken place at the moment of the beep, such that the resultant description was of a
clearly-seen image. If this were the case, the description unfortunately does not maintain fidelity
to the at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience.
The majority of Daniel

eings were realistic; however, at 2.3, he had an inner

seeing that was discrepant from would be impossible in
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reality. [He was booking an Airbnb

rental in Reno.] At the moment of the beep, he innerly saw from above (aerial) a twodimensional map of Reno. The map had few details; he saw two freeways intersecting and other
streets arranged in a grid-like pattern. Simultaneously and overlaid on the map, Daniel innerly
saw a forest of evergreen trees that, unlike the 2-D map of Reno, looked like real trees and, also
unlike the map, were seen from a street-level perspective. Thus, several aspects of this inner
seeing would be impossible in reality. First, the two inner seeings were simultaneously separate
and somehow connected (overlaid). The trees were part of the map but also seen separately from
the map. Second, he innerly saw the trees near the streets on the map when, in reality, he knew
there would not be a forest of trees next to the city streets in Reno. Furthermore, the map was a
two-dimensional configuration of shapes whereas the forest overlaid on it was realistic

real

Evergreen trees as opposed to two-dimensional or geometric trees you might expect on that
particular map.
Daniel had another inner seeing of a map. At 8.3, [he was trying to decide where to eat in
the Spring Mountain area of Las Vegas and], at the moment of the beep, was innerly seeing from
above (aerial) a two-dimensional map of the Spring Mountain area with very few details. He saw
the main road and some buildings, though the buildings were not specified (as restaurants or
otherwise). Thus, 2.3 and 8.3 were similar in that, in both experiences, Daniel innerly saw a
vague two-dimensional map from an aerial view; however, they differ in that 2.3 defied the laws
of reality whereas 8.3 did not.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Daniel had fairly frequent (6.5 of 33 total samples, or 19.7%) unsymbolized thinking,
specific thought processes that do not contain words either spoken, heard, seen, or otherwise
symbolized, the first of which appeared on day six. DES participants at first often have a hard
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time describing the experience of unsymbolized thinking. This is perhaps because unsymbolized

thinking must be
fact that, in order to describe experience, participants must use words, sometimes further
entrenching the idea that words must have been present in the experience itself.
To illustrate the difficulty, here is an excerpt from the interview for beep 6.2, Daniel
first potential example of unsymbolized thinking.
[A brief summary of Daniel
opening and wondered what caused the door to open.]
Daniel
RTH: And, and, is that putting the pieces together, how does that present itself to you?
Daniel
internal dialog (nods affirmatively) [pause], where, um, like, kind of just playing it,

h

exactly how to describe how I processed it, though. Um, like I think it was, the best way
is like an internal kind of dialog, um of asking questions and not necessarily answering it,
but like knowing the answer.
[This is Daniel
speaking, which is typically among the easiest phenomena to describe. Daniel has
adequately described inner speaking before. Here, however, he alludes to inner
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like uh an internal dialog (nods affirmatively) [pause], where, um, like, kind of

RTH: So [pause] I wanna, I-

-, every-

I

Daniel: Mhm.
RTH: And, and so I guess I could understand it by saying
That
would be one possibility. And another possibility would be,

g,

a dialog. [Daniel: Mhm]
[Note that here we attempt to honor Daniel
matching the level of subjunctification, while introducing one possible distinction:
inner speaking versus unsymbolized thinking.)]
Daniel: Correct, yeah.

Daniel: Yeah.
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Daniel

no one at that door, it, like, I just kind of think of, well, what else could have possibly led
to that, you know, led to that event.
[Some transcript deleted here for brevity. RTH raises the possibility that one can
process events (like the sound of a door opening) without their being in direct
experience.]

how this door
Daniel

like, What was that? [Daniel: Yeah] or What made that happen? Or?
Daniel
RTH: But probably not words? [Daniel: Yeah] Okay.
Daniel: I think that was just trying to describe it.
Daniel

attempt at describing (or

considering the possibility of) unsymbolized thinking. He maintained confidently that the door-

cessing was in words or not. As best we could say at the
end of the interview for this beep, Daniel

but not confidently

unsymbolized thinking.
Cognitive Recognition
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Daniel also had some experiences of cognitive recognitions (2.5 of 33 total samples, or
7.6%), which are in the ballpark of but something less than unsymbolized thinkings. That is,
cognitive recognitions are a discrete noting, recognition, or understanding, whereas
unsymbolized thoughts are more fully-elaborated ideas or concepts. Here is an example of a
cognitive recognition:
Daniel 3.6

Daniel heard a sound and recognized it to be the sound of his new washing

machine. [As best we could say, this was a cognitive recognition. It was not an
unsymbolized thought because there was no thought present, for example, Oh, hey, that
must be the new washing machine. Nor was this experience entirely perceptual; it was not
only that he heard the washing machine sound.] Rather, he heard the sound and
simultaneously recognized (in some cognitive way) the sound to belong to his new
washing machine.
In contrast, here is another example of unsymbolized thinking:
Daniel 8.2

[Daniel

book and was using an Amazon gift card as a bookmark.] At the moment of the beep, he
thought something like Maybe I should get that backpack today [referring to the travel
backpack he intends to buy with this Amazon gift card]? This thinking was not in words,
pictures, or other symbols, but was clearly present and specific
whether or not he should get the backpack today. At the same time but much less salient,
he heard a child laughing on the TV that was playing loudly in the room.
As the descriptions underscore, the experience of a cognitive recognition is
phenomenologically different than that of an unsymbolized thought

even if they could be said

to be closely related within the family of cognitions. That is, beep 8.2 contains a clearly-present
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idea (Maybe I should get that backpack today?) whereas beep 3.6 is much less than that

a

recognition of a sound as his new washing machine.
Watching TV
Occasionally in experience (4 of 33 total samples, or 12.1%), Daniel was being carried
along by a video, video game, or TV. DES has, i
Daniel was watching a YouTube vide of someone playing a
video game. Some of his experience (30 or 40%) was of watching the game character fall off of a
ledge while the other 60 or 70% of his experience was of hearing the human player say
Daniel was even more
Daniel was again watching a
YouTube video of someone else playing a video game. At the moment of the beep, he was
watching the video, was being carried along by the visuals, narration, plot, and so forth. Nothing
else was in his experience. Sample 3.5 is a classic example of the phenomenon we have called

Inner Speaking
Daniel had some samples of inner speaking (2.5 of 33 total samples, or 7.6%). In the
interview for Daniel
whether he was innerly speaking or innerly hearing. [The sensations of inner speech and inner
hearing differ in ways that are important to some DES participants. Inner speech is likened to the
experience of speaking into a tape recorder whereas inner hearing is likened to the experience of
hearing that tape recorder play your voice back to you. Same voice, same words, very different
experience.] Daniel suspected his experience at 2.2 was more likely of innerly hearing because,
Daniel to bracket that self-theory such that, if
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it was true, we would see examples of his auditory experience in samples to come and, if it was
not true, it would not unduly influence or skew his upcoming apprehensions or descriptions in
the direction of audition.
Daniel s apprehending of inner speaking/inner hearing became more refined in later
sampling, and it became clear that his verbal inner experiences were not primarily hearing. At
6.3, he was (he reported with confidence) innerly speaking, but he could not be sure whether he
was also innerly hearing. Note that, despite Daniel
with our encouragement and care

to resist assuming that his

experience then must be of innerly hearing and arrive at a higher fidelity (though still slightly
uncertain) apprehension of his experience. Then, at 7.2, Daniel was watching a video of a play

hus, at 7.2, Daniel was able to say definitively that his
experience was of simultaneously innerly speaking and innerly hearing.
At 6.3, an inner voice was clearly present (either spoken or spoken and simultaneously
heard) but Daniel could not be confident that the voice was his; it sounded somehow different
Daniel-

Daniel was innerly speaking in or

normal voice. At the interview for 6.3 there was not more we could say about this. The next
sample of inner speaking at beep 7.2 provided some insight into why Daniel may not have
apprehended the inner voice as exactly like his outer voice. At 7.2, Daniel was innerly speaking

seemed to be his but sounded different than his normal voice. He speculated that perhaps this
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was partly due to the inner voice having a different tone (less animation) than his normal
speaking voice.
[Daniel also explained that, when he speaks aloud, he first says the words, experiences a
very short delay, and then hears the words. That is, in Daniel
apparently a delay between producing the words and then hearing what he said. This is not the
case for Daniel
there is no delay. Daniel

t his

experience of inner speech is what is typically assumed to be how humans experience speaking
(i.e., no delay). Indeed, most people would find his external speech (delay between speaking and
sible that Daniel
apprehending inner speaking/inner hearing stemmed from the fact that his inner speaking
experiences differed from his outer speaking experiences and were thus, more unfamiliar to him
and more difficult to understand. DES studies often find that participants are mistaken
sometimes dramatically so

about the details of their inner experience and, given that, Hurlburt
Daniel

may have struggled with his own inner experience because it differed from his beliefs about his
outer experiences.]
Daniel was of the impression that he frequently, if not constantly, engages in previewing
and evaluating what he might say. This was revealed during the interview for 6.3. At the moment
of 6.3, Daniel
Daniel believed he was innerly saying this so that he could consider or
evaluate whether he would or should actually say it aloud. In the end, he did not actually ask his
Daniel also self-analyzes
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or evaluates his external speech; in fact, it may be that the delay between speaking and hearing
his own external speech is precisely for some moment of reflection or self-analysis.
Feelings
Daniel had few emotional experiences (2.5 of 33 total samples, or 7.6%). At 2.4, he was
at the moment of
the beep. In Daniel
[apparently how he thought she actually looked in her room at the moment] and found the
experience (innerly seeing her sleep-talking) to be funny or amusing. He was confident that the
funniness was in his experience, but it was not clear how. That is, he could not or perhaps did not
apprehend clearly the qualities of this feeling, whether bodily, mental, or otherwise. At 7.2, while
watching a video of a trick play from SuperBowl LII, Daniel felt excited/surprised/amazed, a
mental feeling. Thus, at 7.2, he definitively described the characteristics of the feeling; it was
mental as opposed to bodily or some other phenomenon.
Two of Daniel

ng experiences were less straightforward. At 4.4, Daniel may have

been feeling frustration for another. He was watching a video of someone else playing (not live)
a video game. He saw the player adjusting the game settings and was somehow interacting with

was more mental but also bodily (though, where or how in his body was not clear). That is, a
feeling was possibly but not confidently present at 4.4 but, if that feeling was present, it was not
Daniel

Daniel was not feeling anything at all but was, at

the moment of the beep, trying not to feel. He and his brother had been talking about trypophobia
(fear of pores) and he had been, before the beep, feeling disgusted by that conversation. At the
moment of the beep, he was trying to think of a different topic, something to distract him from
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the disgusted feeling. Thus, he was apparently in an emotional state (disgust) and his experience
was of thinking so as to distract himself from feeling disgust. He was apparently successful: at
the moment of the beep he did not feel in his direct awareness anything that could be called

Perspective-taking
Daniel

ccasionally took on the perspective of another. At two samples, he

was experientially taking the perspective of a doctor [In fact, Daniel aspires to be a doctor, and
has been accepted into medical school]. Here is an example:
Daniel 5.1

Daniel was reading a book in which a doctor describes how he delivers

bad news to patients. At the moment of the beep, Daniel imagined himself in the position
of a doctor delivering bad news: He innerly saw from first-person perspective a woman
and her husband in a hospital room. The man and woman were not very clear; they were

hair, which was definitively blonde. In this seeing, Daniel was the doctor and knew
himself to be about to or poised to give bad news to the couple.
Another example of doctor-perspective-taking was at beep 6.1 when Daniel was, in reality,
washing his hands. While he was washing his real hands, he innerly saw a pair of hands
before a surgical procedure) in a hospital. Though
the innerly seen hands were not Daniel
was apparently spawned by Daniel washing his real hands and thus, is, in some ways, another
example of Daniel taking on the perspective of a doctor.
Infrequent Phenomena
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Sensory awareness. Daniel had very few (1 of 33 total samples, or 3.0%) experiences of
sensory awareness.
Words. Aside from the two (possibly three) instances of inner speaking, Daniel had very
few experiences involving words. This is contrary to Daniel

-in-

Self-directed. Daniel had very few experiences which were directed at himself. For
example, he had little emotional experience, or feelings. As mentioned above, he also had very
little sensory awareness, including any awareness of his own bodily sensations, tastes, smells,
tactile feelings, and so forth. Even when he innerly spoke, he experienced the voice as somehow
not exactly his own,

Daniel

Daniel

impressions; she noted that he rarely talked about himself in session, usually focusing instead on

also seems fitting of his overall experience: frequent imagery, cognitive recognitions, and
unsymbolized thoughts but relatively less frequent feelings, sensations.
Daniel
When asked about his experience of the DES task, Daniel
Daniel
DES could ever be a therapeutic tool. He did not share specifically any ways in which he found
the process to be therapeutic. However, he did learn from the task that he was apparently not as
aware of his characteristic experience as he previously thought. He provided an example: After
one of our DES interviews, he went to a psychotherapy appointment and shared with his
therapist that he had never had such trouble describing his own experience as he just had in the
interview and that he thought doing so should be easy (given it is his everyday experience).
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Indeed, our interviews often did involve a good-natured, collaborative struggle to understand
Daniel

Daniel attributed the struggle to our difficulties in

potential difficulty or unclarity of the experiences themselves.
Daniel believed he got better at the DES task near the end of sampling. We agreed, for
the most part; however, some difficulties persisted even into our eighth day together. For
example, in the interview for 8.3, Daniel began his description with a substantial amount of
context, an explanation of the various factors he was considering in choosing a place to eat. And,
in fact, his experience was partly of thinking where to eat (however, the many factors he was
describing were not nearly as salient as the general thought of where to eat). In addition, Daniel
was innerly seeing a map of the area where he might eat. Despite eight days of sampling
including many (nearly half of all samples) instances of inner seeings, it took us a considerable
amount of time to arrive at Daniel

psychotherapy seemed to have with the DES task above and beyond the difficulty experienced
by the typical DES participant.
Family History of Schizophrenia
After we had completed all DES sampling, we learned from Daniel
mother is diagnosed with schizophrenia. We and Daniel

otice in Daniel any
Daniel

is at an increased likelihood of developing schizophrenia (offspring of biological parents with
schizophrenia have a 6-fold increase in risk of developing schizophrenia; Chou et al., 2017). It is
possible that the mechanisms influencing Daniel
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themselves in subtle
Daniel

or dramatic

ways in his inner experience. The following are instances of

ner experience that include phenomena that may be interesting to explore when

thinking about risk for schizophrenia. Note that all of the following characteristics were
explicitly noted before we learned that Daniel had a family history of schizophrenia. We did not
re-code any samples after learning of his family history, nor did we, in the coding, look
specifically for features consistent with schizophrenic experience. Those features happened to
emerge and we later learned that Daniel happened to have a positive family history for
schizophrenia.
Anomalous Inner Seeings
Hurlburt (1993) reported on the general characteristics of a small sample of patients with
schizophrenia, finding that inner seeings were frequent. We note that Daniel
also frequent (47.0% of his samples).

differing from reality; concrete images (that is, not just innerly seeing a tree but innerly seeing an
image of a tree with borders) that were occasionally tilted; and inner seeings with seemingly
arbitrary demarcations. No one has yet systematically studied the inner experience of individuals
at risk for developing schizophrenia (such as family members of individuals with schizophrenia
like Daniel); however, one might assume that the experience of someone at risk for
schizophrenia resembles that of someone with the disorder.
We noted
Daniel

Daniel had an instance of an inner seeing with a

more or less arbitrary demarcation or distortion, which is fairly unusual among typical DES
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schizophrenia. At 4.1, Daniel was watching a YouTube video of a recording (not live) of
someone playing a video game. In his experience, he innerly saw an upcoming scene in the
game: the side of a dark, coal-colored rocky mountain rising up to the right against a blue sky.
The top of this inner seeing at 4.1 was faded or dissolved at the edges. That is, it was not just that
(as is more commonly found in DES); on the
contrary, he saw the faded/dissolved edges, thus dividing the mountain from the top of the
mountain. The rest of the seeing was relatively clear.
Hurlburt (1993) also reported that individuals with schizophrenia occasionally (for some,

(Hurlburt, 1993, Chapter 11) was one participant for whom this was fairly frequently; for
example, at one sample (sample #75), she was innerly seeing Joe who was, in fact, sitting across
from her in the room; Joe was accurately innerly seen (that is, the innerly seen Joe looked the
same as the real Joe) except that the innerly seen Joe was holding a blue glass whereas the real
man was holding a yellow glass.
The majority of Daniel
seeing that was discrepant from and would be impossible in reality. [He was booking an Airbnb
rental in Reno.] At the moment of the beep, he innerly saw from above (aerial) a twodimensional map of Reno. The map had few details; he saw two freeways intersecting and other
streets arranged in a grid-like pattern. Simultaneously and overlaid on the map, Daniel innerly
saw a forest of evergreen trees that, unlike the 2-D map of Reno, looked like real trees and, also
unlike the map, were seen from a street-level perspective. Thus, several aspects of this inner
seeing would be impossible in reality. First, the two inner seeings were simultaneously separate
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and somehow connected (overlaid). The trees were part of the map but also seen separately from
the map. Second, he innerly saw the trees near the streets on the map when, in reality, he knew
there would not be a forest of trees next to the city streets in Reno. Furthermore, the map was a
two-dimensional configuration of shapes whereas the forest overlaid on it was realistic

real

Evergreen trees as opposed to two-dimensional or geometric trees you might expect on that
particular map.
Perceptual Features
Hurlburt (1993) noticed that his participants with schizophrenia had occasional
exaggeration or distortion of perceptual details

for example, colors were seen as being brighter

(neon-y) than they actually are.
Perhaps of relevance in this regard, when Daniel attempted to wear the earphone, he
found the sound of the beep to be much too loud even on the lowest volume setting. This is a
highly unusual response for DES participants. For his fifth through eighth sampling days, we
provided Daniel a volume adapter
lowest setting. He reported that, with the dongle, he was able to find a manageable volume and
wear the earphone. We make no attempt to interpret why Daniel had a different experience of the
beep; instead, we note here merely that Daniel apparently had an intensified experience of the
beep.
Hurlburt (1993) noticed temporal inconsistencies in the perceptions of his participants
with schizophrenia, for example, experiencing two aspects of an event as taking place in order ab when the physics of the situation required that they occurred in order b-a. Daniel experienced
a fairly unusual temporal disconnect between his inner voice and outer voice. That is, Daniel
explained that, when he speaks aloud, he first says the words and then¸after a short delay, hears
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the words. That is, in Daniel
words and then hearing what he said. This is not the case for Daniel
speaking, he mostly simultaneously innerly hears without delay. Daniel noted that his inner

to be how humans experience speaking (i.e., no delay). Indeed, most people would find his

Feeling Features
Daniel never had straightforward feelings (the experience of emotion). He had two
experiences in the realm of emotion, both with unusual characteristics. One feeling (beep 4.4)
was vicariously felt for another, not himself. In the other instance (beep 8.5), his experience was
explicitly of trying not to feel a certain emotion. At 8.5, Daniel was not feeling anything at all
but was, at the moment of the beep, trying not to feel. He and his brother had been talking about
trypophobia (fear of pores) and he had been, before the beep, feeling disgusted by that
conversation. At the moment of the beep, he was trying to think of a different topic, something to
distract him from the disgusted feeling. Thus, he was apparently in an emotional state (disgust)
and his experience was of thinking to distract himself from feeling disgust. He was apparently
successful: at the moment of the beep he did not feel in his direct awareness anything that could

clear, hyper strong feelings that they masked from external manifestation (that is, the affect
appeared blunted even though it was experienced very strongly). We are not in a position to
know whether Daniel
feeling is the result of the potential for hyper-clear feelings.
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Summary
The potential relation between Daniel

who

may develop schizophrenia is entirely speculative; these few examples provide only an
interesting parallel, but are not at all sufficient to suggest that Daniel will or might develop
schizophrenia. Future research should target individuals like Daniel who are genetically at-risk
potential for
decompensation into schizophrenia or other serious mental illness.
Questionnaire (NIEQ) Results
-reported frequencies of each of the 5FP before
(far left bar in each column) and after (middle bar in each column) sampling and compares those
frequencies to her frequencies of the 5FP discovered by natural-environment DES sampling (far
right bar in each column).
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Figure 3.
seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling, SA = Sensory awareness.
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his
DES sampling percentages for all of the 5FP except inner seeing. This discrepancy is typical of
nearly everyone who takes the NIEQ, regardless of whether or not they are psychotherapy
clients. With respect to inner seeing, his before-sampling NIEQ estimate is impressively close to
his frequency of inner seeing as discovered by DES sampling. However, note that his aftersampling NIEQ estimate is then far higher than both his before-sampling and DES frequency for
inner seeing. Aside from inner seeing, his NIEQ estimates after sampling are basically equivalent
to his NIEQ estimates before sampling.
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Chapter 7: Emma
Background
Emma is a Caucasian female. At the time of her participation in the study, she was a
young adult (18-20 years old) and was working part-time. She had completed some college but
was not enrolled at the time of sampling.
Emma

CE clinic. At the time she

presented to the clinic, she completed a self-report questionnaire of depression, anxiety, and
stress symptoms. Her scores indicated severe levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. After
completing the initial intake interview at The PRACTICE, Emma was referred to a group
psychotherapy program. She reported to one of the DES investigators that she never matriculated

intake interview and her follow-up intake interview. She never participated in formal
psychotherapy.
After four days of natural-environment DES sampling, Emma contacted one of the DES
investigators (AK) stating that she could no longer participate in sampling because she was
overwhelmed and felt she needed to seek psychiatric services. We honored Emma
end sampling and provided her with referrals for psychiatric services. She agreed to return for
one final meeting with AK to debrief on the procedure and complete the end-of-sampling
documents. At that meeting, Emma stated explicitly that she was enjoying the DES task, was
regretful that she needed to stop, and expressed interest in sampling more in the future when she
Emma also disclosed her fear that her mental health was decompensating,
something she had apparently seen happen with her mom, whom she reported likely has bipolar
disorder. This was corroborated by Emma
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Emma

health issues. Emma was emotional during this meeting;

she described feeling like her emotions were out of control, that she was frequently lashing out at
her boyfriend, and that she had recently been inflicting harm on herself by banging her body
against things when angry.
Ultimately, Emma completed four days of natural-environment DES sampling spanning

1 beeps as training (3 days × 6 beeps per day = 18 total beeps). Though 18 is a small number of
samples relative to Emma
potentially interesting patterns of experience.
Upon completion of her sampling, Emma gave us permission to have a conversation with
her intake clinician, during which we discussed Emma
discovered by DES. The intake clinician noted that, having only met with Emma on two
occasions, her impressions were limited. She reported that, overall, Emma

conversation with Emma, the clinician reported that Emma seemed very concerned about her
mental status. The clinician reported specific symptoms/problems that Emma shared;
specifically, she reported that Emma was frequently becoming so emotionally overwhelmed and
dysregulated that she had difficulty regai

-like

behavior (screaming, crying, etc.). Emma reported to the clinician that this tantrum-like behavior
was similar to or reminiscent of Emma
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Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
Table 5 below summarizes the salient phenomena of

18 experience samples.

Each characteristic will be discussed below.

Table 5
Emma Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience

Count1

IS

ISee

U

F

SA

SAvisual

SAcolor

ISeewords

ISeeborders

ISeebckgrnd

Fb

0.5

6.5

2.5

2.0

5.5

3.5

2.5

2.5

3.0

2.0

2.0

13.9%

13.9%

16.7%

11.1%

11.1%

Frequency2 2.8% 36.1% 13.9% 11.1% 30.6% 19.4%

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness; SAvisual = Visual sensory awareness visual; SAcolor = Sensory awareness of
color; ISeewords = Inner seeing of words; ISeeborders = Inner seeing with borders or
arbitrarily cut-off; ISeebckgrnd = Inner seeing with explicit background color; Fb = Bodily
feeling
1
Number of samples containing that phenomenon (Recall that phenomena can be coded 0.5
when they are possibly but not confidently present)
2
Frequency = Number of samples containing phenomenon ÷ Total number of samples, expressed
as a percentage
Inner Seeing
Emma had frequent (6.5 of 18 total samples, or 36.1%) inner seeings, all of which had
some feature or features that were rare or unusual or atypical. Those features will be described
next.
Borders/cut-offs/demarcations. Typically, when DES participants report inner seeings,
the seeings do not have explicit borders or cut-offs but, rather, participants simply do not see, or
do not see clearly, certain parts of (usually) the periphery. However, for Emma, inner seeings
frequently included explicit cutoffs and arbitrary demarcations (3 of 6.5 ISee samples, or 46.2%
of all ISee). For example, at beep 2.3, [Emma
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on Google]. She saw Johnny clearly and in color. He was standing, turned about 30 or 45 degrees
to the left with his face unturned, looking straight ahead, and smiling. The seeing was explicitly
cut off at his feet such that the seeing seemed to end abruptly above where his feet would be.
Such abrupt cutoffs are unusual in typical DES participants, but similar to what Hurlburt (1993)
described about patients with schizophrenia.
Beep 3.5 also had abrupt demarcations within the seeing:
Emma 3.5

[Emma and her friends were playing a movie title memory game. The hint
Emma thought of the movie Open Season.] At the moment of the

beep, she innerly saw a scene that was either from the movie or of her own creation, she
had its legs out doing a
karate move. Below the deer was a section of grass with worn-down dirt. In front of the
deer, she saw clearly a tree stump. The seeing had accurate depth: the tree stump (closer
to point of perspective) was larger than the deer (further from point of perspective). To
the right of the deer, Emma saw an animated bear but with few details [not because the
details were expressly missing but because she was not focused on the bear] including no
face. The bottom left of the bear

his brown fur and left paw

was seen clearly, but the

top and right side of the bear were seen dimly or undifferentiatedly. The seeing was
divided by a rather arbitrary diagonal in such a way that the bottom left half of the bear
(closest to the deer) was seen clearly whereas the top right was unclear and
undifferentiated. The tree stump, too, was seen most clearly on the left half. Behind the
deer and bear was a forest but this had few details.
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Note the explicit demarcation in 3.5, the diagonal line through the deer. This is highly
uncommon in inner seeings. Also note the arbitrariness of this demarcation; there was apparently
no reason why the bear would be divided in this way. This is also highly uncommon in inner
seeings but similar to what Hurlburt (1993) described about patients with schizophrenia.

Emma innerly saw the shape of her closed eyes, like a
schematic drawing of closed eyes, and the inner seeing seemed to be rectangular despite the fact
that she did not see explicit borders. She knew or sensed the seeing to be rectangular.
Innerly seen words. Generally, when words (and other tokens of language, like letters
and numbers) are present in experience, they are innerly spoken or heard. Words can be innerly
seen, usually in context; for example, if someone is remembering an e-mail he just sent, he might
innerly see the e-mail including some or all of the words. It is more uncommon for words to be
innerly seen apparently just for the sake of being seen; however, this happened on several
occasions (2.5 of 6.5 ISee samples, or 38.5% of all ISee) for Emma. For example, at beep 2.1,
[Emma was working on a math problem, factoring a polynomial.] She innerly saw the number 4
in black, Times New Roman serif-esque font against an explicitly white background (it was not
merely that the background was not there). [Perhaps interestingly the innerly seen 4 was
apparently spawned by the math problem, but Emma was not aware of any connection between
the innerly seen 4 and the problem. She knew there was at least one 4 (the exponent X 4) in the
problem, but this innerly seen four was not experienced as an inner seeing of the exponent 4 from
the problem, and she thought that 4 might have been one of the factors, but she was not sure.

to be spawned by the math problem but was more or less meaningless.]
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At beep 3.1, Emma again had an inner seeing of a word more or less meaninglessly
connected to her environment.
Emma 3.1

[Emma

Fantastic

Four,

beep, Emma
Emma innerly saw the word stream in

thick, block font letters with the individual letters italicized. The word stream was
engraved/embossed/indented in a background. Both the word and background were black
and dark blue speckled, such that the embossedness is what distinguished the word apart
from the background [Thus, this inner seeing was somewhat like the HBO logo (see
figure below), though the HBO logo is black and white, not black and blue].

Figure 4. The HBO logo screen, similar to Emma

-seen stream at beep 3.1

Note that, though she innerly saw stream presumably because of the conversation about
mainstream, this seeing did not seem to be at all related to the word or concept of mainstream. In
fact, as far as her experience was concerned, the word had no meaning at all, just as the innerly
seen 4 at beep 2.1 seemed to have no meaning.
Also note the extravagant/brilliant/embellished way Emma innerly saw stream. This is
quite unusual among inner seeing experiences, maybe especially of innerly seen words. Thus, we
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concluded that Emma
language, on occasion, embellishing them, dressing them up.
The inner seeing of words is relatively rare in typical DES participants.
Significance of location. Emma

of her inner visual field. The seeing had a white background such that there was more white in

Emma saw eyes in the bottom left of her inner
visual field, covering about one-quarter or more of the total space with the rest being a grey fog.

participants report inner seeings, the thing seen is central. At beep 4.4, Emma

significance of location. That is, at beep 4.4, Emma
center. Smoking Man was turned, looking over his shoulder mysteriously with his eyes aimed at
Emma
of him where his hat, face, and collar meet. Thus, he was centered in her imagination, but her
focus was decidedly to the left of center. This is, again, fairly uncommon; DES participants
typically describe looking straight on at an inner seeing.
Explicit backgrounds. At three samples (3 of 6.5 total ISee samples, or 46.2% of all
ISee), Emma

eing had an explicit background. Beep 2.1 (the innerly seen 4 described

-

, it was

not merely that Emma did not see a background (as is more commonly described by DES
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participants), she saw a background and it was white. At beep 3.4 (described below in the

Significance of color. Sometimes in Emma
unusual. Consider beep 3.4:
Emma 3.4

[Emma and her friends were playing a game for which they chose a letter

and then tried to come up with as many movie titles that begin with that letter. The letter
Emma
saw a grid-like structure: a horizontal line bisected by at least one (and probably more)
vertical lines. In the upper left of this structure was the letter M. The bisected lines
separate some columns (how many was unclear) in which she somehow visualized other
letters descending in series. It was difficult for Emma to describe how she apprehended
these columns; it was somehow more than sensing but less than a fully-articulated seeing.

it than typical inner seeings, as if she was seeing indeterminate letters. [She was using
this imagining to think of movie titles by considering the combinations of letters, for

set of letters.] She confidently saw a black background but the color of the letters was
more difficult to describe. Perhaps the letters had no color

the color was indeterminate

or not-yet-arrived. Perhaps she saw the letters in color but there was no word she could
use in the interview to accurately describe the color(s). The letters seemed to be
translucent. [Perhaps something like Figure 5 though we did not confirm this with
Emma.]
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Figure 5.

In the interview for beep 3.4, we and Emma worked diligently to understand how she
experienced the color of the letters. She seemed motivated to describe the color (or lack thereof)
to us, but

for whatever reason we were never able to fully understand. The possibilities we

arrived at (indeterminate color, no color, no color yet, a color that does not exist in realit y)
suggest that Emma
thought to be perceived in external experience.
Beep 4.4 was another example of the significance of color. At beep 4.4, Emma was
innerly seeing Smoking Man from the X Files. [She had, in fact, never seen the X Files and so
what she saw was a creation of her own imagination, how she assumed Smoking Man to look.]
She saw a darkly-colored (hues of grey and black) shape of a man wearing a fedora and a
trenchoat with the coat collar covering his face. Smoking Man was turned, looking over his
shoulder mysteriously with his eyes aimed directly at Emma; however, she was not attending to
his eyes; her attention was decidedly to the left of center, at the place where his hat, face, and
collar met. Her experience was not really about the man Smoking Man but rather, about the
shapes and colors. It was like a rudimentary painting, like a paint-by-number with different parts
of Smoking Man (his coat, his face, etc.) solidly colored without any shading. Like beep 3.4, it
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was difficult for Emma to describe the differently-colored parts: Was the background black?
Was the hat grey? They all seemed to be greys and blacks. However, it was her impression that,
at the moment of the beep, she saw the colors clearly and differentiatedly.
Felt to be literally connected to external reality. Beep 4.2 is emblematic of some of the
rare qualities of Emma

in this case, especially the way the inner seeing seems to

be literally connected to her external reality.
Emma 4.2

[Emma was dozing off on the couch.] Her eyes were closed and she

innerly saw the shape of her closed eyes obscured/clouded by a grey fog (see picture
approximation below which Emma agreed in the interview was pretty accurate, although,
in experience, the eyes were clouded). It was not that she saw her eyes; rather, she saw
the shape of her eyes, the shape her closed eyes were making. She felt the innerly seen
shape of eyes carried forward from her real eyes, somehow connected to them though
exactly how she apprehended their connectedness was difficult for Emma to describe.
The eyes were in the bottom left of Emma
one-quarter or more of her total imaginary field; the rest was the grey fog. Her imaginary
field seemed to be rectangular even though it did not have any borders to signify
rectangularness.
[Emma confirmed in the interview that the eyes appeared similar to the figure below
except that, in experience, the eyes were clouded]:

Figure 6. Visual depiction of Emma
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Sensory Awareness
Emma had fairly frequent (5.5 of 18 total samples, or 30.6%) sensory awarenesses (SA),
most of which were visual of either shape or color (3.5 of 5.5 total SA, or 63.6% of all SA). She
also had sensory awarenesses of touch, sound, and her own body. At beep 4.4 (described above
Emma had a sensory awareness of color (the glowy white
hin an inner seeing.
Consider, as an example, beep 2.5, during which she had two distinct but simultaneous
experiences of sensory awareness:
Emma 2.5

[Emma was itching her right eye with her right pointer finger.] She felt her

eye being massaged/ rubbed i
by the rubbing. Primarily in the medial corner of her eye, Emma felt pressure [her eye
being massaged] and relief [which was maybe just the absence of itchiness; if relief had
its own characteristics, we could not be sure of them.] Simultaneously and in sync, she
heard the splooshy sound which had a somewhat gross quality to it; that is, she
apprehended it as a slightly gross sound [and noted that the grossness was magnified in
the recording and describing of it].
Thus, at beep 2.5, there was a bodily sensory awareness of her eye being rubbing and an auditory
sensory awareness of the sound created by the rubbing. Emma
these sensations.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Emma confidently had one example of unsymbolized thinking: at beep 2.2, she had just
scooped a spoonful of chocolate Ovaltine powder and was noticing the mountainy shape (visual
sensory awareness) and thinking that the powder looked like mountains (unsymbolized thinking).
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Emma had three other possible examples of unsymbolized thinking, though, at those beeps, she
either (a) could not be sure the thought was before the beep or still ongoing at the moment of the
beep or (b) could not distinguish between inner speaking (words present) and unsymbolized
thinking (idea present without words). It often takes several days of sampling for DES
participants to make these kinds of fine-grained distinctions, so it is not surprising that Emma
was still building skill after only 2, 3, or 4 days of sampling.
Feelings
Emma had two (2 of 18 total samples, or 11.1%) experiences of emotion, what DES calls
Emma had just realized she might have missed the
final exam.] She felt panic that was apprehended in her body; her
heart was beating fast and she had an urge to move that was felt throughout her entire upper
body. Beep 4.6 provides an example of a fairly unusual feeling, one that was somehow too big
for Emma
Emma 4.6

Emma saw one of her dogs lying down playing with a treat she had given

him. She felt overwhelmed with pride and happiness. Her heart felt literally bigger,
swollen, full. From her heart, which felt swelled and oozing outward with
pride/happiness, she felt radiating/glowing warmth/pride/positivity. This radiated feeling
was not specifically directed at her dog but was moving out from her and towards him, in
his direction.
Questionnaire (NIEQ) Results
-reported frequencies of each of the 5FP before
(far left bar in each column) and after (middle bar in each column) sampling and compares those
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frequencies to her frequencies of the 5FP discovered by natural-environment DES sampling (far
right bar in each column).
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Figure 7.
NIEQ vs. DES Frequencies (%) for the 5FP. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner
seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling, SA = Sensory awareness.

Figure 7 demonstrates th
DES sampling percentages for all of the 5FP. This discrepancy is typical of nearly everyone who
takes the NIEQ, regardless of whether or not they are psychotherapy clients. There was perhaps
one exception: Her before-sampling NIEQ estimate of inner seeing was fairly similar to her
DES-

-sampling

NIEQ estimates are all higher than her before-sampling and DES estimates, which is slightly
unusual. Most DES participants evidence the opposite pattern: Their after-sampling estimates are
lower than their before-sampling estimate.
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Chapter 8: Laura
Background
Laura is a Caucasian female. At the time of her participation in the study, she was in her
twenties (20-29 years old) and was a graduate student. According to Laura
an internationally-acclaimed flutist.
Laura
presented to the clinic, she completed a self-report questionnaire of depression, anxiety, and
stress symptoms. Her scores indicated normal levels of depression, anxiety, and stress.
She completed eight days of natural-environment DES sampling spanning approximately

training (7 days × approximately 6 beeps per day = 40 total beeps).
Upon completion of her sampling, Laura gave us permission to have a conversation with
her therapist, during which we discussed Laura
discovered by DES. The therapist reported that Laura attended weekly psychotherapy sessions
spanning nearly three months. He reported she met criteria for a diagnosis of generalized anxiety
disorder and that their treatment was largely targeting at managing anxiety with her anxiety
primarily driven by concerns about her graduate program and being separated from her wife who
lives on the other coast. He reported that therapy engaged in family of origin exploration and
then, later, focused on cognitive restructuring of Laura

-provoking

situations.
Laura
ession, were distressing reactions to anxiety but not full-blown panic attacks.
Upon the completion of therapy, Laura

Laura herself noticed she had
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made progress: She experienced fewer break

was more hopeful

about the future. Laura and her therapist also called Laura
asked for her impressions. According to Laura
made progress

or, at least, that that progress had apparently not yet made an impact on

significant others in her life.
Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
40 experience samples.
Each characteristic will be discussed below.

Table 6
Laura Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience

Words
IS

ISee

U

F

SA

Nothing

MA

SAb

Reading

Hear

Hear no

Emph.

Comp.

TV

without

Count1

1.0

0.5

2.0

2.0

10.0

8.5

4.0

7.5

6.5

5.5

5.0

9.5

4.0

Frequency2

2.5%

1.3%

5.0%

5.0%

25.0%

21.3%

10.0%

18.8%

16.3%

13.8%

12.5%

23.8%

10.0%

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness; Words w/o = Words present without the ability to specify what the words are
or how they are present; MA = Meta-awareness; SAb = Bodily sensory awareness;
Reading = Reading with comprehension; TV = Watching TV; Hear Emph. = Emphasis
on hearing; Hear no Comp. = Hearing without comprehension
1
Number of samples containing that phenomenon (Recall that phenomena can be coded 0.5
when they are possibly but not confidently present)
2
Frequency = Number of samples containing phenomenon ÷ Total number of samples, expressed
as a percentage
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Words
The most striking characteristic of Laura
which is very dif
sometimes include words and almost always in one of the following ways: words may be innerly
ard,
seen, and so on. However, for Laura, words seemed to be present on many occasions though
almost never in one of those more typical ways.
Words present without the ability to specify what they were or how they were
present. Often in Laura

(8.5 of 40 total samples, or 21%), words were apprehended

as being present without the ability to specify what those words were or how they were present.
For example, at 2.3, [Laura was trying to figure out how to write something]. She said that
specific words (a possible way to write the intended sentence) were present at the moment of the
beep, though she could not say what the exact words were or how they were present. She thought
maybe the words were innerly spoken in some way. We used the interview of this beep and
subsequent beeps to raise for Laura the possibilities: that words might be present in a voice (or
not), with the sensation of innerly speaking but without a voice, in a voice but without the
sensation of innerly speaking, or in any other way. We explored whether the particular words
had been apprehended at the moment of the beep but forgotten across the hours between the beep
and the interview; or whether the words had been apprehended at the moment of the beep but
forgotten in the few seconds between the beep and jotting down notes about the beeped
experience. Our intention was not to coerce Laura into choosing one of our possibilities (and, in
fact, we never arrived at an answer) but rather was to help build Laura
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her inner world, including the possibility that her inner world defies the laws of the external
world.
At 3.3, [she was typing]. The specific words she was typing were somehow present to
her, though she could not say how. She could say definitively that the words were not innerly
spoken, heard, or seen. Simultaneously, she was reading the words on her computer screen and
was somewhat (though minimally) experiencing the act of typing. Thus, at the moment of this
beep, Laura had three separate and simultaneous experiences that involved the same words
(words present, reading words, typing words) and said believably that the specific words were
present to her at the moment, yet she could not recall the words or say more about how she
experienced them.
On one occasion, 4.4, Laura

webpage]. Despite being fairly confident that there were words, and that the words were innerly
spoken, Laura was never positive exactly what the words were and did not write them down.
This is unusual; DES finds that inner speech is one of the most

if not, the most

easy to

recognize inner phenomena and, when it occurs, it is usually quite easy for participants to
remember (or, at least, write down) what the innerly spoken words were. On each sampling day,
we reminded Laura that if words were present, we would like to know what they were, so that (if
words were present) she should write them down. Laura did not do so, which did not seem to be
sloth or inattention. There was something about Laura
specific words, but it was impossible to specify what those words were, despite Laura
to do so just after the beep.
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Words without a natural connection to their characteristics. Moreover, Laura
experienced words without a natural connection between words and their characteristics. Words
can have many characteristics: their meaning (also known as semantics); their form (also known
as graphemes); their sound (also known as phonemes); the tone and rhythm with which they are
spoken (their prosody); the emotion they represent; their importance; the gestures that
accompany them; and so forth. Laura rarely experienced words in their fullness, for example,
reading and comprehending a text message. Rather, she experienced (or sometimes, almost or
barely experienced) characteristics of words divorced from the words themselves.
For example, at 5.2, [Laura was pra

right. She was also somewhat noticing that she was hand-gesturing rather dramatically. Thus,
though Laura was saying words, the words were not directly present to her

she did not

experience producing words or hearing (or whatever) the words themselves. Instead, her
experience was centered on the characteristics of words

their phrasing

and her accompanying

hand gesturing. Even though the phrasing was doubtless connected to the words, no specific
words were present to her; she was somehow involved with the phrasing without being at all
involved with the words. That is, though her gestures accompanied and elaborated words, her
experience was about the gestures, regardless of the words. Most participants whose experience
centers on word-y characteristics, like gesturing or phrasing, would also be involved with the
words themselves

very likely, mostly involved with the words themselves.

Occasionally, Laura

-

order or next-level characteristics. For example, at 6.3, [she was typing a fiction story. Typing
was automatic, not in experience]. In her experience, she apprehended/acknowledged/tracked the
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story as it unfolded on her computer screen. That is, her experience was not of the words, it was
story without any direct experience of the words that, in reality, communicate to her the story.
One might assume this experience is no different than merely reading with comprehension.
However, Laura said confidently and believably that her experience was not of reading. She was
not involved with the act of reading (active); she was grasping the story as it entered her
experience (passive). The distinction between these two phenomena was not entirely clear, but
the fact that there was a distinction was abundantly clear to Laura.
Beep 5.2 (described above) is another example of Laura
be said to have been experiencing the higher-order or next-level characteristics of words.
Specifically, at 5.2, she was involved with the phrasing of words, was effortfully speaking to get
the phrasing right, yet the spoken words themselves were not at all in experience.
At 7.5, [Laura was typing. Typing was automatic, not in experience]. As she typed, she
was muttering under her breath an alternative wording to what she had just typed. She
section below) and, via the mutter, was gleaning or noticing that the muttered wording flowed
better, was more pleasing in its flow, than the sentence she had typed. She was simultaneously
visually (via the words on the screen) noting the preferable flow of the muttered wording. This
visual experience was not about seeing a discrepant word on the screen; it was about
recognizing, in some visual way, the flow (the same flow she is considering via the muttering).
Note that neither the words themselves nor their semantic meaning were present in her
experience. Thus, at 7.5, there are two separate but coordinated experiences of the flow of
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words again a higher-order or next-level characteristic

and no experience at all of the words

themselves.
Even when words were confidently present (which was rarely the case for Laura), they
were not always as expected. For example, at 3.4, [Laura was working on a homework
assignment using the statistical program called R.] Mostly (80% of the total experience at this

importing SPSS [another statistical software program] files into R. This thought was present
without words, pictures, or other symbols

what we call unsymbolized thinking (see

[Laura was typing and] was thinking that she needed to type .spss instead of .sav [and was, at the
moment, making this change]. This needing-to-change was unsymbolized thought; however,
with this thought, the word .spss seemed to be somehow present as well. The presence of a word
was unusual for Laura; most often, when words seemed to be present, she could not specify what
they were. At 3.4, she knew the word was .spss. However, perhaps interestingly, .spss was not
-p-s-

perienced as

period s-p-s-s. Laura understood period s-p-s-s to be the way the word was present despite the
fact that no words were innerly spoken, heard, or otherwise articulated in her experience. It was
difficult for us to make sense of how, or if at all, this experience contributed to our understanding
of Laura
which words found their way into Laura
How words changed. Overall, Laura

nvolving words or the lack of words

were highly complex and difficult for us and her to understand. This was not the result of
inattention: We discussed at length during all interviews that, if words were present, we would
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be interested in knowing exactly what they were. It did not appear to be the result of sloth: Laura
seemed genuinely interested and motivated to do the task and for us to understand the apparent
complexity of her experiences. It was also apparently not the result of a lack of skill: We worked
hard with Laura (who was entirely engaged in the process, working hard alongside us) in what

apprehending her experience, describing her experience, considering taken-for-granted
possibilities of experience, clarifying the language used in descriptions, and so on. Yet, at nearly
every sampling day, there would be at least one experience for which she could not recall the
exact words despite exact words being in (and even central to) her experience.
On day 7, at sample 7.4, Laura had a somewhat more articulated (for her) experience of
words. [She had just read on her computer about signing up for something] and was thinking
something like Would it be worth it to sign up for this? Laura thought perhaps words were
present in this thinking, though she could not be sure; if words were present, though, she was
sure they were in the ballpark of Would it be worth it to sign up for this? as opposed to anything
similar like Maybe I should sign up for this. Moreover, if words were present, she could not say
how they were present, but she was confident they were not innerly spoken, heard, or seen. Thus,
at 7.4, words remained mostly elusive (as they had been throughout sampling), but Laura was
able to make more careful distinctions than she had been able to previously.
In the interview for this beep (7.4), we had a frank discussion with Laura about why she
was seemingly unable to specify the words in her experience. We were able to quickly rule out
many possibilities: By this time, Laura knew our interest in the exact words; she was motivated
to the do the task; she took notes about her experience; she seemed comfortable and forthcoming
with us; and she seemed self-motivated as well that is, she seemed genuinely interested in the
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sampling results as they applied to her (regardless of whether they were pleasing to us). Laura
speculated that perhaps part of the reason why she did not write down the specific words was
because, in experience, the words though present

were somehow not specific. We

encouraged Laura
and grapple with Laura
understand that the words themselves were not specified in experience. We then had a prolonged
conversation with Laura about the different ways words are or are not present and about our
interest in maintaining fidelity to however words present or do not present themselves to her.
On day 8 at beep 8.4, Laura had her first sampled experience with specific words for
which she was able to say confidently and, to our ear, in high fidelity what the words were and
how they were present. She even wrote down those words when she took notes at the moment of
the beep. At 8.4, [Laura was typing a story]. Mostly (90% of the total experience at this beep),
the words wrapping him up were present to her though not innerly spoken, heard, or seen. DES
has called this pheno
back top of her head. At the same time but much less dominant in experience, Laura was reading
with an editorial eye, watching for typos, errors, adequacy, and so forth.
When asked about her impression of this shift in the definitiveness of words at 8.4, Laura
identified our day 7 discussion as an important step in helping her begin to grasp her experience
of words. Unfortunately, day 8 was our final sampling day with Laura and we were unable to see
if her experience of words (or any other phenomena for that matter) changed. It seems possible
that her 8.4 experience signified a change in her experience of words: from almost no clarity or
specificity to decent clarity and specificity. If true, this is a dramatic shift, and may possibly be
accompanied by equally dramatic shifts in Laura
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Experience is on a Continuum of Lack of Clarity
continuum of lack of
clarity such that even when phenomena were present, they were barely present or, at best, were
present in an unclear, unarticulated, elusive way. That is, her experience was, at times, somewhat
clear (one extreme on the continuum), at other times, va
was nothing at all present (the other extreme on the continuum). Indeed, Laura had more
frequent experiences of nothing (4 of 40 total samples, or 10%) than has the typical DES
participant. For example, she relativ
(barely but not fully present) of words, experiences that were somewhat more than nothing yet
much less than something richly apprehended.
[In our meeting with Laura

his impressions of her inner

experience and he wondered if her experience might potentially be on the continuum of nothing

language, while seemingly crude, as not meant to convey that Laura is not intellectual or
imaginative or creative

on the contrary, we know from him that she is all of those things

but

rather, is meant to convey his suspicions that her experience was difficult to grasp with frequent
ank states.]
Lack of centrality.
experiences also tended to lack a central target. This is unlike most DES participants, who, even
when experiencing multiple simultaneous phenomena, can describe with confidence the central
aspect of their experience. If experience is predominantly an inner seeing, they can describe what
they see, often with vivid details; if experience is predominantly of emotion, they can describe
what they feel; if experience is predominantly of an inner voice, they can describe the inner
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words and whether those words seem to be spoken or heard. For Laura, this lack of centrality
was especially true for words; that is, even when words were the only (or the most dominant)
aspect of experience, they were apparently highly unclear and had few, if any, characteristics she
could describe.
However, even for non-worded experiences, there seemed to be a lack of a clear center of
experience. For example, at several samples, Laura was barely aware of anything (usually barely
listening to a TV show) and was simultaneously slightly aware of herself as barely attending (see
center of experience is el

barely in

experience and, even what is in experience, is not well articulated. Is it the meta-awareness of
her own barely aware state? That does not seem right either, given that Laura usually described
the meta[Laura prefaced several (at least 3.5 of 40 total samples, or 9%) samples by describing
we understood mental fog to be
an experiential phenomenon, that is, that Laura experienced fogginess and that that experience
would have characteristics which would be described. However, Laura was never able to
describe this mental fogginess to us and relied heavily on metaphors (rather than descriptions) to

description of her internal lack of clarity/centrality.
Laura

according to Laura

Laura understands mental fogs to be closely related to anxiety, to
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be a moderate manifestation of anxiety (a grand manifestation would be, to Laura, a complete
breakdown, of which her therapist reported she has experienced at least one in her life).
Laura reported to her therapist that, when she has these mental fogs, she cannot work or
think or c
Laura reported she had a series of mental fogs (mini anxiety breakdowns) in January just
before she began sampling with us (which began in February) and, as we observed in sampling,
she apparently had at least some experiences approaching these mini anxiety breakdowns in
February and March. Notably, Laura
she is physically ill. She reported to us that she was physically ill with a sinus infection on day 6
of sampling and, indeed, on day 6, there was very little in her experience at any of the samples,
and nearly all were consistent with her description of mental fogs.]
Meta-awareness
Laura was engaged in meta-awa

DES participant. This included one meta-meta-awareness (beep 5.2) at which she was noticing
herself hand gesturing (meta-awareness) and then cognitively commenting on her gesturing

Meta-awareness of the physicality of speaking. Like the gestures in 5.2, Laura had
relatively frequent (3.75 of 7.5 total meta-awareness samples, or 50% of all meta-awareness)
meta-awareness of the physicality of her own aloud speaking. (Because the physicality of
speaking (e.g., hand gestures, mouth mechanics, control of tone and pitch, and so forth)
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accompany spoken words, this represents another example of how Laura often experienced the
characteristics of words instead of (or sometimes along with) the words themselves.)
For example, at 2.5, Laura was [trying to figure out how to write something]. She was
muttering the potential wordings under her breath and, at the moment of the beep, words (a
specific potential wording) were innerly present to her, yet, she could not specify what they were
ability to specify what they were or how they

synch with the inner words; the muttered words seemed to be lagging slightly behind the specific
potential wording. Also simultaneous though only slightly in experience, Laura was aware of the
fact that she was talking, perhaps especially was aware of the mechanics or physicality of herself
talking. All three phenomena (inner words, hearing herself mutter, knowledge of herself as
speaking) were inextricably related to the same words she is speaking, yet the words remained
elusive. While the words themselves were elusive, Laura experienced characteristics of the
words; in this case, including the mechanics of speaking them. Note that beep 2.5 was highly
complex with three separate simultaneous experiences of the same words, none of which was
fully articulated in experience, and perhaps interestingly, which were not temporally in synch.
This level of complexity and uncertainty was not unusual for Laura

on the contrary, this was

the norm3.

3

Sample 2.5 is an example of experience that directly contradicts the popular theory of

that conscious experience plays out on a stage where it is observed by an audience (the self, or

has at least three theaters (a multiplex?). The theaters are not uniformly important (the inner
words are on an IMAX screen, hearing herself mutter is on a modern movie theater screen, and
noticing the physicality of her speaking is on a household television). And furthermore, the
theaters are not playing in sync (each screen starts at a different time). A truly descriptive science
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In the final example, at beep 7.5, [Laura was typing] and muttering under her breath an
alternative wording of what she had already typed. She could not be sure whether the muttered
words were in her experience and, if they were, she could not say what the words were.
However, the physical act of muttering was in experience

here again, she was experiencing the

physicality of speaking words without experiencing the words in any other way

and, apparently

via her muttering, she was gleaning or noticing that the muttered wording was more pleasing,
flowed better, than the words she typed.
Perhaps interestingly, Laura also had one sample during which she was drawn to the
physicality of

s speaking. That is, at 4.2, [she was watching a clip of a comedy show on

Laura was hearing the show and beginning to feel the humor of the joke. Simultaneously, she
was drawn to the hand gesture the character was making. Thus, it seems that, for whatever
reason, Laura tends to notice the physicality of speaking
Meta-awareness of her own lack of experience. Laura

ively

noticed herself to be having this kind of barely aware experience. For example, at beep 6.4 [she

Laura was barely hearing the show playing on her computer. That is, she heard sound coming
from the show but was not comprehending its meaning, was not following the show.
Simultaneously, though only a small portion of h

would help inform our assumptions of consciousness, including perhaps transforming the idea of
the Cartesian theater.
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(in a meta way) herself to be in this vaguely listening state. A near-identical experience was
captured at beep 8.3 during which Laura was thinking in an unsymbolized way about her upset
friend. She recognized that she was feeling concern for her friend (that is, this was more a metaawareness of an emotional state than of a feeling of emotion). Also at the same time, she was
aware of herself as barely listening to and not comprehending a video.
Sample 8.5 was similar, though just slightly different, from the previous examples. At
8.5, [Laura was watching TV while eating dinner.] She was somewhat carried along by the TV

was confident that it was not merely nothing in experience]. In experience, she sensed herself to
be unengaged, again a meta-awareness of her lack of experience.
Thus, at all three of the samples (6.4, 8.3, and 8.5), Laura was not much into the videos
she was watching (or anything else about her inner or outer environment) but yet was metaaware of herself as not much into the videos, a fairly unusual phenomenon by DES standards.
Sensory Awareness
Laura had frequent (10 of 40 total samples, or 25%) sensory awareness, which were
predominantly bodily (6.5 of 10 sensory awareness samples, or 65% of all sensory awarenesses)
and sometimes visual (2 of 10 sensory awareness samples, or 20% of all sensory awarenesses).
Three of the 6.5 bodily sensory awarenesses were of headaches (two occurring on day 3 and one
on day 6). On day 3, both experiences (beeps 3.1 and 3.2) were of feeling a dull ache on the top
of her head and forehead approximately two centimeters deep into her skull. Perhaps
interestingly, both of these experiences were barely in experience; Laura quantified them as, at
3.1, 10% of her total ongoing-at-the-moment experience and, at 3.2, less than 5% of her total
ongoing-at-the-moment experience.
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On day 6 at beep 6.1, [Laura was sick with a sinus infection] and was feeling a sinus
headache on the right side of her face from her hairline to just below her right ear. At 6.1, her
experience was of more than just feeling the headache, however; she was also cognitively aware
of, cognitively (?) reacting to, the pain (a meta-awareness). Indeed, this was not Laura
meta-awareness of a sensory experience. At 5.4, her experience was mostly of innerly hearing a

noticing that her hands were cold from holding a bag of frozen vegetables

a cognitive

awareness of a sensory process. Maybe also her hands felt cold (a sensory awareness), though we
were never sure.
Hearing Emphasis
In general in her external experience, Laura seemed to experientially emphasize hearing
over other available sensory modalities (namely, seeing). When watching videos or TV, she was
usually more hearing the video or show as opposed to seeing the video or show. For example, at
3.1 she 80% of her experience was of hearing a TV whereas only 15% of her experience was of
seeing the TV character on the screen. Even when Laura was barely attending to a video (see
listening (hearing) as opposed to barely watching (seeing).
Hearing was emphasized from other sources aside from TV. For example, at both 2.5 and
5.1, Laura was speaking aloud, and her experience was more of hearing herself speak (or, at 2.5,
mutter) than of doing the speaking (or muttering).
Reading
Laura was relatively frequently (5.5 of 40 total samples, or 14%) reading, always with
comprehension. Though it was not always clear how reading presented itself to Laura (e.g., in a
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voice or not, as a stream or word-by-word-by-word, with visual imagery, and so on), she was
apparently never innerly speaking the words as she read them (innerly speaking the text is
commonly reported in non-DES studies). Not innerly speaking the text while reading is
consistent with another DES study (Brouwers et al., 2018) that finds inner speech of read text to
occur only 3% of the time.

occasional complexity of Laura
computer screen, yet, she was not seeing the words on the screen. [This kind of phenomenon
(experiencing something without simultaneously perceiving it) challenges lay perceptions but is
actually quite commonly found in DES. That is, individuals relatively often skillfully do things
(like reading or driving a car) without the accompanying perceptual experiences (seeing the
words, hearing nearby traffic, etc.) in direct awareness.] Additionally, at 6.2, Laura felt the words
coming towards her but, the words themselves were not in her experience

rather, the meaning

of the words was in experience. That is, she felt the words
meaning of the words is what actually
materializes in experience. Words and meaning are two importantly different things from a DES
perspective. This experience is consistent with Laura
experience of words, perhaps another example of how she experiences words disconnected from
their natural characteristics (in this case, the words experienced separately from their meaning).
Watching TV
Laura

5, or 60% of all watching TV samples), her experience was of hearing the video as opposed to
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Laura was occasionally only barely watching
TV; the video or show was reaching her experience bu

Unsymbolized Thinking
Laura had infrequent (2 of 40 total samples, or 5%) unsymbolized thoughts, thoughts or
ideas that are clearly present (and often quite specific) but not in words, pictures, or other

containing a hint of a word.
The other example of unsymbolized thinking came at beep 7.4 during which [Laura had
just read on her computer about signing up for something.] At the moment of the beep, she was
visually scanning back over the part she had just read and, at the same time, was thinking
something like Would it be worth it to sign up for this? The thought was specific, that is, it would
not be right to express it as Maybe I should sign up for this or anything else. Laura could not be
sure whether there were words in this thinking; she had the
was confident the words were not innerly spoken, seen or heard. What Laura

7.4 is possibly a straightforward unsymbolized thought or is possibly an unsymbolized thought
somehow involving words or possibly something else altogether. Note that we raised this
uncertainty in the interview for 7.4 and Laura identified the conversation that followed as
perhaps the turning point in our sampling with her

the moment that gave her new and

important tools for apprehending and describing her experience of words.
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Feelings
Laura infrequently (2 of 40 total samples, or 5%) experienced emotion (what DES calls
eling was clearly present at one beep, 4.3, during which Laura [was reading an
article] and feeling annoyed that the article was so difficult to comprehend. The annoyance was
mostly mental, possibly also with bodily characteristics (perhaps tension), though we and she
could not be sure. It seemed difficult for Laura to describe this feeling; the difficulty was most

instead of descriptively. We did not see enough samples of feelings to understand whether the
use of metaphor at 4.3 was potentially indicative of some characteristic of Laura
it was for at least one of our other participants, Sophia).
At two beeps, 2.4 and 4.2, Laura had what we

mostly unarticulated and we did not inquire about its characteristics in the interview. At 4.2, the
feeling was slightly more specific: Laura [was watching a clip of a comedy show on YouTube.
. Mostly, she was hearing the show (See
acter on the

experience, Laura was beginning to feel the humor of the joke. We call the humor at 4.2 an
Laura made the clear distinction between feeling humored by the joke and
beginning to feel humored by the joke, the latter which implies a nascent or budding feeling as
opposed to a fully-present, fully-articulated feeling.
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Other
Does Inner Experience Shapes Outer Interest?
We learned from Laura s therapist that her research is at the intersection of words and
music. We learned from Laura
is highly unusual and complex, and that she frequently experiences the properties or
characteristics of words without experiencing the words themselves. This included some of the

accompanying words.
One might wonder whether Laura

-descriptions are the result or the

cause of her professional research interests. Perhaps her inner experience is really very much
like that of others

that the complexity of her DES word-reports arises because her research

interest has disposed her to pick apart the characteristics of words. We had extended
discussions during Laura
possibility, and eventually rejected it. Because DES goes to fairly remarkable lengths to
understand how participants use language and to focus as narrowly as possible on experience (as
opposed to narrative, generalities, and the like), it seems more likely that the causation operates
in the other direction that Laura
professional research interests. She has an experiential tendency to notice the qualities of
language and thus, to study the musical properties of language may come quite naturally to her.
Laura
Laura stated that she generally enjoyed the D
it to be interesting. She believed she had become more aware of her own inner process and, when
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said she was not, after sampling, constantly aware of her inner experience but occasionally
would spontaneously interrupt herself (like the beeper) and notice her ongoing experience. Laura
was also interested in the procedure from a scientific standpoint and enjoyed having that
perspective on the method. However, she found wearing the beeper to be time-

time but still contended that the procedure was somehow burdensomely time-consuming.
Questionnaire (NIEQ) Results
Figure 8 displays

questionnaire-reported frequencies of each of the 5FP before

(far left bar in each column) and after (middle bar in each column) sampling and compares those
frequencies to her frequencies of the 5FP discovered by natural-environment DES sampling (far
right bar in each column).
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Figure 8.
seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling, SA = Sensory awareness.
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DES sampling percentages for all of the 5FP. This discrepancy is typical of nearly everyone who
takes the NIEQ, regardless of whether or not they are psychotherapy clients. Except for sensory
awareness, NIEQ scores are somewhat lower after her participation in sampling, also a typical
result.
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Chapter 9: Maya
Background
Maya is a Hispanic/Latino female. At the time of her participation in the study, she was a
young adult (18-20 years old) and was working part-time. She had completed some college but
was not enrolled at the time of sampling.

presented to the clinic, she completed a self-report questionnaire of depression, anxiety, and
stress symptoms. Her scores indicated severe levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. Shortly
before we ended sampling, she completed the same questionnaire. Her results indicated mild
depression (a significant improvement), severe anxiety, and moderate stress (a fairly significant
improvement).
She completed eight days of natural-environment DES sampling spanning approximately
cluding all day 1 beeps as
training (7 days × approximately 6 beeps per day = 41 total beeps).
Upon completion of her sampling, Maya gave us permission to have a conversation with
erience as
discovered by DES. Her therapist reported that Maya was diagnosed with bulimia nervosa (BN)
and was in partial remission though still actively bulimic at the time of sampling. According to
her therapist, at the time of the meeting, Maya still experienced feelings of loss of control while
eating and purged (in her case, self-induced vomiting) between zero and seven times each week.
Her therapist reported that Maya had been purging since approximately age 16 and binge eating
since age 12. Per the t
Las Vegas but returned to Las Vegas (her hometown) in large part to address her eating

143

pathology. The therapist reported that Maya had been attending weekly psychotherapy sessions
(12
cognitive behavioral therapy for eating disorders (CBT-E) which includes weekly weighing,
d attempts to reduce
binging and purging through problem-solving and changing negative/unrealistic thoughts.

(more or less flat affect) to depressed (dysthymic, characterized by highly negative thoughts).

mood period for several weeks before a change. The therapist explained that she was unable to
say confidently whether she or Maya

Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
Table 7 below summarizes the salient phenomena of

41 experience samples.

Each characteristic will be discussed below.

Table 7
Maya Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
IS

ISee

U

F

SA

Skill ISee

SA in ISee

FM

SAcolor

Count1

1.0

24.0

10.0

2.0

16.0

11.0

6.5

9.0

8.5

Frequency2

2.4%

58.5%

24.4%

4.9%

39.0%

26.8%

15.9%

22.0%

20.7%

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness; Skill ISee = Skillful inner seeing; SA in ISee = Sensory awareness in inner
seeing; FM = Fragmented multiplicity; SAcolor = Sensory awareness of color
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1

Number of samples containing that phenomenon (Recall that phenomena can be coded 0.5
when they are possibly but not confidently present)
2
Frequency = Number of samples containing phenomenon ÷ Total number of samples, expressed
as a percentage
Clarity

sampling, Maya seemed able to capture, apprehend, and describe her experience with believable
confidence and detail. This was in stark contrast to some of the other participants in the present
study for whom lack of clarity and difficulty with the task were central features of their
experience. Indeed, after only her second day of sampling (a day that can often be difficult and
discarded a
have a much better grasp at the procedure [as compared to her first day of sampling]. She was
careful and skillful throughout the interview.
When asked about her impressi
Maya would have a difficult time identifying and articulating what she is experiencing.
According to the therapist, Maya need substantial help and guidance in identifying her thoughts
and feelings,
disorders). One might suspect, as the therapist did, that external experience equates one-to-one
with internal experience, such that a difficulty articulating experience in outer conversation is

evidence to the contrary. Her inner experience was generally quite clear and so, if she does in
fact struggle to articulate her experience, it is apparently not the result of the inner experience
itself.
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describe her experience within the latter two months of treatment. Per her report, Maya was
better-able

erything was

thought or feeling. It is possible

perhaps even likely

on her experience and therefore contributed to her ability to articulate in therapy.
Inner Seeing
Maya had inner seeings (ISee) in 24 of 41 total samples, or 59% of the time. Thus, she
experienced inner seeings quite a bit more frequently than typical DES participants (34% on
average; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2

seeings also ranged in clarity from vague to clear and highly detailed. Different features and
idiosyncr
Skillful.

seeing in some skillful/masterful/clever/accommodating way. Consider some examples (in which
the skillful aspect is underlined for illustration):
Maya 3.1
eople at a fancy cocktail party

the host ever said anything about a party.] Her perspective was as if she were amidst the
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partygoers. She saw generic, undifferentiated men and women holding champagne
glasses and mingling. The people did not have faces and were cut off arbitrarily and
abruptly around their mouths such that she could still see things like earrings and chins
eir mouths.
heads/faces, anyway; she was more into their bodies

but the heads and faces were not

merely in the not-well-seen periphery they disappeared abruptly. The cocktail party was
in realistic color, in motion, and with sound. That is, she heard the chattering sound of
people talking. Some of the women were wearing sparkly dresses and Maya at least
somewhat drawn to the sparkliness: orbs of light, a reflection or distortion of the sparkle
created by the jewels on the dresses.

not a memory of a cocktail party she had been to or
seen on TV or anything else, but a generic cocktail party. Given this is a generic party, she does
not know the guests. Therefore, we consider it skillful that, in this otherwise detailed and vibrant
seeing, she experientially distorts a feature that would be expected in reality
This is an example of skillfully inner seeing by removing some detail.
In contrast, 3.5 is an example of skillfully inner seeing by adding some detail.
Maya 3.5

[Maya was looking at a cart in the PetSmart parking lot. Perhaps she saw
e sure. The cart was unusual: it had a

shallow basket with lots of extra room underneath the basket.] Mostly (70% of her
experience), Maya was wondering why the cart was shaped like this, what it could be
used for

maybe for a sack of dog food or a cage. This thinking was without words,

pictures, or other symbols. At the same time, she innerly saw the cart [exactly the same,
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including the positioning/orientation, as the one she was looking at] but with a dog cage
in the large open area under the basket. The cage was blue plastic (or maybe metal) with
rounded edges and a black door with metal bars. The innerly seen cart was still and
surrounded by a white background. [She was confident that the background was white, as
opposed to simply missing.]
In 3.5, Maya was wondering what the shopping cart could be used for and innerly saw one
possible answer: she saw the same exact cart as the one in reality but distorted one important
detail instead of an empty cart, she saw a cart with a dog cage. This is a skillful use of inner
seeing. Similarly, in 5.3, Maya added detail that did not correspond with reality. Her mother had
told her about a difficult conversation she would soon have with a client. Maya was innerly
seeing her mother and said client having the conversation. They were sitting in two chairs with a

two chairs she saw them sitting in nor does she have any such configuration of two chairs and a
coffee table in her living room. Maya had added this centrally important detail to the inner
seeing.
Twice Maya skillfully innerly saw by substituting details in an inner seeing. In both
cases, she had no experience of the substitution; the details were incorrect, but she did not
experience them as such.
Maya 6.4
d wondered who could be calling her
from Silver Springs, Nevada.] At the moment of the beep, mostly (70% of the total
experience) she was drawn to the smooth motion of the grey and white gradient on her
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iPhone slide-to-unlock button. This was a sensory awareness: She was drawn to the
smooth moving of the grey and white, not to anything about the unlock button. At the
same time, (30% of the experience) she innerly saw the town Silver Springs, a small town
with dirt landscape; in particular, she saw one house with stained glass windows, dirt all
around it, and a dirt road near it. the house with a red sign by it whose yellow letters read
In fact, in the interview for this beep, Maya explained that the house and
sign she was innerly seeing are, in fact, in Tonopah, Nevada, but her experience was of
seeing Silver Springs (a town she is not familiar with). That is, the experienced seeing
was of Silver Springs, but the seen details were instantiated by what she knows of
Tonopah].
In 6.4, Maya skillfully populates an inner seeing on Silver Springs [a place she had never
been] with remembered details of Tonopah [a place she had been]. At the moment of the beep
she had no experience whatsoever of Tonapah, no experience of doing the substituting and,
perha

told her about doing a science experiment at school. She innerly saw par
classroom. She saw two rows of desks facing each other. The desks were set up for an
experiment: Some of them had on them glass chemistry beakers and paper towels. She saw a
whiteboard in front of the room but no people or chairs. Maya explained that the classroom she
saw was actually her own 5th grade classroom and not

she remembered of her own 5th grade classroom.
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perspective. That is, she
occasionally innerly saw from an impossible perspective. Beep 3.3 is an example:
Maya 3.3
she got it.] In her experience, she
innerly saw the cover and post come together. That is, she innerly saw what was, in
reality, transpiring behind the back of her ear but viewed from the back [which she
cannot actually see]. She saw clearly the clip and post and the back of her ear, but she did
not see any fingers. In her inner seeing, the clip and post were somehow coming together
without any fingers actually guiding them. The seen clip and post were in sync with the
real clip and post

both the real and imagined came together at the same moment.

At 3.3, Maya saw herself from behind

an impossible perspective but one that allowed her to

innerly see the task at hand (putting in her earring). Similarly, at beep 7.3, she innerly saw
herself at work with a co-worker and a customer (this beep will be described more fully in the
Feelings section below). She saw herself from behind and to the left such that she saw the back
and some of the right side of the innerly seen Maya another impossible perspective. At all of

intended to mean that she skillfully/masterfully/cleverly manipulated or distorted some feature of
the inner seeing. She did so in a variety of ways: by removing details, by adding details, by
substituting details, or by the perspective itself. This is somewhat uncommon for DES

Simultaneous inner and external seeings. Maya occasionally (4 of 41 total samples, or
9.8% of all samples; 4 of 24 ISee samples, or 16.7% of all ISee) had two simultaneous visual
experiences

one an inner seeing (imaginary) and the other an external seeing (perceptual).
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She saw externally the real PetSmart cart and simultaneously innerly saw the same cart with a
dog cage in it. Beep 5.4 was similar. At 5.4, [Maya was at T.J. Maxx shopping for a plant holder
for her room.] She was looking down at a white plant holder with a rounded bottom. At the same
time, she innerly saw the same white round-bottomed plant holder in her bedroom at home with
a plant in it, the green leaves of the plant showering down. She was most drawn to the sensory
aspects of the plant

the green color and showering shape of the leaves. Thus, at 5.4, there was

simultaneously an external seeing (the plant holder in T.J. Maxx) and an inner seeing (the plant
holder in her room).

seen. Beep 5.2 is different than 3.5 and 5.4 in that the inner seeing did not include the thing
her that her eyes were swollen. Her

amber-colored tincture bottle of Las Vegas Allergy Drops. It had a black top and a white label
with Las Vegas in big letters and a gold block somewhere on the label. She was drawn to the
gold-colored block on the label of the bottle. Also at this moment, she was (20% of the
experience) thinking she should tell her aunt about the Las Vegas Allergy Drops. This thinking
was without words, pictures, or other symbols

the idea was clearly present.

Simultaneous inner seeings. Maya had two (4.9% of all samples; 8.3% of all ISee)
experiences during which there were separate simultaneous inner seeings. This is relatively rare;
generally, if participants report inner seeing at all, there is typically only one inner seeing. Maya,
however, was confident that, at these moments, she experienced two definitively separate (even
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if contextually related) seeings. The two seeings could differ in important ways that underscored
their separateness. For example, at 5.5, Maya had different perspectives in the two inner seeings:
Maya 5.5

[Maya was talking to her mom about how Maya, as a child, used to eat the

cilantro sprigs out of the cup of water and fresh cilantro her mom kept in the fridge.] At
the moment of the beep Maya innerly saw simultaneously and separately (1) the kitchen
from her childhood apartment and (2) the cup of cilantro in the door of her childhood
refrigerator. She saw the kitchen from the point of view of looking straight at the kitchen
from an adjacent room or hallway but she did not feel like she was herself was present in
the seeing. The kitchen was dark with some light coming in through a window.
Simultaneously and separately, she innerly saw the cup of cilantro. However, in this
seeing, she was there. She had imaginarily opened the door of the refrigerator and was
looking inside [It was not clear if she experienced herself opening the door at or before
the beep or if the seeing just began at the point of having already opened the door without
experiencing the opening]. She saw the cup of cilantro on one of the lower shelves (at the
height of a 4- or 5-year-old). Perhaps in this imaginary seeing, Maya was 4- or 5-year-old
Maya, though we could not be sure. Regardless, she definitely saw from the perspective
of a small person. [Perhaps these two images unfolded in some way

first seeing the

kitchen and then imagining herself at the refrigerator opening the door, but the unfolding
was not fluid, was not of her walking to the refrigerator, opening the door, seeing inside.
If it did unfold, it was more disjointed.] [Though Maya described this as a nostalgic
remembering, she did not feel nostalgia or any other emotion at the moment.]
Thus, at 5.5, Maya had two separate visual experiences ongoing simultaneously, one of
which she was experientially in. It was not just that she saw the cilantro; she was there, at the
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refrigerator door, looking at the cilantro. In the other seeing, she was not present; she simply saw
the kitchen.
In the other example, at beep 6.6, [Maya was remembering having filled the soap
dispensers at work the day before.] She innerly saw (1) a metal shelf tilted upward holding two
stacks of different-scented soaps. The shelf was rusted where the bottom soap met the metal
[This was, in fact, the state of the soap dispensers at work and Maya and her co-workers had
been attempting to remedy the rust by putting wax paper between the soap and metal.] Separately
and simultaneously, she innerly saw (2) the same metal shelf with the soap but with two pieces
of wax paper between the soap and the metal. She was noticing specifically the unevenness of
the wax paper. These were apparently two seeings of the same shelf in two forms (with and
without the wax paper) but the seeings were separate. They were not overlaid or conjoined.
There were two separate visual experiences. For beep 6.6, there is no difference in perspective.
Both shelves are seen from the same perspective.
Imageless seeing. Maya had two experiences (4.9% of all samples; 8.3% of all ISee) of

visu
seeing is rare among typical DES participants. Beep 3.2 was one example:
Maya 3.2

Maya is listening to a video while she sweeps her kitchen. At the moment

of the beep, mostly (60% of the experience at 3.2) she was trying to sweep the crumbs
and trash into a neat pile on a single square of tile. At the same time, [the video had just

slight
container like you would find at a construction site. However, she had realized that the
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video was probably not referring to this kind of trash container, so she imagined the
fam
to mean not exactly a trailer but something close to a portable-small-living-structure-thatmay-be-like-a-trailer]. At the moment of the beep, she (40% of the experience) innerly
saw a dry wooded area with dry pine needles all over the ground and scarce pine trees.
She saw the <trailer> in an open clearing except she did not actually see the <trailer>;
that is, she saw clearly the open clearing and she saw the <trailer>
experience

but yet the <trailer> is not actually innerly seen. Her experience was of

seeing and, experientially, she knew she was seeing a trailer, but she did not actually see
a trailer.
Note that 3.2 is not entirely an imageless seeing; some parts of the inner seeing are seen (the
clearing, the pine needs, the pine trees), yet the central feature (the <trailer>) is not seen. Also
note that 3.2 is also an example of skillful inner seeing; that is, Maya did not know what the
video
really know if the <trailer> was accurate, she saw it while also not seeing it.
Beep 4.2 was an example of an entirely imageless inner seeing:
4.2

[Maya was in the car with her sister. They were listening to a song, part of which

includes a humming sound that Maya thought was humming and her sister thought was
buzzing.] At the moment of the beep, Maya innerly saw but did not see a bumblebee.
That is, this was a visual experience (seeing a bee), but there was no thing being seen (the
bee). Maya felt herself in transition, felt that her experience was moving from thinking
about buzzing to something else. It was not necessarily that her experience was
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transitioning into clearly seeing the bee

but, as

far as her experience was concerned, she was transitioning into something else.
Imageless seeing is not simply a reflection of flaws in language, that is, using visual

Heavey, 2006, p. 216). Of course, DES participants (and all of us in everyday conversation)
my

remembering the cafeteria in some nonvisual way. In contrast, imageless seeing is indeed a
confidently visual experience. The person, like Maya, has the sensation or experience of seeing
something except that the object of the seeing is not seen.
Autonomy of visual experiences.

uality. That

is, she could be engaged in some external task and, at the same time, innerly see something
clearly and in detail that was totally separate from and unrelated to the task. The container of 3.2
s mostly of trying to sweep crumbs into a
neat pile; however, she simultaneously had a detailed and unusual (imageless) inner seeing that
was entirely unrelated to the main task in her experience (i.e., the forest scene instead of the floor
sweeping).
Moreover, in a moment of experience, Maya could have inner seeings that were
substantially less salient than other phenomena
phenomena

relatively insignificant compared to the other

and yet were clear and detailed. This is fairly uncommon; when typical DES

participants describe a phenomenon as comprising only a small portion (say, 10%) of their
experience, that phenomenon tends to be less detailed, less clear, vague, etc. This may be
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especially true for a phenomenon like inner seeing. For Maya, however, that was not the case.
She could have an inner seeing make up only 10% of her experience and be just as clear and
detailed as an inner seeing that comprised her entire experience.
For example, at 6.1, Maya was mostly (80% of the total experience at 6.1) wondering
where she left her to-go box of food. This was a cognitive thinking not in words, pictures, or
other symbols. At the same time but only 20% of the total experience, Maya innerly saw the
cardboard to-go box on top of her car parked in the driveway. She saw from the perspective of
looking straight at the side of the car. She saw most of the car, but not the rear end and not the
bottom of the car including the wheels [these parts of the car were not cut off abruptly but
rather, she just was not seeing them. She was focused on the front and body of the car.] She saw
details such as a pine tree behind the car. Maya sensed this inner seeing was fading, was losing
clarity, and it was her sense that, had the beep not interrupted her, it would have disappeared.
Thus, at 6.1, Maya had a clearly seen, detailed inner seeing even though it comprised only about
20% of the total experience and was substantially less salient than another phenomenon.
Discrepant from reality.

asionally (4 of

41 total samples, or 9.7%; 4 of 24 ISee samples, or 16.7%) discrepant from reality or impossible
in terms of the laws of the physical world. This is fairly common among DES participants, which
participants often realize with some surprise. It becomes important in the interview to continually
bracket logic and expectations based on reality as the experiential realm does not necessarily
have to

and often does not

follow the laws of the physical realm.

For example, at beep 2.3, Maya innerly saw a green Whole Foods basket of items, mostly
soap. She saw from the perspective of holding the basket in the Whole Foods store; she saw
some of the interior of Whole Foods, namely the produce section to the left and the vitamin
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section to the right. The interior of the store was blurrily seen. On retrospect, this beep was
unusual to Maya because she saw the view as if walking into Whole Foods, and yet the basket

foyer. She saw them sitting in two chairs with a coffee table between them and noted in the
s or coffee table or any

populated the inner seeing differed from what she knew to be true in reality.
Growing and diminishing. Occasionally (2.5 of 41 total samples, or 6.1%; 2.5 of 24

budding or growing in detail and clarity or fading and losing detail and clarity. For example, at
3.6, [she was at Ross shopping for furniture. She had been thinking about buying a desk for her
room.] At the moment of the beep, mostly (90% of the total experience at 3.6), she was thinking
that she wanted to be sure the desk was not bulky. There were no words in this thinking, though
the concept of bulky was clearly present and was the center of the thinking. Bulky had a negative
valence (i.e., Bulky is bad). At the same time (10% of the experience), Maya innerly saw her
room. She saw it clearly but with very few details

the colors, the beige walls, but no furniture

or anything else. [She knew that she would soon innerly see a desk in an empty part of her
innerly seen room; that is, this inner seeing was apparently an incipient inner seeing that would
be specific but was not yet complete. She knew she would see a desk but did not yet see it].
Thus, beep 3.6 is an example of an inner seeing that is growing in detail.

was an example of a diminishing inner seeing. At 6.1, she innerly saw her car parked in the
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driveway. Before the beep, this inner seeing had been clearer and it was her impression that she
had seen the car becoming less and less clear such that, at the moment of 6.1, she still innerly
saw her car fairly clearly but not as clearly or detailed as it had been some time before.

section above) was another example of a growing or diminishing inner seeing. In experience,
Maya felt herself in transition. Her current experience was transitioning into something

though

that something was not specified.
Sensory Awareness

39% of all samples). Her sensory awarenesses were across a range of modalities: visual (color),

awarenesses were of color (visual).
Beep 2.5 was a typical example of a sensory awareness of color (the sensory awarenesses
underlined for emphasis):
Maya 2.5

[Maya was in her pantry to get some tea. She noticed her pantry was

messy and unorganized and thought that she ought to buy a tea box to organize her tea
packets.] At the moment of the beep, she mostly innerly saw a glass tea box with gold
lining [apparently an imagination of what the tea box she hoped to buy would look like].
The box was closed but she could see through it. Inside were different kinds of tea
packets organized into sections,
focused on the lavender color of one section of tea bags. She was drawn to the lavender
color itself [In fact, she knew the lavender tea bags were her sleeping tea but, at the
moment of the beep, her experience was not of tea or sleeping tea. Her experience was of
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the lavender color which just happened to be sleeping tea.] She saw this all from slightly
above. At the same time but much less salient, she heard music playing in the
background.
Tactile was the next most common form of sensory awareness for Maya (4 of 16 SA
samples, or 25%). For example, at 4.5, [Maya was standing in the cold shade at a crosswalk. She
was crossing her arms tightly in an attempt to get warm.] She felt her body, mostly her ribs, and
expected to soon feel warmth. [She did not yet feel warm at the moment of the beep.] This was a
tactile sensory awareness because Maya experienced a sensation of touch

the feel of her ribs

against her crossed arms.
Like beep 2.5, the tea box visualization (described above), Maya frequently (6.5 of 16 SA
samples, or 40.6%) had sensory awarenesses within inner seeings. Beep 5.4 (described above in

innerly seeing a plant holder [the one she, in fact, saw at the store and was considering buying] in
her room at home with a palm plant in it. She was drawn to the green color and the showeringdown shape of the palm leaves

visual sensory awarenesses within the inner seeing.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Maya had fairly frequent (10 of 41 total samples, or 24.4%) unsymbolized thinking, some

Intentional Doing
Maya experience was fairly frequently (6 of 41 total samples, or 14.6%) of intentionally

experiences the instrumental act of doing something but with little specific attention or intention.
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aspect of the task or had a specific goal present to her in the doing of the task. For example, at
beep 2.1, she was making her bed. She was focused visually on one corner of the bed and was
pulling her comforter over that corner so that it fit just right [which meant, generally, that the
comforter was even and did not hang on the floor.] This could not have just as well been written
as: Maya was pulling on her comforter. The act was more intentional: She was pulling on her
comforter in such a way that it would fit just right.
Feelings and Emotion

samples, or 4.9%). Beep 7.3 was one example:
At the moment of beep 7.3, Maya innerly saw herself and one of her co-workers at work
helping a customer [In this inner seeing, she and her co-worker were both helping the customer
but Maya knew herself to be less involved, standing to the side watching her co-worker take the
lead. This apparently happens for her frequently at work]. In her direct experience, Maya felt
awkward for the innerly-seen Maya. This feeling was partially bodily (something like bodily
indecision as to whether to m
away so as not to intrude) and partially mental. Thus, at 7.3, Maya had an emotional experience
(feeling awkward) that was apprehended as partially bodily and partially mental. This is of the
fairly straightforward garden variety of feelings often discovered by DES; however, it is
somewhat unusual in that the feeling was actually a vicarious feeling. Maya felt awkward for
another (in this case, the innerly-seen Maya).
More often than her straightforward feelings, though still infrequently (3 of 41 total
samples, or 7.3%), Maya identified herself as being in an emotional state at the moment of the
beep yet without any direct experience of that emotion. For example, at beep 5.5 (described
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above
at the cilantro in the refrigerator, she described the experience as nostalgic but yet did not feel
anything that could be called nostalgia at the moment of the beep. That is, she had no direct
experience of the nostalgia.
Sensed Motion
Maya occasionally (3 of 41 total samples, or 7.3%) sensed or saw her own motion but did
not experience the motion itself. That is, though she was the agent of the doing, she had no
experience that would imply agency; she experienced the result or by-product of her own
actions. The typical DES participant, when engaged in some action, is more likely to experience
the action itself than the result or by-product of the action, so this is somewhat uncommon. Here
is an example:
Maya 4.3

[Maya was in the car listening to music with her sister. A song came on

it.] At the moment of the beep, she was, in fact, reaching for the skip button to change the
song, yet her experience was of watching her finger move towards the button. She was

was expectantly waiting for the short beep sound her radio makes when skipping songs.
As in 4.3, these experiences were often coupled with an expectation of what would come
(in the case of 4.3, the sound of her radio skipping).
Bulimia Noteworthy
Fragmented multiplicity. Maya is diagnosed with bulimia nervosa (BN). A relatively
large body of DES research has focused on the inner experience of women with BN. The most
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experience in which multiple, distinctly different, and perhaps incomplete phenomena occur
simultaneously. In one study (N = 14), the average frequency of fragmented multiplicity across
participants was 60.1% with within-participant frequencies ranging from 32% to 92% (Krumm,
Jones-Forrester, & Hurlburt, under review). That is, women with BN had fragmentedly multiply
experience at least one-third of the time and, for some, nearly all of the time. Fragmented
multiplicity has been found among non-BN DES participants, but is generally much less
frequent.

she was diagnosed with bulimia. At that time, we noted two multiple experiences (both involved
two separate, simultaneous inner seeings; one also included a simultaneous sensory awareness
within one of the inner seeings). After learning that she was diagnosed with bulimia, we reencountered each of her samples to code for multiplicity if it was present. We followed the same
standards of coding fragmented multiplicity that have been employed in other DES studies of
bulimia, namely Krumm, Jones-Forrester, and Hurlburt (under review). We identified an
additional seven samples as fragmentedly multiple. Therefore, without looking explicitly for
fragmented mult

Beep 4.4 was a typical example of the kind of fragmented multiplicity reported among
previous DES participants with BN:
Maya 4.4

[Maya was driving, and her GPS had just instructed her to turn left on

Swenson, which was surprising to her.] Most salient, she doubtfully thought something
like Maybe that way is faster? No. This thinking was without words, pictures, or other
symbols

just the idea was clearly present to her. Simultaneously, but somewhat less
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salient, she felt flustered which, as best she could say, was a bodily experience that felt
ng a lot of things, going in a lot of different
directions, in an uncoordinated way. Simultaneously and least salient, she innerly saw the
intersection where she would soon turn, including the green street sign. [However, she
innerly saw the intersection from a different perspective, as if looking at it from the south
when, in reality, she was coming from the north. Additionally, in her inner seeing, the
intersection was far away from her, seen from a perspective as if she was already some
distance ahead (further than she was in reality) and in a different lane.]
Thus, at the moment of 4.4, there were at least three entirely separate but simultaneous
phenomena ongoing: (1) unsymbolized thinking of Maybe that way is faster? No.; (2) feeling
flustered; and (3) innerly seeing the intersection. Each phenomenon was clearly present to Maya;
that is, it was not merely that there were sort of or almost three phenomena present; there were
confidently at least three phenomena present which were highly differentiated. Moreover, many
previous DES participants with BN have reported that fragmented multiplicity can be distressing;
this was apparently the case for Maya at beep 4.4. She experienced distress directly; she felt
flustered, like a lot was happening within her in an uncoordinated, chaotic way.
Thought/feelings. Some (2 of 41 total samples, or 4.9%; 2 of 10 unsymbolized thinking

feelings. That is, Maya found it difficult or impossible to disconnect the cognition from the
affect; they were experienced as one entity. Previous DES studies (Doucette & Hurlburt, 1993;
Hurlburt, 2011; JonesThought/feelings are uncommon among typical DES participants but, like fragmented
multiplicity, have been found to be relatively more frequent among individuals with BN. Krumm
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et al. (under review) found thought/feelings to occur, on average, in 12% of samples with withinparticipant frequencies ranging from 0% to 33%). Here is an example:
Maya 3.4

[Maya was driving through the neighborhood where she grew up.] She

was recognizing that the neighborhood looked different than it did during her childhood
and simultaneously thought something like
this. How did this happen? This thinking was without words, pictures, or other symbols.
Maya apprehended this thought as sad or nostalgic [yet there was no emotion ongoing at
the moment of the beep; she did not feel anything that could be called sadness or
nostalgia; rather, the thinking itself was sad or nostalgic, which is why it might be called
a thought/feeling.]
a was
shopping for a desk.] She was thinking that she did not want the desk to be too bulky. The
concept bulky was clearly present, the center of this thinking, and had a negative valence (Bulky
was bad). Thus, at 3.6, a thought

more specifically, one piece of the thought

had an affective

tone that was inextricable from the thought itself. She was not feeling separately disgust or
distaste or anything else about bulkiness; rather, bulky-bad was one experience

a

thought/feeling.
Beep 4.4 (described above in
example. In 4.4, Maya was doubtfully thinking Maybe that way is faster? No. She was confident
that there was more to her thinking than simply the cognitive aspects; there was definitively an
affectual element of doubt, but she did not feel doubt in any other way; there was no separate
feeling of doubt; doubt was all tied up in the thinking.
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Tails.
to thoughts that are known-before-the-footlights-ofconsciousness to be present but yet, the thought itself is outside awareness. Maya had no such
experiences during sampling.

Maya said believably that she found the DES process to be quite fun, although hard work
during the interviews themselves as, she said, she struggled to understand the questions and give
adequate answers. She said she would recommend participation to a friend. When asked if she
personally benefitted in any way from the study, Maya said she did not think she had, but that
she had learned a lot about herself and other people and found herself, even when not wearing
the beeper, attending to her experience as if to capture it for herself. Maya did demonstrate
improvement in her therapeutic assessments, which may be in part attributable to her
participation in DES even if she does not make that attribution.
Questionnaire (NIEQ) Results
Figure 9 displays

questionnaire-reported frequencies of each of the 5FP before

(far left bar in each column) and after (middle bar in each column) sampling and compares those
frequencies to her frequencies of the 5FP discovered by natural-environment DES sampling (far
right bar in each column).
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Figure 9.
Frequencies (%) for the 5FP. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner
seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling, SA = Sensory awareness.

DES sampling percentages for all of the 5FP. This discrepancy is typical of nearly everyone who
takes the NIEQ, regardless of whether or not they are psychotherapy clients.
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Chapter 10: Ingrid
Background
Ingrid is a Caucasian female who was born and raised in the Netherlands. At the time of
her participation in the study, she was an older adult (60+ years old) and single. She had attended
four years of conservatory to study dance and previously worked as a professional dancer. At the
time of her participation, she worked part-time as a massage therapist.
Ingrid
presented to the clinic, she completed a self-report questionnaire of depression, anxiety, and
stress symptoms. Her scores indicated extremely severe levels of depression, severe levels of
anxiety, and moderate levels of stress. Her therapist referred to her intake score on the depression
Shortly before we ended sampling, she completed the same
questionnaire. Her results indicated extremely severe depression, moderate levels of anxiety, and
moderate levels of stress.
She completed five days of natural-environment DES sampling spanning approximately
y 1 beeps as
training (4 days × approximately 6 beeps per day = 21 total beeps). Ingrid frequently cancelled or
rescheduled sampling interviews, usually due to time conflicts or, on two occasions, because she
was feeling so depressed that she could not get out of bed. As such, we, the DES investigator
team, and Ingrid mutually agreed to end sampling after five days instead of the targeted eight.
We hoped this would lessen any burden on Ingrid and we also agreed that we had reached a point
of diminishing returns with respect to understanding her inner experience.
Upon completion of her sampling, Ingrid gave us permission to have a conversation with
her therapist, during which we discussed Ingrid
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discovered by DES. Ingrid
therapy for the past eight months. He indicated that he enjoys working with Ingrid, though he has
found it to be challenging. He noted that Ingrid values her mental and physical health and makes
therapy a priority in her life.
Per his report, therapy was primarily aimed at alleviating depression. Ingrid describes
being more or less depressed for the past 20 or 30 years. Her therapist indicated that there have
been identifiable episodes of more serious depressive symptoms within those 20-30 years and
that the most recent episode was triggered by a fight with her son last Thanksgiving. Per her
Ingrid had a long history of antidepressant use but has not been using
medications for the past two years. Ingrid
interpersonal in nature, including conflict with her adult son, not having been in a romantic

Ingrid
behavioral therapy for depression (mostly behavioral activation); mindfulness/meditation
exercises; interpersonal/social skills tr
listening, communication analysis); and tracking of suicidality. Per his report, Ingrid endorses
thoughts and feelings about suicide but has never had a plan or made an attempt. He indicated
that, while Ingrid continues to identify suicide as an important topic for therapy, her ratings on an

Ingrid
that he regularly has to redirect Ingrid back to the topic at hand and that she rarely
straightforwardly answers his questions but, instead, provides a long, circumferential story
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before arriving at an answer. This is consistent with our experience during sampling interviews;
Ingrid almost always provided unnecessary context and detail and seemed to have difficulty
cleaving to the specificity of our questions, especially to the time of interest (the moment of the
beep and only the moment of the beep).
Ingrid therapist stated that she experiences emotions quite strongly. He reported that, at

indicated that her crying is usually triggered by conversations about her son and, occasionally, by
conversations about her thoughts of suicide. This, too, was consistent with our experience during

Difficulty with the Task
Ingrid had tremendous difficulty with the DES task. Even after five days of sampling, it
was apparent that Ingrid
she able to distinguish between direct experience and context. That is, there was no improvement
in her DES ski

Ingrid could do neither, even after five sampling days. This was not the result of
lack of motivation; she appeared to work hard at sampling, to enjoy the process, and sincerely to
want to perform the tasks well. However, we have no confidence that Ingrid ever, across
sampling, definitely apprehended an experience at any of her 21 beeps. We chose not to code
Ingrid
not be meaningful and, for most samples, would be impossible. Therefore, unlike the other
participants, there is no table denoting Ingrid

169

We noted that Ingrid
uncertainty even about that sample (uncertainties underlined for emphasis):
Ingrid 5.3

[Ingrid was making fresh lemonade.] At the moment of the beep, she was

pouring hot water over the squeezed lemon. She was probably simultaneously thinking
something like

, but how that

thinking was present was not clear. [This was the clearest experience of the day and,
probably, across all sampling.]
It is highly unusual to have no confidently-apprehended samples of experience after five days of
DES sampling.
Affect during Interviews
Ingrid

uring interviews. Perhaps once an interview, she

would abruptly break into tears, typically when talking about how she has been depressed, but
then recover just as quickly. She would laugh animatedly when no one else was laughing.
Ingrid

extreme when she was not cleaving to direct experience but was

providing context, telling us about her day, bringing up a related memory, etc. We noted her to
be relatively calmer when describing beeps; that is, in the midst of a crying spell, if we redirected
her back to the sampling task, the crying would abruptly cease.
Concerns about Memory
Ingrid reported concerns that her memory was declining. For example, on her second
sampling day, Ingrid wore the beeper while she was in bed, per her report, feeling depressed and

describe one of them, though there was substantial reason to be skeptical of Ingrid
She was unable to describe experience at any of the other three beeps. She reported that she was,
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Ingrid was
highly troubled by this and attributed it to a possible sign of memory loss. She became abruptly
emotional in the interview, crying animatedly about her current suffering (depression) and fears
of memory loss.
Upon completion of her sampling, we asked Ingrid to reflect on the experience and she,

-existing fears about memory loss. She explained that

layer of demand to her faculties. She indicated that she worried her mind would fail her under
such demanding conditions.
Despite her concerns, Ingrid showed no external signs of memory loss. Her therapist also
denied noticing any objective signs of memory loss. She almost always shared in great detail
about the context and history leading up to the beep, including distant (e.g., years prior) and
more recent (e.g., that morning) history. She occasionally confidently quoted people word-forword even when she had not written the exact quote in her notes. She never missed a sampling
interview due to forgetting and, even when she rescheduled, typically did so the day before.
Therefore, it is possible that memory problems contributed to Ingrid
DES task, and additional assessment would be required to determine the extent, if any, of her
memory problems [Ingrid
broached the topic of memory testing with her general physician]. However, it is also possible
that Ingrid
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explained this, in part, by pointing to memory issues. We will consider this possibility in greater
detail below.
Salient Characteristics of Inner Experience
No Apprehendable Inner Experience
Given the uncertainty surrounding all of Ingrid
describe characteristics of her inner experience. Indeed, no such characteristics emerged. We
think it likely that Ingrid does not have apprehendable inner experience of the kind typically
discovered by DES. Another way to conceptualize this is that Ingrid may not have secure inner
experience, or experiences that are clearly inhere in her awareness from moment-to-moment and
Ingrid

does experience, we

will use Ingrid

does not experience.

We arrived at this view based on the following patterns: Ingrid seemed to make no
distinction between context and experience and rarely, if ever, provided experiential details.
No distinction between context and experience. Ingrid consistently confused context
and experience. Context refers to lead-up/backstory/extraneous details/etc. surrounding or
explaining an experience whereas experience refers to directly-apprehended, before-thefootlights-of-consciousness phenomena. Even on her final sampling day (day 5), in her initial
reports for each sample, she blurred the distinction between context and experience, although
when she was reminded of that distinction, she seemed clearly to understand it. However, we
could not be confident that that distinction applied apprehending the beeped experience.
Ingrid
engaged in than a description of direct experience. For example, at beep 3.3, Ingrid was, in fact,
trying to find a phone number for her old dental office and, when asked to describe this
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-

stead of answering about the experience, she would reiterate
context: that the office had moved and had a new number, and so on. Similarly, at beep 3.1,
Ingrid was, in fact, on the phone with a car rental company to discuss a billing agreement and she
said
was not clear if or how she experienced those words and, again, seemed that she may have been
putting words to the context as opposed to describing the direct-experience.
Also see beeps 4.1 and 5.6:
Ingrid 4.1

[Ingrid was scrolling through pictures of her Facebook friends.] As best

we could say, her experience may have been of visually scrolling (perhaps with some
sensitivity/intention to focus on friends whos

friend Francine and would have to remove someone else to do so.]
Ingrid 5.6

[Earlier that day, a potential massage client had texted Ingrid inquiring

about availability.] She was at the moment of the beep crafting a text reply, arranging the
dates and times she was available. She maintained that something about texting was in
her experience but what, if anything, was not clear. Though her text was in words, those
specific words were apparently not present in her experience. [After the beep, she thought
I hope he confirms for a two-hour appointment.]
At both beeps, Ingrid described the task in some detail with little attention to the experience. At
5.6, it was entirely unclear what was in experience. At 4.1, she said her experience was of
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scrolling which may have been true or may have represented a presupposition. The
presupposition would operate something like, I was, in fact, scrolling and therefore, scrolling
must have been in my experience. DES participants commonly make such errors (assuming a
task must be in experience) but rarely after four days of sampling.
Beep 4.2 offers another perspective on Ingrid
experience:
Ingrid 4.2

[Prior to the beep, Ingrid had gotten a call from a potential customer

interested in her massage services. This customer had made some bizarre
requests/insinuations including asking if he could watch his sister get a massage (he
Ingrid if she
would wear a certain nail polish to the massage (which Ingrid understood to signal a foot

Ingrid
and hung up.] Ingrid believed there were several things ongoing in her experience at this
moment but those things were very difficult or impossible for her to describe. She
consistently said she was amazed and horrified at the man and his vulgarity and the fact
that she has to deal with such things, but how she experienced amazement/horror was
never clear, nor was it clear which of those (or both) might have been present at the
moment of the beep. Perhaps at the moment of the beep, Ingrid was innerly hearing both

innerly seeing the toe portion of a foot with green toenail polish. [Both these inner
hearings and the inner seeing should be regarded with skepticism; it took us a long time
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in the interview to arrive at such details and only after interviewers offered inner hearing
and inner seeing as possible phenomena.]
Even in this remarkable situation, Ingrid could not straightforwardly say what was in her
experience. She maintained that there were several things ongoing but never described anything
remotely experiential until we offered possibilities. Her most consistent description was of
feeling amazed and horrified but it was never clear whether this was a general characterization of
the phone call or of what was actually in direct experience at this singly apprehended moment. It
seemed more likely to be a general characterization; if it were a directly-apprehended, beforethe-footlights-of-consciousness experience, she should conceivably be able to tell us how it was
experienced.
Note that Ingrid did provide a fairly specific description of an inner seeing at beep 4.2
(the top portion of a foot with green toenail polish) but, even then, could not be confident that the
inner seeing was in her experience, and if so, whether the experience was present at the moment
of the beep or only during the interview. By day 4 of sampling, participants can typically say
with confidence whether they were innerly seeing something or not. It is highly uncommon that
they would say,
No experiential details. When the typical DES participants have directly-apprehendable
experience (as is usual), they usually spontaneously provide experiential details. For
example, if a participant is innerly speaking at the moment of the beep, he will likely allude to
.). As
another example, if a participant is innerly seeing something at the moment of the beep, she can
almost always describe what she saw in great detail, including from what perspective she saw it,
if it was in color or black-and-white, where it started and ended, etc. This was never the case for
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Ingrid. Her descriptions rarely, if ever, included such experiential details. Consider, for example,
beeps 3.4 and 3.5:
Ingrid 3.4

[A potential client had texted Ingrid to schedule a massage. She called him

back and described her massage services to him. They had just hung up.] At the moment
of the beep, she may have been more feeling than thinking (i.e., more an emotional
experience) that he seemed like a nice guy and that she hoped the appointment would be
conf

-the-fact

characterization that such an event would naturally be more emotional than cognitive.
How or whether she experienced this was never clear. [It was difficult to be confident
about when in relation to the beep these experiences occurred, or whether they were
overall characterizations rather than descriptions of experience.]
Note that, in beep 3.4, Ingrid asserts this is more like (but not definitively) an emotional
experience, but she does not describe what she feels. In contrast, other DES participants will
sometimes describe a bodily component to their feelings; for example, they may feel anxious and
experience that anxiety as a tightness in their chest. In such cases, they can almost always
describe where in their chest, how intense is the tightness, if it is diffuse or localized, if it is
inside or on the surface, if it is stable or pulsating, etc. Ingrid could do no such thing: How she
experienced this was never clear. Also see beep 3.5:
Ingrid 3.5

[Ingrid had just texted a former massage client to wish her happy birthday.

She saw in their stream of text messages that, last year when she said happy birthday, the
woman did not respond.] As best we could tell, Ingrid understood this to be sad/loss
event [because she could not be sure the woman would see the text
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maybe she had a

feature of her experience was not clear to us or, apparently, to her. [Again, it was possible
that her account was only context and not a description of Ingrid
the moment.]
As in 3.4, Ingrid describes a potential emotional experience but nothing of how that is
experienced. Note that beeps 3.4 and 3.5 are already problematic given it seemed Ingrid was
confusing context with experience.
If ever Ingrid considered experiential details, it was only after we had offered some
possible ways that people might experience. For example, at beep 3.1, Ingrid

initial description

was that she was thinking something like I have to stay on top of this billing. As we asked

in words (like inner speaking) or not in words. Only after that suggestion did Ingrid contend that
she was probably innerly speaking. It is possible she was, in fact, innerly speaking at the moment
of beep 3.1 and simply did not know or took for granted how to say so, but it is problematic that
she does not describe directly-apprehendable phenomena like inner speaking until they are
suggested. This is apparently not the result of ignorance about inner speech. On the NIEQ, Ingrid
rated herself as fairly frequently engaged in inner speech and, when filling out that questionnaire,

Ingrid
When asked to reflect on her participation in the study, Ingrid
beep itself (and perhaps also the demands associated with the beep,
such as paying attention to experience and jotting things down) was startling and triggered a
small rush of anxiety for her. The anxiety, she thought, was exacerbated by her concerns that her
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memory was declining. She stated that this was true for all sampling days; that is, the anxiety
never improved.
Ingrid reported that, on the first day or so of sampling, she wore the beeper while going
about everyday activities but that, for day 5, sh
skipping yoga class to do so (which she would not have done otherwise). She described day 5 as

Questionnaire (NIEQ) Results
Figure 10 displays Ingrid questionnaire-reported frequencies of each of the 5FP before
(far left bar in each column) and after (middle bar in each column) sampling and compares those
frequencies to her frequencies of the 5FP discovered by natural-environment DES sampling (far
right bar in each column). Because we could not be confident that Ingrid definitely apprehended
a single experience, her samples could not be meaningfully coded according to the 5FP and,
therefore, her DES frequencies all equal 0.
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Figure 10. Ingrid

IEQ vs. DES Frequencies (%) for the 5FP. IS = Inner speaking; ISee =

Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; F = Feeling, SA = Sensory awareness.
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Chapter 11: Across-Participants Results and Discussion
Heterogeneity of Experience
Overall, the present participants varied substantially in the salient characteristics of their

seeings (Daniel: 47% of all samples; Maya: 57.1% of all samples) whereas other participants had
no (Ingrid and Sophia: 0% of all samples) or very few (Laura: 1.3% of all samples) inner
seeings. As was shown in Table 2

Frequencies (Percentages) of the Five

Frequent Phenomena), the same comparisons could be made for all of the 5FP. Additionally,
idiographic salient characteristics (including
but not limited to the 5FP), a scan of Tables 3 through 7 shows that the same comparisons could
be made for all other phenomena as well. DES typically finds that individuals vary substantially
in the characteristics of their inner experience (Hurlburt, 2011).
Some DES studies have found that individuals with a certain disorder shared
characteristic of their inner experience. For example, women with bulimia experienced
fragmentedly multiple inner experience with striking regularity (experienced by 100% of
participants, on average 60% of the time; Krumm, Jones-Forrester, & Hurlburt, under review;
Jones-Forrester, 2006, 2011, & Hurlburt, 2011). The present study did not find such a
phenomenon or pattern of inner experience that seems to characterize the group people who seek
psychotherapy. Despite sharing the external experience of seeking therapy, they did not
uniformly share characteristics of inner experience.
Even participants with similar presenting problems did not have similar inner experience.
For example, both Emma and Laura came to therapy at least in part because of a struggle with
anxiety; however, their inner experience differed d
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generally unclear, diffuse, and difficult to describe with almost no imagery or other discrete
phenomena. Additional research with larger samples would potentially allow for experiential
similarities within disorders to emerge. Psychotherapists should be aware of the heterogeneity of
inner experience in their clientele so as to avoid making inaccurate assumptions about clients and
applying methods uniformly across potentially very different people.
Atypicality of Experience
Despite the variability in

experience overall, it was remarkable that all but

Sophia had experiences that are highly unusual among typical (non-clinical) DES participants.
Note that Sophia was also the only participant who had presented for psychotherapy but
terminated after three therapy sessions and was no longer seeking any form of psychotherapeutic
or psychiatric treatment during her participation in sampling. Therefore, she was arguably the
most well-adjusted. For half the participants (Emma, Laura, Ingrid), it was not only that they had
occasional anomalous experiences but rather, that their experience was, in general, anomalous.
Anomalous inner seeings. Most striking was the finding that half of the present
participants (Daniel, Emma, Maya) experienced anomalous inner seeings with some regularity
(i.e., more than one isolated experience). Hurlburt (1993) previously observed such inner seeing
features in patients with schizophrenia, who were said to have experiences dramatically unlike
those of typical DES participants, especially with respect to imagery.
Demarcations, borders, and backgrounds. Emma, Daniel, and Maya each had inner
seeings tha
demarcations are highly uncommon among typical DES participants; more commonly,
participants will not see clearly-defined cut-offs but rather, not see or not be attending to
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certain parts of the image (almost always the periphery). Demarcations were particularly
frequent for Emma, occurring in nearly half (46%) of her inner seeings (which themselves were
frequent; 36% of all samples). For example, at beep 3.5 (displayed in its entirety in Chapter 7),
Emma was innerly seeing an animated deer and bear (from the movie Open Season) standing in a
patch of grass and dirt with a tree stump in the foreground between them. The clarity of the
entire seeing was arbitrarily divided along a diagonal which went through the bear and stump.
That is, she saw clearly everything below the diagonal
left half of the stump

the bottom left-half of the bear and the

whereas everything above the diagonal was seen dimly and

undifferentiatedly. Similarly, at beep 2.3, Emma innerly saw the cartoon character Johnny Test
3.1, Maya innerly saw people
mingling at a cocktail party;

trarily

cut off around their mouths. That is, she could see the lower half of their heads, including such
features as chins and earrings, but she saw nothing above their mouths.
ned explicit
backgrounds, which is also uncommon among typical DES participants. The typical DES
participant can either confidently discern that there is no background (they see something and
there is nothing behind it) or that the concept of background ju

.

However, for Emma, the background was often explicit. For example, her innerly-seen Johnny
Test (beep 2.3) was situated against an explicitly white background. The presence of the
background was highlighted by the fact that the inner seeing was bordered; that is, Johnny was

nothingness) visible in the upper right half of the seeing (where Johnny Test was not). Similarly,
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at beep 2.1, Emma innerly saw 4 in a black, serif font against an explicitly white background.
She was confident that the background was white, not merely unseen.
Previous DES studies have observed such inner seeing features in individuals with
schizophrenia. Hurlburt
Discrepant from reality. Daniel and Maya each had inner seeings that were discrepant
from reality. This, too, Hurlburt (1993) noted in participants with schizophrenia; he noticed that
patients with schizophrenia would occasionally see things that differed in some meaningless way
from reality; for example, innerly seeing someone who is known to be wearing a blue shirt but,
instead, innerly seeing him in a red shirt. At beep 2.3 (described more fully in Chapter 6), Daniel
had an inner seeing of two separate though somehow conjoined/overlaid seeings of Reno,
Nevada. He saw from above a two-dimensional map of Reno with streets intersecting in a grid
like pattern. Simultaneously and overlaid on that two-dimensional map, he saw a realistic forest
of evergreen trees seen (not from above as with the map) but from street-level. This inner seeing
is highly unusual in several ways: it consists of two overlapping/conjoined scenes that are
connected yet distinct; the map is seen from aerial perspective whereas the trees are seen from
street perspective; the map is two-dimensional whereas the trees are realistic; and, finally, Daniel
indicated that he knows there are no evergreen tree forests that close to the city streets in Reno
(as the trees were in his inner seeing). Some of the discrepancies are dramatic (the overlaidness,
two-dimensional and three-dimensional) whereas the trees-near-the-road discrepancy is subtler,
more like the meaningless differences Hurlburt (1993) noticed of his patients with schizophrenia.
Innerly-seen, sometimes embellished, words. In 13.9% of all samples, Emma was
innerly seeing words. It is uncommon for typical DES participants to innerly see words; when
words are present, they are more commonly innerly spoken, innerly heard, or present without
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being spoken or heard. Even more uncommon, at beep 3.1, Emma saw the word stream in a
dramatically embellished display. The letters were in thick, block font and italicized. The word
was embossed against a black and dark blue speckled background (perhaps similar to the HBO
logo screen, shown in Figure 4). To innerly see words is a rare phenomenon. To see words so
dramatically dressed up is even rarer.
Imageless seeing. Also uncommon for typical DES participants, in two samples (4.9% of

seeing
something) yet there were no visual details to be seen. She knew what she was seeing (in one
beep, a trailer; in another, a bumblebee) and, experientially, she saw it (it was confidently a
visual sensory experience), but there was nothing to be seen and, therefore, no visual details to
describe

.

No experience? After five days of sampling and 21 beeps, we could not be confident that
Ingrid apprehended a single experience. We concluded, based on her conflating context with
experience and seeming inability to describe experiential details, that she likely does not have
directly-apprehendable inner experience. It is beyond the scope of this study to explain why
Ingrid does not have inner experience. Her behavior, self-

(to some

extent) questionnaire scores indicated that she was in significant psychological distress and
perhaps her lack of experience is in some way related to that distress. It may also be related to
her age. Ingrid was substantially older than the other participants.
One prior study (Seibert, 2009) examined the inner experience of older adults with and
without cognitive impairment, finding that the DES task was difficult for a significant portion of
older adults and basically impossible for older adults with a diagnosis of cognitive impairment.
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Ingrid; for
example, he observed that some participants were unable to produce reliable reports of any
samples, often reporting instead on generalizations about experience that were inconsistent and
even contradictory. This was true even when Seibert adapted the procedure to further minimize
demands on memory by interviewing those participants immediately after the beep (as opposed
to within 24 hours). Seibert speculated that the participants who seemed unable to do DES may
not have had inner experience or had inner experience that was so unclear, undetailed, and/or
undifferentiated that it could not be described. He also noted that cognitive impairments in
memory, learning, processing, speed, reaction time, and executive functioning likely exacerbated

deterioration or disappearance in inner experience as people age.
Lack of centrality/clarity in experience.
from non-clinical DES participants in that her experience was generally characterized by a lack
of centrality (no central focus or phenomenon in experience)
otherwise unclear experience). Typical experience as discovered by DES ranges in clarity but is
generally clear with usually one and no more than a few clearly-apprehended phenomena
ongoing at a single moment. One of those phenomena is almost always the focal point of the
experience and is usually experienced more clearly or in more detail.
For Laura, in contrast, experience seemed to be on the continuum of nothing, such that,
even when phenomena were present, they were, at best, unclear, unarticulated, or otherwise

Words were understood to be ongoing, but she could not specify what the specific words were or
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as with all of her
experiences) was not the result of a lack of effort or engagement or skill: she appeared genuinely
interested in and committed to describing her experiences with fidelity and seemed genuinely to
struggle with how to describe her experience of words during each of her eight sampling
interviews. That is, the difficulty in description seemed to be a reflection of the experiences
themselves: Laura did not experience phenomena (especially words) in a clear, discrete, explicit
way.
Fragmented multiplicity. Maya experienced multiplicity in 22% of all samples.
Fragmented multiplicity is the experience of strikingly multiple, separate, usually disjointed
phenomena occurring simultaneously (Jones-Forrester, 2006, 2009; Jones-Forrester & Hurlburt,
2011). Maya 4.4, which appears in its entirety in Chapter 9, was one such example. At the
moment of beep 4.4, t
experience: doubtfully thinking Maybe that way is faster? feeling flustered in a complicated
bodily way, and innerly seeing the upcoming intersection. Note that, though these three
phenome
different contents: thinking about the turn her GPS suggested while simultaneously innerly
seeing a different turn, all while simultaneously feeling flustered as if her body is going in many
directions in an uncoordinated way. Maya 4.4 is, by DES standards, a classic example of
fragmented multiplicity.
After completion of her sampling, we learned from Maya therapist that she is diagnosed
with bulimia nervosa (BN). Previous DES studies have found fragmented multiplicity to be
highly salient among women with BN. In a study of 14 women with BN, fragmented multiplicity
occurred in 60% of all participant samples with within-person frequencies ranging from 30% to
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90% (Krumm, Jones-Forrester, & Hurlburt, under review).

frequency of fragmented

multiplicity was on the lower end at 22% but is still substantially higher than has been observed
in participants without BN. It has been estimated that, in the non-BN population, multiplicity
occurs less than 4% of the time (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
In sum. Decades of DES research has naturally defined a spectrum of experience ranging
from typical to atypical and DES studies of clinical populations suggest that clinical populations
tend to have more and/or more frequent experiences on the atypical end of the spectrum. The
present study lends support to that notion, finding that, in a small sample of participants seeking
psychotherapy, atypical inner experiences were fairly frequent.

have previously been observed in patients with schizophrenia (Hurlburt, 1993). It is possible that
(none of the present
participants had schizophrenia, though two reported a family history of serious mental illness)
but perhaps apply to a broader range of psychopathology. Additional research is clearly needed.
Prospective, longitudinal research with individuals at risk for schizophrenia (such as Daniel)
would be particularly fruitful. Daniel had several anomalous inner seeings and it would be of
interest to see whether his inner seeings changed in form or frequency over time, especially if
those changes preceded or coincided with changes in his mental status.
The question remains as to whether that spectrum from typical to atypical maps onto the
spectrum from psychologically well to psychologically unwell. That is, are individuals with
atypical inner experience likely to be psychologically unwell? And vice-versa?
Emma

illustrates the relationship between atypical inner experience and

psychological distress. Emma was arguably in the most acute distress of any of our participants.
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She presented to therapy for problems with her boyfriend, adjustment to being away from home,

indicated severe levels of anxiety, depression, and stress. Her intake clinician described her as a

client at the clinic because, per her report, she was anxious about attending group therapy. She
was not receiving therapy or other treatment anywhere else. After only four days of DES
sampling (across approximately two months), Emma stated that she needed to drop out of the
study because she was too overwhelmed and needed to prioritize her mental health over any
other obligations. She clarified that the DES task itself was not overwhelming other, but that
making and keeping any appointments was overwhelming at that time. She asked for a referral to
psychiatric medication services in the community. Emma agreed to meet with me for a final
debriefing session, during which she described feeling out-of-control with strong urges to lash
out at her boyfriend and even to hit herself in the head. She cried openly and expressed multiple
times that she was afraid of how her mental health seemed to be deteriorating.

uncommon features such as arbitrary cut-offs, explicit backgrounds, and innerly-seen words,
including intricately-embellished innerly-seen words. That is, her inner experience was the most
atypical in our sample, and her external adjustment was the most disturbed. Her experience was
strikingly like that of patients with schizophrenia (Hurlburt, 1993) and, indeed, she reported a
family history of serious mental illness (she believed her mother had bipolar disorder, which is
closely related to, if not on the same spectrum as, schizophrenia). Note that, as with Daniel, we
before we learned of her family history; we did not recode any samples (e.g., specifically for schizophrenic features) after learning this information.
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DES has uncovered potentially some of the experiential markers of mental disorder
sa) and the
present study lends support to the notion that atypical inner experience may be a marker of
mental disorder broadly. At the current state of the science, these potential experiential markers
of disorder are not well-known and rarely, if ever, appear on questionnaires or in clinical
interviews. Additional research is clearly needed. Methods like DES could be useful in
cataloging experiences that co-occur with certain disorders or that correlate with the severity of
dysfunction. Additionally, clinicians and researchers may be interested in using DES to detect

experience from typical to atypical coincide with decompensation? Likewise, do changes in
ence from atypical to typical indicate improvement? Until the relationship between
features of inner experience and mental disorder is more fully described, those inner experience
features will continue to go undiscovered by typical psychological procedures and will be of no
use to clinicians for diagnoses, conceptualization, or treatment.
Additionally, this and other DES studies (Heavey et al., 2019; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015)
suggest that, simply including inner experiential phenomena on questionnaires and in interviews

The present study included, DES consistently finds that individuals are mistaken
dramatically so

sometimes

about the features of their own inner experience (see Table 8; also Hurlburt,

2011). To our knowledge, DES is the only method that takes the steps necessary to capture
pristine inner experience with fidelity, therefore, those interested in inner experience and mental
disorder will need to employ DES or equivalent/better methods if they exist.
Infrequent Phenomena
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Inner speech. The present participants (excepting Sophia) rarely innerly spoke, whereas
inner speaking is found to occur roughly one-quarter of the time among general population
samples (26%; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Excluding Sophia, who innerly spoke in 30.3% of her
(See Table 2, All
participants (Emma, Laura,
Maya, and Ingrid) experienced inner speech in less than 3% of all samples.
Psychologists often hold that inner speech is important for switching between cognitive
tasks (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Bryck & Mayr, 2005), collecting and integrating information
from a variety of cognitive modules (Gauker, 1994, 2011), and for self-awareness and metacognition (Carruthers, 2011; Morin, 2005). If these theories are accurate, then it may be of some
psychological disadvantage to our participants to engage in so little inner speech.
It may also be useful for a psychotherapist to know that a client engages in such little
inner speech, especially given that many psychotherapies involve inner speech. For example,
eating disorder treatments often involve d

(Metzger, 2014). Consideration of inner speech is a component of other psychotherapies and
interventions including cognitive behavioral therapy (Meichenbaum, 1977); OCD treatment
(Wilson, Neziroglu, Feinstein, & Ginsberg, 2014); anxiety reappraisal (e.g., public speaking;
Brooks, 2014); treatment of aphasia (Langland-Hassan, Faries, Richardson, & Dietz, 2015); sport
performance (Hardy, 2006; Van Raalte, Cornelius, Copeskey, & Brewer, 2014); and music
performance (Oudejans, Spitse, Kralt, & Bakker, 2017)
expected to struggle with an intervention focused on inner speech, as inner speech is not
common to their everyday experience. However, it is also possible that they may benefit from

190

interventions that are designed to increase their inner speech. Additional research is clearly
needed.
Feelings. The present participants experienced feelings infrequently. Aside from Sophia,
participants experienced feelings in only 2.0 or 2.5 samples (ranging from 4.8% to 11.1% of all
samples; See Table 2

Sophia

experienced feelings somewhat more frequently (19.7% of all samples), though still less
frequently than has been found among general population samples (26% on average; Heavey &
Hurlburt, 2008). Moreover, more frequently in Sophia experience was an implied emotional
state without an emotion directly experienced (23.7% of all samples).
experience (internally or externally) suggested strong emotion (e.g., beep 3.1, innerly saying
g a quote)
yet she did not feel excited or happy or anything else at those moments.
Feelings are relevant to all psychological disorders, especially the most prevalent ones
such as depression and anxiety. As can be seen in Figures 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10, all of our
participants, prior to sampling, believed they frequently experienced feelings, as measured by the
NIEQ. In fact, the lowest pre-sampling NIEQ estimate of feeling frequency was 82.5%. This is
consistent with other popular questionnaires of emotion (e.g., PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988), on which psychologically distressed individuals typically earn scores indicating
frequent and intense emotion (Farchione et al., 2012). However, social cognitive research (e.g.,
Stone & Shiffman, 1994; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015) cautions that, when people answer questions
about how they are generally/overall (such as on the NIEQ), they tend to base their answer more
heavily on experiences that are consistent with their self-theories. For example, if someone is in
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asking about their general experience, will give answers describing experiences that fit that selftheory, regardless of the characteristics of their own actual experience. That is, they will base
their answer largely on judgment of themselves as anxious

even if anxiety experiences are

actually relatively infrequent. Such self-theories are precisely the types of presuppositions DES
works so hard to bracket.
Herein lies the problem: Individuals in psychotherapy (such as our participants) are likely
to have self-theories about their emotional experience and, therefore, may be especially prone to
overestimating or mischaracterizing their experience of feelings. By questionnaire or structured
interview, individuals in psychotherapy will appear to experience intense feelings a lot of the
time. However, these DES results

though limited to a small sample

suggest that individuals

in psychotherapy may not directly experience feelings frequently. Theoretically, a lack of
feelings (e.g., alexithymia; Vanheule, Inslegers, Meganck, Ooms, & Desmet, 2010) could be just
as problematic as an overabundance of feelings, and it would seem important for a
psychotherapist to know whether his or her clients are presenting with a lack or an abundance as
the appropriate intervention would differ. Indeed, nearly all psychotherapies involve work with
emotions. Some psychotherapies, such as emotionally-focused therapy, are aimed directly at
achieving a healthy experience of emotions. If psychotherapists are going to expend a great deal
occurring frequency and phenomenology of emotions, not only their self-theories and
impressions of emotions (as are more commonly probed by questionnaire).
The Relationship (or Lack Thereof) Between Experience and Presenting Problems
our participants as suffering from depression,
anxiety, panic, stress, and bulimia nervosa. However, our participants rarely, if ever, had
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experiences that were directly reflective of their clinical descriptions. For example, Maya, who
was diagnosed with bulimia nervosa, did not have any experiences related to binging, purging,
weight, and shape, supposed to be the hallmark characteristics of experience in those suffering
from bulimia. Considering food as inclusively as possible, Maya did have two (2 of 41 total
samples, or 4.9%) experiences involving food, also thought to be frequent among women
suffering from bulimia. For example, at beep 2.3, she was innerly seeing a Whole Foods
shopping basket filled with soaps and at beep 6.1, was innerly seeing a cardboard to-go box of
food. Note that, though they involved food, neither experience resembled bulimia, as is
consistent with larger studies of patients with bulimia nervosa (Krumm, Jones-Forrester, &
Hurlburt, under review), and that the number of such samples was small. Similarly, Daniel, who
was in therapy to deal primarily with family stress, did not have any samples during which he
was experiencing stress, such as the feeling of stress or a stressful thought. Ingrid, who described
suffering from depression for decades, did not have any samples that could be said to reflect an
experience of depression.
This is not to say that our participants were lying to their therapists or to us. It is also not
to say that our participants were not suffering

certainly they were and so much so that they

sought therapy. However, our findings challenge the taken-forimpressions of their experience
session

for example, what they say about themselves in a therapy

are based on their directly-apprehended inner experience. We think that people do not

know their inner experience well until they attempt an exercise like DES (see Table 8) that gives
them the parameters and skills with which to apprehend their experience in high fidelity. They
cannot therefore be expected to describe their inner experience in high fidelity when asked in
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However, it may be of use for people in distress to learn the characteristics of their
experience. On an individual level, great relief may come for the panic-disordered person in
discovering that, contrary to his or her expectations, he actually rarely feels panicked in his
direct, conscious awareness. On a larger level, the ability to delineate subgroups within disorders
may lead to more personalized and, subsequently, more effective treatments. For example,
understanding that some people who feel depressed experience nothing (like Ingrid) whereas
other people who feel depressed experience frequent and intrusive negative thoughts, images or
feelings, seems of import to psychology and to psychotherapy.
Experience Consistent with Ideas of Psychotherapy
Many, if not most, psychotherapeutic interventions are intended to understand, organize,
uals with serious mental
illness often exhibits signs of a thought disorder (disorganized, incoherent, or bizarre thinking)

dysfunction so that people can think logically and act accordingly. Milder disorders, such as
generalized anxiety, are characterized by excessive worry and apprehension about several areas

broadly aimed at exposing clients to the anxiety-provoking experience and teaching them ways
to replace anxious thoughts and feelings with more relaxed thoughts and feelings. Experientiallybased psychotherapies, which can be applied to a wide range of disorders, are explicitly guided

the therapy session so that it can be described and processed. Mindfulness-based therapies, too,
are directly aimed at teaching clients a new way of experiencing

purposive, flexible attention to

the present moment. One possible explanation for the suggestion that DES can be therapeutic is
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that DES is something like the ultimate mindfulness exercise, teaching individuals how to
adequately attend to their experience and describe it with fidelity.
In the present study, nearly all of our participants had inordinate difficulty grasping and
describing their experience and, for some, had very or entirely unclear experience when the
attempt was made to grasp it. Thus, our results tentatively suggest that psychotherapy clients
may have particular difficulty knowing and engaging with their own inner experience; therefore,
therapies aimed at clarifying and understanding inner experience seem to be a step in the right
direction. It raises
generally foggy experience, would her psychiatric symptoms also improve? Prospective,
longitudinal studies are needed.
Difficulty with the DES procedure
The DES procedure was more difficult to employ with the present participants as
compared to typical (i.e., non-clinical) participants. This was especially evident to members of
the DES investigative team who were concurrently sampling with another non-clinical subject

on the participant or the investigators or the method or anyone or anything else; rather, it is
meant to convey that, in those interviews, we needed to work harder to arrive at what seemed the
same level of fidelity as we might with a non-clinical participant, often spending substantial
-

descriptions of experience and metaphors of experience, and so on).
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This was the case for most of our participants: Sophia, Daniel, Laura, and Ingrid;
however, we did not have the same difficulty with Emma and Maya. For Laura and Ingrid, the
difficulty was very likely an artifact of their experience: Because experience was absent (in
Ingrid

which aims at describing

directly-apprehendable phenomena

was, essentially, impossible. Similarly, for Sophia and

Daniel, their experience may have contributed to the difficulty.
which made her interviews
substantially more difficulty

may be explained by our finding that she was, frequently, in an

apparent emotional state but without directly experiencing that emotion.
Participants Did Not Know the Characteristics of their Experience Prior to Sampling
Table 8

-sampling NIEQ estimates are significantly higher

than their DES sampling frequencies (

ds ranging from 1.13 to 19.49).

Table 8
Comparison of Five Frequent Phenomena as Measured by Questionnaire (NIEQ) and DES
IS

ISee

U

F

SA

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

NIEQa

75.08 (13.38)

58.17 (18.27)

47.50 (17.19)

87.67 (6.38)

74.41 (14.84)

DESb

9.12 (12.04)

28.30 (26.31)

14.58 (7.42)

9.64 (6.17)

23.28 (13.23)

NIEQ DESc

68.18 (9.36)

32.90 (29.17)

36.42 (15.05)

77.56 (3.98)

50.02 (20.28)

t (4)d

26.26

4.07

8.73

70.28

8.89

p

<.001

.015

<.001

<.001

<.001

d

7.28

1.13

2.42

19.49

2.47

Note. IS = Inner speaking; ISee = Inner seeing; U = Unsymbolized thinking; SA = Sensory
awareness.
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a

Each NIEQ subscale is the average of the Frequently and Generally item; ranges from 0 (never)
to 100 (all of the time)
b
Excluding Ingrid whose samples could not be meaningfully coded by 5FP
c
NIEQ percentage minus DES percentage
d
Comparing NIEQ percentage vs. DES percentage, nondirectional, dependent samples

the 5FP were dramatically higher than how frequently they experienced the 5FP according to
natural-environment sampling. However, this over-estimate is a consistent finding in DES with
non-clinical populations as well (Hurlburt, 2011). Figures 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 break this
information down by participant. There are perhaps two exceptions: Daniel (Figure 3) and
Emma

7) pre-sampling NIEQ estimates of inner seeing (ISee) were impressively close

to their ISee frequency as discovered by DES. However, their pre-NIEQ estimates of all other
phenomena were highly discrepant from their DES results.
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Chapter 12: Conclusion
Psychology is, directly or indirectly, concerned with the inner worlds of people. The
er experience

a negative thought, a feeling

of panic, a fear of contamination, an overwhelming emotion, and so on. Because thoughts,
feelings, and the like are, by definition, private inner experience, psychologists and
psychotherapists must necessarily ask about them. This is typically done using retrospective
questionnaires or clinical interviews; however, such methods invite errors in recall, biases, self-

experience itself. Thus, the inner experience of individuals in psychotherapy

while of great

importance to psychology remains to be described in high fidelity.
The present study attempted a step in that direction by identifying individuals of interest
(men and women seeking and/or currently engaged in psychotherapy) and carefully wading into
the waters of their inner experience.
Overall, the present study found significant variability of experience between
participants. There did not appear to be a shared form or pattern of experience that characterizes
individuals who seek psychotherapy. However, the present participants did have atypical
experiences fairly frequently, certainly more frequently than is observed among non-clinical
populations. For example, half of the present participants experienced highly unusual inner
seeings which have previously been noted in individuals with schizophrenia. It is possible that
atypical inner experience is a marker of mental disorder, though future studies are required to
explore that association.
As is typical of DES participants, our participants were not aware, prior to sampling, of
the characteristics of their general inner experience and grossly overestimated, on questionnaire,
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how frequently they experience each of five common phenomena. As such, the present
participants (and, likely, all people) are not in an advantageous position to accurately describe
their inner experience with fidelity, including in psychotherapy or on questionnaires and rating
scales used for therapy or research.
experiences were not directly reflective of the problems they described to their therapists. This
discrepancy between experience and self-report underscores the importance of methods such as
DES that aim for high-fidelity apprehensions of inner experience and can provide new and
provocative glimpses into the experience of populations of interest, such as individuals in
psychotherapy.
Limitations & Directions for Future Research
Several directions for future research have already been noted. A potential next-step to
this particular study would be to more closely examine the link between inner experience and
psychotherapy. This would involve prospective, longitudinal sampling beginning, preferably,
before an individual begins psychotherapy. With adequate pre-therapy sampling, thee
characteristic experience (before therapy) could be established and that could then
be compared to their experience during and after therapy. Comparison would conceivably
involve examination of salient phenomena (and their frequencies) before and during/after
therapy. Additionally, it would be useful to collect psychotherapy data (e.g., outcome tracking
data, scores on mood and other psychological scales) in close proximity to experience sampling

and stress measure (DASS), however those scores were not necessarily obtained in close
proximity to sampling days and therefore, comparison was difficult. Future studies may consider
accessing a measure of distress/functioning from each therapy session and sampling inner
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experience close to session dates so that those data (questionnaire or other therapy data vs.
experience sampling) can be compared. It may also be interesting to know which
psychotherapeutic interventions, exactly, were implemented at each session so as to look for
potential experience-level changes resulting from interventions.
Though typical of the sample sizes in other qualitative research (Rennie, 2012), the
present study had a small sample

six participants. Therefore, it was difficult to draw definitive

conclusions about the present sample and even more difficult to draw conclusions that would
generalize to a larger population. If possible, future research should engage larger samples.
Future researchers may also wish to be more specific about the makeup of their samples. In the
present study, we opted to cast a wide net, recruiting, broadly, individuals seeking psychotherapy
and, indeed, our participants were diverse with respect to diagnoses and presenting problems. It
may be of interest to sample with individuals in psychotherapy who share a specific diagnosis or
to sample with individuals who are all engaged in a specific type of psychotherapy.
Engaging large samples of participants is difficult for researchers employing DES given
the time-intensive nature of the procedure, however, the time required seems necessary and
virtuous if one is aiming for high-fidelity apprehensions of inner experience. There is, in
psychology, a movement in favor of more idiographic approaches (Lamiell, 1981) and, with that
movement, will hopefully come novel ideas for analyzing and interpreting idiographic data in
ways that maintain fidelity to experience.
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Appendix of Participant Samples
Key
The following is intended to be helpful for understanding the raw DES samples of experience
below.

Samples occasionally include abbreviations referring to DES investigators. For the present study:
AK = Alek Krumm
RTH = Russell Hurlburt
CK = Cody Kaneshiro
SAM = Stephanie Moynihan

Commonly used abbreviations:
IS = Inner Speaking
IH = Inner Hearing
SA = Sensory Awareness
F = Feeling
F Bodily = Bodily Feeling
F Mental = Mental Feeling
U = Unsymbolized Thinking
Doing of = The intentional, engaged doing of some particular phenomena; for example,
at beep 4.4, Sophia is moving her shoes back-and-forth to create a pattern of sparkly dots
(the reflection of the sparkles on her shoes) on the floor. Her experience is of watching
the sparkly dots (a sensory awareness); however, she is engaged in creating that sensory
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Other:
Square Brackets [ ] are used to separate out anything that is not in direct experience. In
brackets, you will find context, commentary, and other information that is helpful in
completing the description but was not directly-apprehended in experience by the
participant.
Question marks ? are used to convey uncertainty in the coding of a sample. Generally
speaking, more question marks (??? or more) suggests greater uncertainty.
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Sophia Samples
1.1

[Sophia is making chocolate chip pancakes. She is trying not to burn the chocolate chips

like she did the last time she made pancakes.] At the moment of the beep, she is (mostly) telling

chips.] Her experience is probably of speaking (as opposed to hearing herself speak), [but she
was not confident about that in the interview and she was not able to answer other questions
about the inner voice characteristics, e.g., inflection]. Simultaneously but less predominant, she
is singing at the top of her lungs along with the music playing [She could not remember which
song.]

1.2

[Sophia

She is into both the act of singing and the words/meaning conveyed by the song [It was unclear
in the interview how, exactly, the meaning of the song was present to her, but she was confident
the words/meaning were central to the experience. Interestingly, though both Sophia and Lady

own.] Sophia may also be feeling happy/tingly (which may involve some experience of
goosebumps) [In fact, she is playing and singing along with this song because it makes her

this time.] Sophia may also be into her own choreography, energetically dancing/twirling her
body and gesturing/moving her arms and hands, though she was less confident about this aspect
of her experience and it did not emerge until relatively late in the interview.
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1.3

[Sophia

all the things she has to do

unpleasant emotional experience. She feels a mixture of primarily frustration and disappointment
[apparently due to the fact that she does not like her therapist at her current clinic as much as she
liked her therapist at a previous clinic.] Some sort of comparison (whether this was a thought,
feeling, or something else was not clear) between her current therapy and her former therapist at
is ongoing in Sophia
may include some details like the fact that her former therapist was Spanish-speaking whereas
her current therapist is not) [In the interview, Sophia began by describing this comparison as a
visual experience, that is, that she was seeing a comparison of two lists, but we later determined
this was more of a metaphor and Sophia was not actually seeing anything.]

1.4

Sophia is trying to fit items into her lunch bag. This is an instrumental doing

the

movement, the placing and fitting of objects.

1.5

[Sophia

Sophia

-length [somewhat like

the mannequin heads used by hairstylists in training. If the person has facial features, she is not
attending to them. Sophia was not confident she was seeing her own hair; the distinction to be
made is whether she was seeing her hair or whether she was seeing hair and it happened to look
like hers.]
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She sees the space buns hairstyle clearly and in accurate color. The space buns hairstyle is still
[but is not an image or a picture of a space buns hairstyle

it is more the unfolding seeing of a

scene in which there is no motion.] What she sees at the moment of the beep is one of a
succession of options, each displayed individually, one-after-the-other. [She apparently engaged
with each of these seeings for some time, considering things like
straighten my hair.]

2.1

[Sophia is trying to conceptualize a timeline for completing her WPA proposal. She is

apparently basing this conceptualization on the steps Kristen, her lab advisor, gave her in an email earlier.] At the moment of the beep, she is innerly saying in her own voice with little
sitation that Sophia was,

like an explanation for the context of this experience. RTH is in approximate agreement with
this concern. It took a lot of interview time before we arrived at the simpler inner speech
description. Prior to that, Sophia had been giving general descriptions and background
explanations, all in response to the moment-of-the-beep inquiry. So he is worried about the
possibility that the desc
metaphor rather than an experiential description. That is, whereas it is doubtless true that at the
moment of the beep Sophia is trying to conceptualize a timeline, and it is metaphorically
accurate to say that it is as if she were
so confident that she actually was innerly saying that.] Coding: IS??? [Difficulty in
apprehension???]
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2.2

[Sophia

go to therapy.] She feels anxious, a

weight/pressure (roughly five pounds) on the external surface of her chest pushing inward
perpendicular to her body. She feels this in a palm-sized region in the center of her upper chest.
[Sophia knows this pressing on her chest to be anxiety, but there is more to this anxiety

it is

moment of the beep, she feels anxious, which is a pressing on her chest, and a need to get out.
She understands this anxiety as arising from the impending therapy appointment, but there is not
a separate thought about the nor a meta-awareness of the anxiety-as-arising-from-her-therapyclinic. But the anxiety is not free-floating; it is apprehended as anxiety-arising-from-clinic.
Coding: F bodily (Anxiety about therapy)

2.3

[Sophia had made a mistake on her application to a graduate program. Prior to the beep,

she had e-mailed her mentor about this mistake and had received a reply form her mentor that
said, in effect,

From reading this e-mail, Sophia felt
-

her initial relief from the e-mail. [It seems to Sophia that the initial relief had included bodily
aspects, a lack of bodily tension, and that she had been feeling this lack of tension, but she is no
longer into any of these bodily aspects at the moment of the beep.] Simultaneously, Sophia is
innerl
-mail. Interestingly, though,] the heard voice,

Sophia

Sophia hears
Sophia hears an
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external voice. A lengthy discussion ensued in which Sophia explained, when RTH asked how

over there where he is sitting and (simultaneously and contiguously) in a space outside of her
ears on both sides of her head. This was, she said convincingly, not a metaphorical description
(not as if she hears Dr. H just outside her ears), but that she actually hears him in two regions (or
one elongated region that stretches from) where he is seated to around her ears. Sophia was
inside or mental (RTH cannot recall which) and was not in
Coding: F (relief or the absence of
tension??), IH (creative? Or at least not accurate), unusualness of where she hears a voice

2.4

[Sophia is coloring mindfully]. She is into the repetitive strokes of the coloring [and was,

apparently, before the beep, more into the visual aspects of the coloring, appreciating the colors].
Simultaneously, she is noticing her calmness, that is, noticing the absence of overwhelmingness
both in her mind [where overwhelmingness might be something like racing thoughts, though she
is not specifically noticing the absence of racing thoughts] and body [where overwhelmingness
might be something like tension in her shoulders, though she is not specifically noticing the
absence of shoulder tension.] [In the interview, Sophia explains that she can call her coloring
because she feels calm; that is, if she had not simultaneously felt calm, she would not
have been coloring mindfully.] Coding: SA bodily (strokes), meta-awareness of absence of F (cf.
2.3), doing of intended feeling (coloring to calm)

2.5

[Sophia is reading an e-

uote by Rumi, which she has

just finished reading at the moment of the beep. Sophia likes this quote, maybe especially the
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concept of beauty within it.] Her experience is equally of seeing the quote, accurately perceiving
it as it is presented on the screen, and of feeling her smile [apparently because of the quote]. She
feels the right side of her lip curl up into a smile [Both sides of her mouth may have been curling
up, Sophia is not sure. Regardless, her experience is only of the right side. RTH agrees that she
was confident that her experience had been of the right side, but this conviction came only (he
thinks) after she simulated in the interview her smile. So it is possible her experience in the
interview was of a right-side smile, which she then inferred backwards to the moment of the
beep.] Coding: SA bodily (smile), seeing

3.1

[Sophia had been looking at the biography page for a professor at a graduate program

with whom she applied to work. Just before the beep, Sophia had read that one of this
interests is crafting. This also happens to be one of Sophia

ean something like

.]

Less so (30%), Sophia is seeing the word crafting on the screen and maybe also thinking about
the concept crafting. Coding: IS with enthusiasm, seeing/cognition (a word)

3.2

[Earlier, Sophia had been chatting

silly saying she and her family members have used for years. In response, her aunt had said

a commercial. Some time later, Sophia is sitting on her bed reflecting on their earlier
that
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was from a commercial

family.] This is a cognitive experience; she is cognizing about the earlier conversation with her
aunt. There are no words directly present (e.g., spoken, seen, heard) to Sophia at the moment of
the beep, including even the words

[Sophia may also have been aware (meta)

of the reflective/pensitive/pensive way she was thinking. She could not be sure.] [RTH thinks it
is somewhat more difficult than with other participants to clarify the experience.] Coding: U
(difficulty in apprehension?)

3.3

[Sophia is late for a meeting and is hurriedly looking through a PowerPoint presentation

trying to find a slide about mediation vs. moderation before she can leave for the meeting.] At
the moment of the beep, she feels rushed. This is an emotion experience that is mostly (~90%)
bodily, an all-over restless, an urge to leave [Sophia

slides. This scrolling is predominantly visual; that is, she is into the seeing and scanning of the
slides [as opposed to, say, her hand scrolling with the mouse.] [RTH thinks that description
makes the experience clearer than RTH had apprehended it. Sophia was rushed, but whether or
how she experienced that was not clear to RTH. She gave metaphorical descriptions

that it was possible or likely that he did not experience hearing-a-long-slow-story the same way
as did Sophia, and could she please describe that experience without assuming that it was the
I am in a hurry and someone is
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Coding: F bodily (not well differentiated), seeing/scanning,
[entrenched/concrete use of metaphor]

3.4

[Sophia is washing her hands.] Somewhat (20%), she is carefully monitoring her hand

she is not analyzing her handwashing, thinking about the steps to proper handwashing, counting
doing of the handwashing

she is specifically doing it

in the right way, watching to see if it is long enough, thorough enough, etc.] At the same time
and much more predominant (80%), she is innerly hearing a list of things she needs to do today.
Sophia
undoubtedly created the list, and though it is Sophia
this
not at all into the creating of it. Furthermore, Sophia hears her own voice, and it was something
like a recitation, unlike what she would hear in a back-and-forth conversation with herself.]
Coding: Doing of action, IH (list, not conversational)

3.5

Sophia is putting her gym clothes and other things into her gym bag. She is just doing

this, not carefully, not with respect to detail, not mindfully, etc. Her experience is apparently on
auto-pilot. Coding: Just doing

4.1

[Sophia is making cookies to gift to her mentor.] At the moment of the beep, she is

innerly saying in her own voice with normal, nonthese cookies will b

Coding: IS
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4.2

[Sophia has just realized that the marker she was looking for is not in her room where she

is, this is an emotional looking. [Sophia is not separately looking and feeling annoyed; those two
things seem to be one experience; she is looking with annoyance or annoyedly looking. Sophia is
confident she is in an experientially emotional state [yet she does not feel annoyed in any ways
that could be called bodily or mental. She cannot describe this annoyance except to say that it is
the annoyance that you would feel if you were looking for something that had been misplaced.]
Coding: Emotional doing/enacted feeling (looking), entrenched use of
metaphor

4.3

[Sophia has just successfully painted a kitty design on her nails.] At the moment of the

beep, her arms are flexed in front of her with the back of her hands facing her so that she can see
and admire her nails. Simultaneously, she is in
voice in an excited tone. Sophia is excited at the moment of the beep; she is excited in the pose
of her hands
God, kitty nail

Coding: IS with excitement,

doing of action (posing), emotion implied but not felt (excitement), spawned by adornment
(nails)

4.4

[Sophia has just noticed the way the sparkles on her shoes reflect onto the floor.] At the

moment of the beep, she is drawn to the sparkly pattern of light dots moving on the floor and, in
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fact, is purposefully wiggling her feet to make the sparkles move. Coding: SA/doing of SA
(visual), spawned by adornment (shoes)

5.1

[Sophia is getting ready. She has just put on a scarf and] is looking at and seeing the scarf

at the moment of the beep [though she is not drawn to any particular visual, tactile or other
aspects of the scarf]. [Before the beep, she notices the scarf is somewhat old and] at the moment

Coding: IS, seeing spawned by adornment

5.2

Sophia is sliding across the laminate in her bunny slippers. She is somewhat (10%) into

the act of sliding but mostly (90%) is thinking something like Ooooh, bunny slippers! This
thought is not in words [though, when she has to put it into words, they are Ooooh, bunny
slippers!], pictures, or other symbols, yet it is quite specific, [for example, Sophia said it could
not have just as easily been worded Aha, these bunny slippers can slide!] Coding: U/doing of U,
spawned by adornment

5.3

[Sophia is preparing for her upcoming lab meeting. She will have to present updates on

study recruitment.] At the moment of the beep, she is (40%) looking at and seeing a piece of
paper with information about the study on it and, specifically, is focused on the numbers 47 and
48 [of some unknown-to-the-interviewers category related to the study.] Simultaneously, she is
innerly saying in her own voice in a matter-ofSophia will say in the meeting.] Coding: IS, seeing
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5.4

Sophia is singing aloud to the so

away by the music [not necessarily a particular part of the music like the melody or
accompaniment.] This experience is more about the fun of her singing than about the act of
singing itself; she is having fun singing aloud. Coding: F (Funness of singing rhythm), singingdancing?

5.5

[Earlier in the day, Sophia had gone to see a former professor. She is now in her

imagination hearing the end of that conversation again, replaying it. She has just heard her

he conversation.] She hears it exactly as she
said it aloud when the conversation actually happened

in her voice, in a happy tone. In fact,

Sophia is happy at the moment of this beep but whether and to what extent she feels happy
experientially she could

Sophia

professor, the professor is not present to her in any other way (e.g., seen).] Coding: IH of own
voice, F????

5.6

At the moment of the beep, Sophia

ho had just

saying them mindlessly or without feeling. Coding: Speaking aloud

6.1

Sophia

seem to her to be one experience

she is singing-dancing. Both the singing and dancing are in

213

awareness. [Sophia
body move to the rhythm. [Sophia

because she likes the words

and message and], at the moment of the beep, she is perhaps into the message. Perhaps she is
singing the message [as opposed to lyrics or specific words]. Coding: Singing-dancing, doing of
intended feeling (dancing to feel good), Movement: SA?/Doing of intended feeling?/Metaawareness of?

6.2

[A friend had just texted Sophia asking if she is bringing plates to their lab meeting

today.] At the moment of the beep, Sophia is (80%) wondering Do I have plates or will I have to
go to the store (to buy some)? There are no words, visual images, or other symbols present in
this experience, yet the thought is highly specific, [for example, it would not be right to render it
as

]. [Though this thought is seemingly composed of two pieces (1

= Do I have plates, 2 = Will I have to go to store), they are apprehended as one thinking.
Simultaneously, Sophia
the room. She is not drawn to any particular characteristics of the sound; she is hearing it with
minimal attention. Coding: U, hearing

6.3

[Before the beep, Sophia had looked in the mirror at her outfit (notably, a skirt), and was

now wondering whether she should wear that outfit given the weather. It was Sophia
this wondering before the beep was not in words.] At the moment of the beep, Sophia is innerly
st

tone [as in, Go ahead and wear the

Though Sophia

intended to reassure herself, she does not feel reassured nor does she apprehend anything that
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could be called reassurance outside of the tone of her inner voice. She also does not feel
insecure that is, there is simply no feeling (reassurance nor its opposite) experienced at the
moment of the beep.] Coding: IS, spawned by adornment, doing of intended feeling

6.4

At the moment of the beep, Sophia innerly says in her own voice in an annoyed grr-like

Are they in my room? Or the bathroom? Or in my gym bag?) but rather, conveys Sophia
frustration with how she frequently misplaces her bobby pins

something

Sophia was, in fact, annoyed at the
moment of the beep yet she does not apprehend annoyance in any way other than in the tone of
her inner voice.] Coding: IS with emotion implied but not felt

6.5

[Sophia has prepared a box of cookies to share for a birthday at her lab meeting.] At the

moment of the beep, [she is showing her mom the box of cookies] and asks her (in Spanish) what
t which would be intended to be
Sophia is
looking at the cookies, the box, the paper under the cookies, and how they are arranged in the
box, is in some visual way analyzing the presentation. [She is not focused on any particular
aspect of the arrangement;] she sees the box, the cookies, the tissue paper, and so on.

seemed to Sophia to be one experience in which the two component parts were equally (asking,
looking) were equally present. Coding: Speaking aloud, seeing (self-analytical)
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6.6

[Sophia is eating a dish of chicken in a soup-like sauce. She is trying to eat mindfully;

eating mindfully is an exercise she learned in a course on mindfulness last year and she
occasionally tries to do this exercise.] At the moment of the beep, Sophia is tasting
noticing

the taste of the chicken/dish? and is simultaneously feeling

and

and noticing the feel

of the chicken/dish? texture and temperature. She is not only into the sensations, however;
Sophia is also, in a cognitive way, attending to the taste, texture, and temperature

cognitively,

mindfully attending to those aspects. Coding: SA, meta-awareness of SA

7.1

[Sophia is scrolling through Instagram photos.] At the moment of the beep, she

simultaneously feels and hears her stomach growling hungrily. She recognizes she is hungry as
indicated by the feeling and sound of her stomach growl; [she does not have a separate thought
like

7.2

] Coding: SA hunger (bodily and auditory)

[Sophia is talking to her mom who has just asked if she needs to get more flour for the
Sophia

awareness; the act of speaking is ongoing in her experience. RTH thinks the previous sentence is
too meta-awareness-y; he thinks she is just speaking. [Sophia
beep is completely in Spanish; that is to say, the process of translating, an English understanding
of the statement, or anything else is not present.] Coding: Speaking aloud (in Spanish, no
English translation)
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7.3

Sophia is looking at all of the food and decorations she has prepared for her lab

with a curious tone, not of self-doubt but rather, of interest (curious about how her preparations

she may also feel (mostly) curious and (maybe also) reassuring/reassurance. If she feels curious,
it is mostly a mental feeling but is also slightly bodily, an antsy bodily sensation. [The distinction
to be made is whether Sophia

and simultaneously feels curious or if
is her feeling of curiosity.] Coding: IS (self-

analytical), doing of intended feeling (reassurance), F??? mental??? bodily???

7.4

[Sophia

e and, at the moment

of the beep, stops cooking to sing a part of the song she finds especially catchy and fun.] At the

with the musicality and the vocal range. [Her experience is not about the message the song
conveys; cf. 6.1. Though she is, in fact, dancing and waving her hands, she is not at all into or
aware of her dancing at the moment of this beep; cf. 1.2, 6.1] Coding: F (Funness of singing
musicality and vocal range)

7.5

[Sophia is checking on her pizza while it cooks in the oven, is peering in through the

oven window with the oven light on.] She is looking at the pizza, not for anything in particular,
but her sense is that she would notice if something was wrong (e.g., the pizza was burnt).
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Simultaneously and equally present, she smells the good smell of the pizza. Coding: Seeing
(analytical), SA smell

7.6

[Sophia is wondering how her party planning including all of the food and decorations

she prepared will be received by her lab members.] At the moment of the beep, she is innerly
-of-fact tone. She is not
speaking to anyone in particular, including herself or the members of her lab; [she is commenting
Coding: IS, spawned by adornment?

8.1

[Sophia has received an invitation to interview at a graduate school. She is thinking about

grad school, the interview, etc. and is overwhelmed.] Present in her experience are multiple
[more than one, less than one hundred, but their number is not experientially specific]

and are not clearly articulated [though, in the interview, Sophia can articulate what they might
be, including:
live with in Reno?
adequate term) are experienced as overwhelmingness. Simultaneously and in parallel and
equally present, Sophia feels overwhelmed as heaviness and tightness in an (approximately)
palm-sized region in the center of her upper chest). Heaviness and tightness are not synonymous
they are two separate bodily sensations that are both aspects of the feeling of
overwhelmingness. She feels heaviness inside, under the surface of, her chest. [This heaviness is
not pressure but rather, is like a weight or structural rigidity that is in the way of the space she
needs to fill her lungs and breathe]. Separately and simultaneously, she feels tightness, a
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constraint on her breathing, also inside and under the surface of her chest. Coding: Multiplicity,
U, F bodily x 2 (two aspects, specific areas)

8.2

[Sophia is trying to calm herself down by reading a book about anxiety.] At the moment

of the beep, she is reading with comprehension, taking in the message of the book. She is innerly
speaking the words she is reading. She is innerly speaking in her own voice but not with no
inflection or natural prosody; for example, she pauses at the end of a paragraph but does not
pause for periods or commas within a paragraph [That is, if we could listen inside Sophia, we
would not notice the end of a sentence if it was within a paragraph but we would notice the end
of a paragraph. Interestingly, Sophia believes this to be the way she silently reads in English.
English is not her first language and she explained that, when reading in English, it takes effort
to do appropriate inflection, even when speaking aloud, and that, when speaking silently, she
does not make the effort. It is her impression that reading in Spanish is not this way; the
appropriate inflection comes naturally.] Coding: Doing of intended feeling (reading to reduce
anxiety), IS while reading (no pauses for punctuation)

8.3

At the moment of the beep, Sophia

The inner speaking is performed in her own in an extremely anxious tone [in the interview,
Sophia described the tone of her inner voice as sounding like her normal speaking voice. Sophia,
however, believed that her normal speaking voice always sounds anxious, and thus the inner
speaking was performed in the same perceived anxious tone. That is, Sophia understood herself
to be speaking in an extremely anxious way; that she usually speaks in an anxious but not-soextremely anxious way, and yet the beeped speaking could not be differentiated from the usual
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speaking]. Simultaneously

and equally present

Sophia feels overwhelmed, in that she feels

chest heaviness and tightness in a palm-sized region in her upper chest. [The heaviness and
tightness is identical to the heaviness and tightness of 8.1.] Coding: IS with anxious tone, F
bodily

8.4

[Sophia is again reading a book about anxiety in an attempt to calm herself down. She

CK understanding is that she found the passage to be comforting, touching, or sweet.]
Simultaneously and equally present in experience (50%), Sophia feels herself smiling; she
attends specifically to the right side of her mouth upturned [The left side may also be upturned at
the moment of the beep, but Sophia
premeditated. That is, she is not purposefully smiling, yet she is the agent in this smiling. She
feels herself smiling, not merely a smile somehow creeping across her face.] Coding: Doing of
intended feeling (reading to calm), speaking aloud, SA bodily (smile)

8.5

[Sophia recalls a conversation she had with her mentor a week before. Her mentor had

given her advice about graduate school and Sophia is recalling or re-experiencing how that
advice made her feel.] At the moment of the beep, she feels relieved [This was perhaps not the
best word to describe how Sophia felt but it was the closest we could come to a single
descriptor], both as an absence of the overwhelmingness (cf. 8.1 and 8.3) and [a presence of]

calm or pleasantness. Regardless, she feels good.] This is a mental and bodily feeling. She feels
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(50%)
comparative way [that is, compared to the overwhelmingness of thoughts before], that this is
good. She feels (50%) the absence of heaviness and tightness in her chest [bodily feeling of
overwhelmingness, cf. 8.1 and 8.3] and cognitively recognizes this as good. [Sophia was
confident that it is not merely that she feels the absence of the overwhelmingness which is, in
fact, good. She feels the absence and separately and simultaneously, she apprehends (in a
cognitively recognizing way) good.] Coding: F mental and bodily (the absence of
overwhelmingnes but also the presence of something), doing of intended feeling (recalling
conversation to feel relief)

8.6

[Sophia was packing her bag for school the next day.] At the moment of the beep, Sophia

is putting her research notebook in her bag. [The putting involves some attention, but not in a
meta-awareness way.] Coding: Just doing

Daniel Samples
1.1

[Daniel is driving. Sometime befo

-hearing or stillhearing
other accompaniment, but Daniel
actually playing in reality before; [whether he actually hears all the details, accompaniment, etc.
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1.2

[Before the beep, Daniel

beep, Daniel is reading the article headline intentionally [though it is not clear whether reading
was ongoing in his experie
comment in light of the headline; that is, something like What about the article made her say
this? What is she reacting to? Etc. Though Daniel
before the beep, her words are somehow still present to him at the moment of the beep, though it
is unclear how. Simultaneously, Daniel
perhaps is attending specifically to the guitar part of the song. Daniel

something more figurative, as in the experience was less clear or less salient.
Note: At the end of the interview, Daniel mentioned that, at this beep, he felt particularly unsure

1.3

[Daniel
to take his

friends) is ongoing, perhaps not. Undoubtedly, one of the options of where to take his friends,]
the restaurant Firefly, is present to him (80/90%). Daniel is innerly seeing the interior of Firefly
at night, though not very clearly and with little detail. [There was heavy subjunctification in
Daniel
Firefly as if from just inside the front door: the hostess podium is in front of him and to the right;
ark; the interior is reddish in color; there are seats. Daniel

222

much less salient (10/20%), Daniel is innerly hearing the same song
by Jason Mraz and perhaps is again especially attending to or into the guitar in the song.
[Daniel
He denied that he meant this literally, but RTH thinks time will tell.]

1.4

[Daniel is using the app Duo Lingo. The app has prompted him to provide a Japanese

word.] At the moment of the beep, he is innerly saying the Japanese word, the one he will soon
type into the app. This is likely in his own voice though he could not be sure at the time of the
interview.

2.1

[Daniel

Perhaps this reading is in Daniel

lly

outside his awareness. If there is anything in Daniel
describe; he bestnever clear what was meant by this. [Note: We perhaps departed from this beep early. Daniel
himself thought this would be the most difficult beep to describe and it seemed he was right

we

anything, was in his experience. Nearly all of the interview about this beep was designed to make
Coding: Nothing??

2.2

[Daniel is grading papers on a computer and is checking the word count within a section
-up screen containing information about the text, including the
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word count, is now on the screen.] At the moment of the beep Daniel is (less) looking on this
pop-up screen, zoomed in on the region where the word count will be, and, at the same time, is
(more) innerly

Daniel could not be sure whether

ing

this account. It is quite possible, for example, that there were no words present, or even that
there was no thought present at the moment of the beep.] Coding: IS??? IH???

2.3

[Daniel had just booked a rental on AirBnB. He is using the AirBnB app but it is no

longer in his experience. Instead,] he sees a map of Reno and, simultaneously trees which are
part of (overlaid) but also separate from the map. He sees from above (aerial view) a map of

his AirBnB but we did not determine how specific the section was]. The map has few details: He
sees two freeways intersecting and other streets arranged in a more grid-like pattern. The
freeways and streets are depicted as simple lines [though perhaps the freeway lines are thicker]
yet he apprehends them not as lines but knows them to be freeways and streets [though it was not

Simultaneously overlaid on the map, Daniel sees a forest of evergreen trees [that is, unlike the
map, which is more a 2-D graphical depiction of Reno, the trees he sees look like real trees on a
forested hillside, seen from a street level perspective (as opposed to his aerial view seeing of the
map.] The trees are in realistic color. [Perhaps interestingly, Daniel noted that he sees the trees
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near streets on the map when, in reality, there would not be a forest next to the city streets in
Reno.] [The two seeings are simultaneously separate, and somehow connected. That is, the trees
are part of the map; but they are also seen separately from the map. That description may reflect
Daniel

Coding: ISee x

2 conjoined (overlaid, connected, discrepancy from reality, aerial

2.4

[Daniel

-deprived, and just before

the beep and Daniel is probably still tracking her, but in his experience,] he sees his girlfriend in
her bed with headphones on [they wear headphones when talking to each other over the phone or
Facetime] muttering. He knows himself to be seeing the first part of her muttering, that is, the
sounds she had just made before the beep. He is sure that he sees her muttering (i.e., her mouth

sees her from above and to her right laying under the covers in a supine position with the right
side of her face flat against her pillow and most of her face exposed. This seeing is in color but in
a grey-

Danielg to

it.] This experience is somehow funny/amusing and Daniel maintained that the funny-ness was in
his direct awareness; however, it was unclear how. Perhaps it was simply that Daniel innerly sees
Coding: ISee (with sound??, aerial, dark), F (funny)

2.5

[Prior to the beep, Daniel had looked at his work schedule and had seen the name

Jessie looked like.] At the moment of the beep, Daniel innerly sees clearly and in color a still
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image of Jessie [This image exists in reality. It is her profile photo on an app that formerly
housed his and his coDaniel sees the name and blurb but is not focused on
them; he is focused on the image of Jessie. [Even though it is likely Daniel
entirely accurate and misses/distorts some details of the real photo,] his experience is of seeing
the real photo of Jessie, not some other inaccurate-but-based-on-the-real-photo rendering. In the

Coding: ISee,
[trepidation about real referent, cf 6.4]

3.1

[Daniel is in a lab room on campus grading papers with a colleague. His colleague has

just commented on creepy sounds coming from the other room.] At the moment of the beep,
Daniel is innerly seeing the back room: The lights are off and he sees an autoclave machine on
one wall and a couple of refrigerators and a door on the adjacent wall but with few details. He
sees it from above looking down, facing the autoclave machine. Simultaneously, but separately
from his inner seeing, Daniel innerly hears the tail end of a boom-crash-like sound [This is a
specific sound that he knows occurs throughout the day in this lab generated by the autoclave
machine, and it is his sense that he hears it because it is a sound his friend would also find
creepy]. [We are not confident about any of the details in this description. Also note that Daniel
Coding: ISee (aerial, with
sound, darkly)
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3.2

[Daniel is g

grade, he is looking at and consolidating other notes he took contemporaneously while she
performed the task.] At the moment of the beep, he is slightly (10%) aware of the notes but is
mostly (90%) remembering how she performed on the task. Perhaps this is a visual
remembering; that is, perhaps he is innerly seeing (from the perspective of the desk where he
actually sat in the classroom on this day) the left side of her, the student, standing still in front of
the desk where she would perform the task. Perhaps it is not visual at all, but is a remembering of
her performance apprehended in some other way. We are not confident about any of the details
in this description.] Coding: ISee???

3.3

[Daniel

beep, Daniel may be (see the note above) imagining himself in the hallway of the DES lab
having just walked in to tell us [at least some of the DES team but, who, exactly, is unknown]
that he might not get enough beeps and might need to reschedule our interview [there were not
exact words present]. Daniel may be imaginarly transported; he is in the hallway of the DES lab.
He also sees some of the hallway: the walls, the lighting as it usually is. Though he does not see
the table around the corner at the end of the hallway, he knows it is there. Though he may be
imaginarily transported to the hallway to speak with us, he does not see or even know we are
there. [We are not confident about any of the details in this description.] Coding: Isee???
possibly physical transport???
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3.4

[Daniel is watching a Youtube video of the first-person perspective of someone playing a

video game. Just before the beep, Daniel sees a bowling ball roll across the screen and hears the

Daniel is carried along by the video

the visuals, the narration, the plot of the game, and so on

and there is nothing else in his experience. [Perhaps Daniel also thinks, or feels, or knows that he
needs to leave soon. He and we could not be sure whether this was directly in experience or
somehow implied, known on some level outside awareness.] [We are not confident about any of
the details in this description.] Coding: Watching TV

3.5

[Daniel is watching a Youtube video of someone playing a video game.] At the moment

of the beep, he is carried along by the video

the visuals, the narration, the plot, etc. There is

apparently nothing else in his experience. RTH is not confident about any of the details in this
description. [Prior to describing this beep he commented that
Coding: Watching TV

3.6

[Daniel is putting away dishes.] At the moment of the beep, Daniel mostly (80/90%)

hears the sound of his washing machine switching cycles. Separately and simultaneously, he
recognizes that the new sound is coming from his new washing machine. This is a cognitive

more about how it was apprehended. Simultaneously in experience (10/20%), Daniel sees from
street-level and in first person perspective the outer front of a house with a picket fence [This is a
scene he had seen earlier on a Youtube video of a video game.] Nothing else is in his experience.
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RTH is not confident about any of the details in this description. Coding: Hearing, cognitive
recognition/U???, ISee

4.1

[Daniel

does not see the player but rather, sees a recording of the game screen and hears the player
narrating while he plays the game. Just before the beep, the player said something about making
Daniel
the video), the phone and the actual video are no longer in his experience. Instead,] at the
moment of the beep, Daniel innerly sees the side of a mountain rising up to his right (he does not
see the top of the mountain) and a blue sky in the background. The mountain is a dark coal-like
color and is rocky. [What Daniel imaginarily sees is, in fact, the area the player is referring to,
Daniel is recollecting and seeing
in his imagination this area in the game.] This is a still seeing. The top of the seeing is
fa
mountain; he confidently sees faded/dissolved edges. The bottom left part of the seeing is
relatively clear [this is the part of the game that he has already seen]. Coding: ISee (along with
different real seeing)

4.2

[Daniel is on the phone with his girlfriend. They are about to watch a video together

that is, they will each watch the video in their separate location and will talk on the phone while
they watch.] At the moment of the beep, Daniel

video the two have agreed to watch. [Daniel will know the video when he sees it and he knows it
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will include something about a two-ness [this is part two of a video series] but the exact title, the
thumbnail image, etc. are not present to him.] This is predominantly a visual experience

a

visual searching that will presumably resolve with a visual recognition of the video. [Though he
is physically scrolling, this is not in experience.] Coding: Visual scrolling, hearing (slight)

4.3

[Daniel

obstacle but something brought him down off the ledge. The beep interrupts as the player says

Daniel

ame avatar falling

was not clear. AK asked a not-even-handed question about this and Daniel seemed to agree that
he was drawn to the sarcasticness, though his response was heavily subjunctified and suggested
some presuppositions. The distinction to be made is whether he was hearing the player (who
happened to sound sarcastic) or was hearing the player and was particularly into the
sarcasticness.] Coding: Watching TV, SA??? (auditory)

4.4

[Daniel

adDanielg the settings on the settings menu. At the same time, Daniel is somehow interacting

the emotion that he understands the player to be feeling. It is not Daniel
more mental but also bodily (he could not say where or how). Perhaps he is not feeling
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frustration at all but is cognitively recognizing/understanding the player to be frustrated. Coding:
Watching TV, F??? bodily and mental??? (vicarious)

4.5

[Daniel is again wat

made it to the obstacle where he failed in beep 4.1. Daniel has already seen some of this part of
the game, so he is pressing the 15 second fast forward button to skip through the parts he has
already seen. As he skips,] he is looking for the mountain or area that he knows to come just
before the mountain [this is where he wants to start watching again]. As in 4.2, this is a visual
experience; he is looking and will know to stop when he sees it. [There is no separate cognitive
experience of thinking about the mountain scene, deciding whether or not to keep skipping, etc.]
Coding: Visual scrolling

5.1

[Daniel

moment of the beep, he imagines himself in the position of a doctor giving bad news to patients
[Perhaps interestingly, he does not see himself giving bad news to patients; rather, he sees
himself about to or poised to or able to give bad news]. He sees from first-person perspective a
blonde-haired woman (who he knows to be middle-aged though he does not see any features that
signify middle-agedness) sitting and her husband standing in a hospital room. Though he knows
the man and woman to be people and though their shapes are person-like, their features (aside

Any details of the room are also undifferentiated. Daniel sees this in color yet the color (aside
from the
is seeing in black-and-white; the seeing is in color but he does not apprehend dinstinguishable
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colors.] This seeing is still, not in motion. Coding: ISee (undiffere
perspective, cf 6.1, maybe cf 4.4 for perspective taking not visual)

5.2

[Daniel is FaceTimeing with his girlfriend. She is about to say something when the beep

interrupts.] Perhaps Daniel is anticipating what his girlfriend will say. Much more
predominantly, he is adDanielg his iPhone, trying to set it up to get the angle right, which is

phone with perhaps some emphasis on the thumbnail picture of him, though he is not looking at
himself but rather, is looking at where he is in the thumbnail. Coding: Doing, (perhaps
anticipating)

5.3

[Daniel is creating a song that is at least in part about hospital patients. He has already

crea
-in bracelet). At the moment of the beep, he innerly hears the
music track and attends especially to the cadence/rhythm of the lyric (perhaps also including the
melody of the lyric) and how it fits musically with the innerly heard track [perhaps he innerly
hears his voice singing the lyric though, if he does, this was not well-articulated]. Daniel
considers the lyric and music with intention; he is listening for how it feels. That is, if it feels
right, he will know and, if it feels wrong, he will know. [This is not simply about whether the
lyrics sound good with the music; it is also about whether or not the lyrics and music sound
right/true/etc. of the image they refer to, which Daniel is simultaneously innerly seeing. That is,
Daniel is evaluating his lyrics for how they fit both rhythmically and meaningfully with the song
ded as one experience and 60% of
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his experience at 5.3. Simultaneously, Daniel sees an Asian woman in her midwoman he actually knows and the seeing is derived from a memory of this woman. Daniel
knows her to be Asian and in her mid-

owever, in the seeing there are not specific details

that signify her Asianness or midlooking down and, if any of her facial features are visible, they are undifferentiated [not nonexistent but rudimentary, unspecific]. She is standing, wearing a white hospital gown, a hospital
bracelet on her wrist, no shoes. Daniel sees this clearly and in color. The seeing has a white
surround, but Daniel is not sure whether he actually sees white or whether he sees nothing that is
somehow experienced as white. The image is still. Coding: IH, SA? auditory, intentional inner
listening, ISee (undifferentiated)

5.4

[Daniel is playing a video game. Sometime just before the beep, he noticed he was

thirsty.] At the moment of the beep, he imagines himself going to the refrigerator to fill his water
bottle. Daniel at first described this as an inner visual experience: he sees the movement toward
the refrigerator unfold in his visualization

at the moment of the beep he is seeing the

refrigerator ahead and the kitchen island off to his left. Later in the interview the description is
more of Daniel imagining himself moving toward the refrigerator, feels himself holding the
water bottle and moving through the kitchen toward the fridge, which may involve only a few, if
any, visual details. [Note: Towards the end of the interview for 5.4, Daniel
more about having an imaginary sense of himself going to fill the water bottle as opposed to
seeing himself going to fill the water bottle. However, this is possibly the result of a leading
question by AK. Cannot be confident about the visualness of 5.4.] Coding: ISee, Imaginary
sense???
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6.1

[Daniel

served a surgical
-

Daniel innerly sees

interview for this beep ran long, we did not have time to ask about the difference, if any, between
washing and scrubbing in.] He sees the hands clearly in color and in motion from a first-person
perspective though he himself is not in the seeing [that is, the hands he sees
his

even if they are

are not attached to his body that is also in the seeing.] He knows the hands to be in a

hospital setting though he does not see anything else [sink, bars of soap, gloves, etc.] that would
indicate hospital. [He seemed confident (and had written in his notes) that the imaginary hands
were his hands, though his confidence waned after several minutes into the interview. At the end
of the interview, he also could not be sure whether the hands were exclusively in imagination (he
is not at all into his real hands washing but is innerly seeing hands washing) or if there was some
interplay between the real and imagined (he is seeing his real hands washing and his imagination
somehow transforms that such that his experience is of seeing hands scrubbing in for surgery).
At the beginning of the interview, however, he was confident of the distinction between
imagined hands and real hands.].

6.2

[Daniel

ke that of his doorknob

he is thinking something like Why or How did the door open? This thought process is directly
apprehended and specific, yet there are no words, pictures, or other symbols present. [It took us a
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long time to arrive at this thought process, perhaps because Daniel had trouble cleaving to the
moment of the beep and provided too much context, perhaps because unsymbolized thinking
goes against a presupposition. His description was heavily subjunctified throughout. He also
d providing
himself responses), yet he did not experience any dialog.] Coding: U???

6.3

[Daniel
the moment

now brought it to mind in order to evaluate whether
will occur sometime after the beep. That is, the inner speaking is part of an evaluation process
where he previews something he might say and evaluates its appropriateness. Daniel is of the
impression that engag
question is in Daniel

-of-fact (not conversational) tone and

inflection. [Throughout the interview, Daniel was not sure the words were in his voice, but this
seemed to be because the voice sounded different than Daniel usually does and thus it felt less
like him, like there was less Daniel-ness to it.] Simultaneously, he (20%) scrubs the dish with
intention, is aimed at getting the oil off. [Interestingly, Daniel began his description of 6.3 saying

was much later than that

he was washing the dish when the beep occurred.] Coding: IS (IH??),

self-evaluation, just doing
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6.4

[Daniel is watching Film Theory, a Youtube webseries. This episode is reviewing the

Disney move The Incredibles. The opening cinematic presented an image of the four main

the beep, Daniel innerly sees the four characters in front of a blue backdrop and is wondering
who could be the strongest [he knows that question is the center of his wondering but the
question itself is not explicitly in experience in words, symbols, a voice, etc. Perhaps the seeing
itself is the experienced question; perhaps there is an unsymbolized wondering that is behind the
question; we never sorted it out.]
[It took us a very long time to arrive at a rather straightforward description of a rather simple and
clear experience

innerly seeing the four characters with a blue backdrop. Daniel

that he was hung up on whether or not the inner seeing was an exact recollection of the screen he
had seen before or if it was a creation of his own imagination. He realized that perhaps that
distinction was irrelevant to us anyway (for the most part, it was), but he apparently could not
straightforwardly describe his experience without resolving that distinction for himself. AK is
skeptical
skeptical (or, better, ignorant). He thinks it is possible that the clear inner seeing was more a
construction that uccurred during the interview process, rather than at the moment of the beep,
but he is not at all sure about that.] Coding: ISee (clear) [long time into interview before we got
to details]

[Daniel had collected additional day 6 beeps, but we ran out of time in the interview.]
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7.1

[Daniel had just picked up from his counter an In-N-Out cup of melted ice, left over

from last night.] At the moment of the beep, Daniel is innerly seeing from a 1st person
perspective the In-N-Out cup tilted over the bathroom sink and water draining from the cup into

seeing was dark/at nighttime without lights on in the bathroom. [Daniel found this odd because
the lights were on in his bathroom at the moment of the beep. He seemed confident that this was
a night-time seeing, rather than just a grayscale seeing of a daylit scene.] Simultaneously, he is
thinking how much ice (in terms of the weight of the cup he had just picked up, and not in terms
of the height of the water in the cup) must have melted resulting in this much water. This
thinking is present cognitively, without any images, sounds, words, or any other symbols.
[Daniel acknowledged that he knows that ice retains the weight of water, however at the moment
of the beep he was thinking in terms of weight.] Coding: ISee (darkly), U

7.2

[Daniel was re-watching a video of the trick play Nick Foles executed last night in Super

Bowl LII] At the moment of the beep, Daniel is innerly speaking as well as simultaneously
Daniel originally described this

about it

was it really his voice? Yes, it seems like his voice but it was not the way he usually

speaks aloud. The inner speaking has less expression/animation than an aloud speaking of the

speaking of it, which differs from speaking aloud,
wherein he first experiences himself producing the words and then, after a delay, hears the words
in a sort of self-analytical process. That is, in external speaking the process of producing words
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and the process of hearing himself say the words are not temporally in sync

the auditory

process is delayed and comes after the verbal process.] Daniel
monotonous tone and possibly in his own voice (although not in the same voice he would use to
say these words aloud). This makes up 70% of his inner experience. At the same time, Daniel is
also feeling excited/surprised/amazed. This feeling is similar to, but not as intense/to a lesser
degree than how he felt when he originally watched the football play. This feeling is mental, not
bodily. Coding: IS and simultaneous IH [The inner voice is somehow different from the external
voice perhaps because there is a different tone, perhaps because when he speaks aloud he had
a delayed hearing in which he self-analyzes. Cf. 6.3]

7.3 [Daniel
Daniel is innerly seeing a Saturday Night Live skit he had
seen previously on T.V. of actress/comedian Kate Mickinnon sitting on a couch and dressed as
an old person with curly hair. In front of Kate is the Alexa Echo device placed in the middle of a

things, none of which is Alexa. The scene is seen from 1 st person and Daniel has the perspective
of looking into the room, watching the scene play out; there is no T.V. in Daniel
The inner seeing is in color and in motion. Daniel also hear
Also, at the moment of the beep, Daniel is internally laughing. Coding: ISee (with sound, clear)

7.4 [Daniel was closing the lock on his gate door outside.] At the moment of the beep, Daniel has
a non-detailed/not-very-specific thought about his next step after closing the gate and heading
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nothing was going on in experience at this beep and he was in autopilot; it is also possible that
the heading-out/traffic somehow shaped the gate-locking action.] Coding: U???, nothing???

8.1

[Daniel

he has driven his brother there for the
The Center Cannot Hold, by Elyn Sachs while

simultaneously listening to classical music through his earbuds. Just before the beep, he read the

know]. As best he can tell, he is probably also simultaneously innerly seeing the
author/protagonist (the book is autobiographical) pale face [apparently a manifestation of his

pallid-pallor (70-75%) and the inner seeing (20-25%) seem to him to be one experience which
comprises most (95%) of his experience at the moment. At the same time but much less salient
(5%), he hears the loud TV playing in the waiting room. [It took a long time in the discussion for
the inner seeing to be described

we should try to figure out why that is.] Coding: Cognitive

recognition (U???), ISee?, hearing

8.2

[Daniel is still in the waiting room, cf. 8.1. He has just closed his book, using an Amazon
Maybe I

should get that backpack today? [He has sometime in the past decided he is going to use this
Amazon gift card to buy a travel backpack and is now thinking about whether he should get it
today.] This thinking is not in words, pictures, or other symbols. At the same time but much less
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salient (but more salient than in 8.1), he hears a little kid laughing on the TV playing loudly in
the waiting room. Coding: U, hearing

8.3

[Daniel

to
price, nearness, whether he should just go home, etc.

All of those considerations are no doubt ongoing in his thought process,] but in experience at the
moment of the beep, he is thinking about which restaurants are near where he is going. This
thought is not in words, pictures, or other symbols. Equally salient and simultaneously in
experience, he innerly sees an aerial view rendering (simple, not photographic, somewhat like
earlier versions of Google maps) of the Spring Mountain area [this is, in fact, the area he plans to
go to get food.] This seeing is vague with few details. He sees from above the main road and
some buildings [though nothing about any of the buildings signifies that they are restaurants].
Thus, at this moment, Daniel is thinking about which restaurants are nearby and is creating a
vaguely[It took a long time in the discussion for the inner seeing to be described

we should try to

figure out why that is.] Coding: U, ISee (aerial, map, vague)

8.4

[Daniel is at a restaurant, Mochiko Chicken, and is looking up, reading the posted menu.
-

moment of the beep, he is wondering what this sauce could be, whether it is some sort of fusion
of Asian and barbeque (BBQ) [such that the name is a play on words]. This thinking is not in
words, pictures, or other symbols. His thinking is aimed at the sauce itself
who named the sauce, but at what the sauce is. Coding: U
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not at himself or at

8.5

[In Mochiko Chicken, Daniel and his brother had been talking about how Daniel could

never be a dermatologist because he is disgusted by human pores. They had looked up a picture
of pores and either he alone or with his brother had thought of trypophobia, fear of pores. Daniel
was feeling iffy/disgusted by all of this talk of pores and now, as the two were walking out of the
restaurant,] he is trying to think of a different topic, something else to think about, to distract
himself from the disgusted feeling. This is a thought process without words, pictures, or other
symbols, but is quite specific
disgusted feeling. [Though presumably, new possible topics may soon arise in his experience,
none are present at the moment of the beep.] [Additionally, though Daniel
is to distract from the disgust, he does not feel disgusted. He is, in fact, disgusted, but does not
apprehend anything in experience that could be called disgust.] [AK notes that this would be a
fairly classic example of what psychotherapists call cognitive restructuring.] Coding: Doing of
U, emotional implied but not felt

Emma Samples
1.1

[Emma is talking to her boyfriend about the school shooting in Florida. He has just said

something about the policy idea floating around that teachers be armed. Emma has been thinking
about this; before the beep, perhaps she is imagining a scenario of a gunman and an armed
teacher.] At the moment of the beep, as best she can approximate, she is wondering if teachers
will get a raise [for being armed]. It was not clear how this wondering was present to Emma, that
is, in words/not, in a voice/not, etc. [This would be a good video example of the importance of
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first interviews and how participants have a very long-duration view of the moment of the beep,
t
have adequate skill in discriminating the differences between such different phenomena.][It
would also be a good video example of the difference in rection between a general and a
concrete example of the timeline.]

1.2

[Emma is writing an essay about an

the author, wondering how old she is and what she looks like. As she writes, her dogs are asleep
on her legs.] As best she can approximate, at the moment of the beep, she feels uncomfortable
tingling and numbness in her right thigh [the result of her dogs sleeping on her]. [Note that
Emma was not confident about the moment of the beep and this was only her best
approximation. We proceeded in the interview not for the purposes of understanding this beep
but for future beeps and to raise her interest in all sorts of phenomenon, including bodily
sensations like this one.]

1.3

[Emma

Emma

buffet.] At the moment of the beep, Emma is innerly seeing the buffet, mostly the seating area
with booths, tables, and chairs, and also trees [the real restaurant is apparently heavily decorated
with trees as well]. This is a first-person seeing, that is, from a first-person perspective as if she
were there in the restaurant though, experientially, Emma does not feel that she is in the
restaurant. Behind the seating area, she sees a casino and slot machines [this buffet, is in fact, in
a casino], though she is not attending to the casino as much as to the seating area. This seeing is
in realistic, vivid color. Interestingly, Emma does not see any people in the restaurant or casino
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despite the fact that, in reality, there would be people there and, presumably during her past
experiences there, people were present.

1.4

[Emma

pride that she has found the wallet and can now nag her boyfriend about it, something like Yes!
Take that! I have the wallet so now I can nag you about putting it away and not losing it [though
words, including those exact words, are not present

those words are an approximation of the

prideful-naggy experience]. As best she can guess, her experience is somehow visual at this
moment, perhaps an inner seeing of a scenario in which she nags her boyfriend, though she was
not at all confident about this and we chose not to pursue it further in the interview.

2.1

[Emma is actively working out a math problem

factoring a polynomial.] At the moment

of the beep, she innerly sees the number 4 in black, Times New Roman serif-esque text, against a
white background. That is, it is not just that she sees the 4 with no background but that she sees
the 4 and sees a clean white background [as if it were typed and printed on a piece of paper.]
This seeing has no borders yet seems to be confined to some limited experiential visual space,
and the 4 fills most of that space. [Perhaps interestingly, this innerly seen 4 is definitely spawned
by the math problem, but Emma is not at the moment of the beep explicitly aware of any
connection between the innerly-seen 4 and the problem. She knows there was at least one 4 (the
exponent X4) in the problem, but this innerly seen four is not experienced as an inner seeing of
the exponent 4 from the problem, and she thinks that 4 might have been one of the factors, but
the 4
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signifies.] [Though she continues to actively work out the problem, that math problem-ing is not
in her experience. Her experience is of the innerly seen 4.] [The 4 looks like this: that is, it is the
triangle-shaped 4 and has the serif foot.] Coding: ISee (confined to a space, white background,
meaningless from environment, cf. 3.1)

2.2

[Emma is preparing a glass of Ovaltine. She has scooped the chocolate powder onto her

spoon, and] at the moment of the beep, sees the powder and notices the mountainy shape it
forms. Simultaneously, she is thinking that the spoonful of powder looks like mountains. This
looks-like-mountains idea is clearly present in experience but is not in words, pictures, or other
symbols. That is, not only does she see the mountainy powder but she simultaneously has a
cognitive/analytical experience [like commenting on] of the mountainness of the powder.
Coding: SA visual/shape, U

2.3

[Emma

moment of the
seeing Johnny Test. She sees Johnny as he is, a cartoon, [as if a stock image she had found on
Google.] She sees Johnny clearly and in color. He is standing, turned about 30 or 45 degrees to
the left with his face unturned, looking straight ahead, smiling. She sees Johnny against a white

Perhaps interestingly, there are no explicit borders yet Emma sees Johnny in the bottom left of
her imaginary visual space, such that there seems to be more white on the upper right half of the

[As compared to 2.1: It seems to Emma that the inner seeings of 2.1 and 2.3
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happen in the same imaginary/experiential visual space but that the 4 (2.1) was much larger,
d is in the bottom
left corner [for whatever reason]. [RTH has a somewhat different view of the size issue: It seems
to him that the 4 and the Johnny were about the same size compared to each other, but that the 4
was much larger than a 4 that you might see on the algebra problem, whereas Johnny was
smaller than you might see Johnny on a TV screen.] Coding: ISee (confined to a space, white
background, arbitrarily cut off)

2.4

The beep occurred while Emma was writing her description for beep 3. We skipped the

interview for this beep. Skipped

2.5

[Emma is itching her right eye with primarily her right pointer finger. ] She feels the

circular motion of her rubbing, feels her eye being massaged/ rubbed, and in synchrony hears the
splooshy sound created by the rubbing. These two sensory awarenesses seem equal but, if
anything, the feeling in her eye is somewhat more present. Primarily in the medial corner of her
eye, Emma feels pressure, her eye being massaged, and relief [which is maybe just the absence
of itchiness but, if relief has any particularly characteristics, we could not determine them.]
Simultanously and in sync, she hears the splooshy sound [which at the moment of the beep may
have a somewhat gross quality to it, that is, she apprehends it as a gross sound, though we could
not be sure whether this grossness was in experience. RTH took it that it was, at the moment of
the beep, a somewhat unpleasant-in-the-direction-of-grossness sound, but the grossness was
magnified by the task of recording and discussing] Coding: SA bodily, SA sound
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2.6

[Emma is sitting on the floor putting clothes on hangers. Though her eyes are aimed at

hearing part of a song, specif

accompaniment. [It is her impression that she was not hearing a loop of this lyric over and over
but rather, was hearing chunks of the song continously, though not necessarily beginning at the
start of the song.] She hears this clearly [as she would if listening to the song through earphones.]
Coding: IH music

3.1

[Emma

and his friends are talking about the movie Fantastic Four,
Emma
Emma innerly sees the word stream in thick, block font letters

with the individual letters italicized. The word stream is engraved/embossed/indented in a
background. Both the word and background are black and dark blue speckled, such that the
embossedness is what distinguishes the word apart from the background [We noted in the
interview that this is similar to the HBO logo screen and perhaps that is what inspired or

gray and white, not black and blue]. Interestingly, though she innerly sees stream presumably
because of the conversation about mainstream, this seeing does not seem to be at all related to
the word or concept of mainstream. In fact, as far as her experience is concerned, the word has
no meaning at all. [Emma began the descri
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apprehension.] Coding: ISee of word (fancy/embossed display, meaningless from environment,
cf. 2.1)

3.2

Emma is playing Super Smash Bros, a video game. At the moment of the beep, she sees

on the screen a pink Yoshi (the character she is playing) in mid-air, jumping between a large
metal red-bordered platform to a similar, smaller yellow-bordered platform above. This is, in
fact, what is on the screen at the moment of the beep; that is, she is accurately perceiving the
screen. She sees the rest of the scene too

the ocean in the background, tall tan buildings, but

mostly she is focused on Yoshi and the two platforms. Perhaps she is drawn to the colors of what
she sees

the pink of Yoshi or red of the platform

be made is whether she simply sees them and they happen to be these colors or if she is drawn to
a color or colors for their colorness alone. [Though she is actively playing the game (using the
controller or whatever), this is not in experience.] Coding: Seeing, perhaps SA color????

3.3

[Emma is talking with a group of friends.] At the moment of the beep, she feels the tingly

minty refreshing sensation of her gum on the tip of her tongue and just inside her lower right
cheek [though she cannot be sure where the gum is at this moment, whether it is touching these
two places or somewhere else]. Before the beep, she was th
gum (this one was losing his flavor), and maybe at the moment of the beep, this thinking is
ongoing, though we could not be sure. Coding: SA tactile, U????

3.4

[Emma and her friends are playing a game in which they choose a letter and then try to
Emma is
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innerly visual, She innerly sees a grid-like structure: a horizontal line bisected by at least one and
probably more vertical lines. In the upper left of this structure is the letter M. The bisected lines
separate some columns in which she somehow visualizes other columns of letters descending in
series. These other columns of letters are something more than sensing but less than fully

about it than typical inner seeings, as if she is seeing indeterminate letters.) [She is using this
imagining to help herself come up with movie titles such that she is considering the combo

letters.] She confidently sees a black background. The color of the letters was more difficult to
describe. Perhaps the letters have no color

the color is indeterminate or not-yet-arrived and thus

she cannot name it. Perhaps she sees the letters in color but there is no word for the color. The
letters seem to be translucent. Coding: ISee? words (sort of), [manipulates inner visual
experience in verbal ways (cf. 3.1, 2.1), playing around with the tokens of language]

3.5

[Emma and her friends are playing the movie title game, cf. 3.4

moment of the beep, Emma [is thinking about the movie Open Season] and is innerly seeing a

most clearly the animated deer who has his legs out doing a karate move. She also sees clearly a
stump in the foreground and below the deer a section of grass with a worn-down dirt section. The
tree stump is larger than the deer who is behind it (father away from the place of perspective) and
to the left. To the right of the deer, Emma sees the animated bear character but with few details
his brown
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fur and left paw

are seen clearly; the top and right of the bear are seen dimply or

undifferentiatedly. It is as if the seeing is divided by a rather arbitrary diagonal in such a way that
the bottom left half of the bear (closest to the deer) is seen clearly whereas the top right is
unclear and undifferentiated. The tree stump, too, is seen most clearly on the left half. Behind the
deer and bear is a forest but this has few details. Coding: ISee (with arbitrary borders)

3.6

[Emma is doing math homework. She is typing a math problem on her computer screen.]

At the moment of the beep, she sees what she has typed -log(y) + log( as it actually appears on
the screen. [Though she believes herself to be processing/working out the math problem, this is
not in experience, is apparently going on on some level outside awareness.] Coding: Seeing

4.1

[Emma is watching

with Guy Fieri.] She sees his brown goatee

with a patch of blonde in it and, as best we could determine, innerly says in her own voice

know the exact words]. [There was some discussion early in this interview attempting dissuade
Emma
words. This seemed to derail her quite a bit such that she started fairly confident that this was
inner speaking and then seemed confused/less confident. Unclear to AK whether her confusion
came from actually questioning the experience or from worrying about pleasing us. Unclear to
RTH whether this is U or IS or just SA]. Coding: SA color, U?? or IS??

4.2

[Emma is dozing off on the couch.] Her eyes are closed and she innerly sees the shape of

her closed eyes obscured/clouded by a grey fog. It is not that she sees her eyes; rather, she sees
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the shape of her eyes, the shape her closed eyes are making. She feels the innerly seen shape of
eyes carried forward from her real eyes, somehow connected to them though exactly how is
difficult to say. Emma innerly sees the shape eyes in the bottom left of her imagination. The eyes
take up approximately ¼ or more of her total imaginary field; the rest is the grey fog. Her
imaginary field seems to be rectangular [maybe like a TV screen] even though it has no borders
to denote rectangularness. Coding: ISee (borderyness, has an impact on her seeing even though
it is not seen; perceptually (not metaphorically) connected to reality)

4.3

Emma is asleep at the moment of the beep, so we skipped this beep. There is apparently

nothing in conscious experience. Coding: Skipped

4.4

[Emma

song refers to Smoking Man from the X Files. Emma has never watched the X Files or seen the
Smoking Man, but imagines how he might look.] She innerly sees a darkly-colored (greys and
blacks) shape of a man wearing a tilted hat (something like a fedora) and a trenchcoat with the

himself.] Her experience is of the shapes and colors. The face is black or non-existent with no
details but for two white glowy dots which are his eyes. Her inner seeing is like a rudimentary
painting, like a paint-by-number with different parts of the man (his coat, his face, etc.) solidly
colored without shading, yet it is difficult for Emma to describe the differently-colored parts (i.e.,
Is the background black? Is the hat grey? They all seem to be grey/blacks), though apparently at
the moment of the beep, she does not have this difficulty, she apprehends the colors. (cf. 3.4
interestingness of color). The man is turned, looking over his shoulder mysteriously with his eyes
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aimed at Emma
side of him where his hat, face, and collar meet. He is centered in her imagination, but here focus
of attention is decidedly to the left of center. Coding: ISee with SA in ISee

4.5

[Emma is wondering whether she missed an online class final exam.] She feels panic: her

heart beating fast in her chest and an urge [Adrenaline] to move throughout her upper body. This
urge feels like a pressure pulling her to something (perhaps to get her laptop and look it up, even
though the direction is not specific [and, in fact, she do
moment]. Prior to the beep, she had been thinking multiple simultaneous thoughts about this
(e.g., Oh my god, did I miss it? What am I going to do? etc.) and, as best she can say, these
thoughts continue ongoing in experience at the moment of the beep but are not specific and are
apparently not worded, voiced, or otherwise symbolized. Coding: F bodily (panic), multiple U or
cognitive awareness??, a specific urge toward something

4.6

[Emma is watching her dogs play.] At the moment of the beep, she sees one of her dogs

laying down playing with a treat she has given him. She feels overwhelmed with pride and
happiness. Her heart feels literally bigger, swollen, full. From her heart, which feels swelled and
oozing pride/happiness outward, she feels radiating/glowing warmth/pride/positivity. This
radiated feeling is not specifically directed at her dog but is moving out from her in towards him,
in his direction. Coding: F bodily (too big, radiating)

Laura Samples
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1.1

Laura i

at the moment of the beep, something about

her friend joking with her boyfriend that every time the two have sex, someone in her family
dies. Laura

t and reading

seems to be in her experience [not just occurring automatically outside experience, that is.]

1.2

[Laura is working on stats homework. She has just clicked through the homework to see

how much she has left to do.] At the moment of the beep, she is mostly (60%) thinking Oh good,
. Laura was confident that those exact words seemed to be present [though this

present. Perhaps she was innerly saying

, though she was not confident

that a voice was present [also probably a reflection of lack of skill on first day of sampling.]
Simultaneously in her experience (30%), Laura was feeling mentally relieved. Also
simultaneously (10%), she was thinking that this assignment had taken less time than the
previous assignments. [Unlike

, it did not seem like this thinking was in words, though

we moved on in the interview before asking more about it.]

1.3

[Laura is practicing giving a lecture that she will be giving sometime in the future.] She

may be speaking aloud at the moment of the beep; maybe the speaking is in her experience; if so,
it seems this experience is more of hearing herself speak than of producing speech. At the

perhaps, specifically the way he sits down at the piano and lowers the piece
covering the keys [she does not know what this piece is called and trying to describe the piece
without the correct terminology may be central to this experience.] It is unclear how trying to
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Laura except that she was effortfully
trying to articulate it so that psychology students [the audience at her upcoming lecture] would
understand. Sometime around the vicinity of the beep, Laura may also have been innerly seeing a
man in a tux sitting down at a grand piano on a stage. She sees this from just slightly above the

faceless figure who she knows is a man but who is not detailed. The piano is positioned left to
right such that she can see the keys. She sees the piano more clearly, with more details, than the
man. Interestingly, the stage is the stage from her undergraduate university [where she herself
performed in or attended many events.]

1.4

[Laura is still practicing giving a lecture, cf. 1.3.] She is strugglingly speaking aloud.

That is, she is tripping over her words/not sounding coherent and she recognizes herself to be
struggling

the struggling is in experience. At the moment of the beep, she is explaining the

tritone paradox [and sometime after the beep, she realizes that her explanation was incorrect,
though at the moment of the beep, she has not yet noticed this; she is just explaining.] At the
same time, she has a mental sense or thought that she is not doing well at giving the lecture. This
sense/thought is not in words, symbols, or pictures, but is somehow present, perhaps just known.

1.5

[Laura is practicing giving a lecture, cf. 1.3, 1.4.] She is speaking aloud something about

how organized sound is not a good/adequate definition for music. Maybe the speaking is in her
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2.1

Laura is in a mental foggy state [the characteristics of which were not clear in the
This fogginess seems to be in her

experience [though apparently not literally as in innerly seeing fog,] but it would not be right to
say there is nothing in experience. There is nothing in particular in experience yet Laura is
experientially foggy. [Note: this description was heavily subjunctified with many metaphors (i.e.,
] Coding:
Nothing? Mental fog

2.2a

Laura missed a beep here. She explained that she was not attending closely to her

remember any details. Skipped

2.2b

Laura is scrolling through pictures on her phone, trying to find a picture of a dress.

Mostly, she feels foggy (cf. 2.1), apparently a mental sensation or other experience that is related
to the fact that she is paying little awareness to anything. She is somewhat aware of the scrollingsearch; the dress is not explicitly in experience but she will know it when she sees it. Coding:
Scrolling, mental fog

2.3

[Laura is trying to figure out how to write something. It is her impression that she has

been innerly sifting through possibilities, presenting the sentence one word at a time and

the beep, a specific sentence, specific words, are present [though Laura did not remember them].

254

How those words are present is not entirely clear: maybe they are present in a voice, maybe not;
maybe they are present without a voice yet the sensation is of innerly speaking, maybe there is
no such sensation [This is an example of iteratively building skill. Here we planted seeds so that,
hopefully, on subsequent sampling days, Laura will attend to such features if they are present.
Laura seemed very motivated to try to understand this in the future] Coding: Words without the
ability to specify what they are or how they are present

2.4

[Laura is watching an episode of the John Oliver show on Youtube on her computer.

beep, Laura
--

present to Laura was not clear in the interview [again, hopefully, an example of iteratively
building skill.] Perhaps simultaneously in experience, there is a rising feeling [an emotional
experience that we did not further describe.] Coding: Words without the ability to specify how
they are present, rising F??

2.5

[Laura is trying to figure out how to write something. She is muttering the potential

wordings under her breath as she considers each.] At the moment of the beep, mostly (70%),
words (a specific possibility for how to write it) are innerly present. How they are present was
not entirely clear. Simultaneously, she is (20%) hearing herself mutter. Perhaps interestingly, it
seems that the muttered words are slightly behind (a second or two??) the inner words. Also
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simultaneously in experience, Laura (10%) is somehow aware of the fact that she is talking,
perhaps especially the mechanics/physicality of talking. This is perhaps a meta-awareness, a
noticing of herself as talking, but that was not clear. [Here again, most of this was not clearly
specified during the interview or apparently at the moment of the beep. Laura again seems
motivated to understand. We told her that if
words.] Coding: Words without the ability to specify what they are or how they are present;
hearing herself mutter simultaneous but not in synch with the inner words; meta-awareness of
external talking???

2.6

[Laura was typing, and was thinking of words a bit ahead of the typing. However, Laura

had helped her make careful distinctions about inner words/self-talk and this newfound

skipped it in the interview. Skipped
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3.1

Laura is watching a TV show, is carried along by the show, is more (80%) hearing the

character say

by salience the hearing and seeing portions, this is one TV-watching experience. At the same
time, she (5%) feels her headache, a dull ache on the top of her head and forehead approximately
2 cm deep into her skull [perhaps somehow she experientially knows the pain not to be reaching
her brain, knows there is space between where the pain ends and where her brain begins]. The
aching is mild, not sharp, and consistent, not pulsating. [CK notes that Laura spontaneously
offered percentages of her experience on her own at the very start of her beep description; this
was also true of beeps 3.3] Coding: Watching TV more hearing than seeing; small SA bodily
[very specific for such a small percentage]

3.2

[Laura has just read a Facebook post on her phone and is trying to understand what the

last sentence she read means or implies.] She feels a vague sense of confusion, which is not an
emotional experience but rather, seems to be cognitive
were put in words, was

a cognitive sense of something like, if it

[This is not an analytical experiencing

not yet analyzing the sentence. Nor is it a meta-awareness experience

she is

she feels confused but

does not notice herself to be confused]. At the same time, she feels her headache, the same
sensation as in 3.1 however less salient, that is <5% of experience. Coding: Cognitive sense, very
small SA bodily

3.3

Laura is typing. At the moment of the beep, her experience is divided between three

separate but simultaneous experiences of the words she is typing: (1) 60% the specific words
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[she could not recall them] are somehow present in experience but not spoken, heard, or seen.
Interestingly, Laura was not confident that the words had an inner location though she could

running from ear to ear on which she knows the words to be moving from left to right though she
does not see or feel them moving. (2) 30% she is reading the words on the screen as she types
them. It was not clear how, exactly, this reading was present to Laura. (3) she is typing [she
began the interview by saying this was 10% of experience; however, as the interview went on, it
seemed this may have been so automatic as to not even be in experience at all or, if so, very
little, <10%]. All three experiences are of the same words, but slightly temporally offset: the
typing first, then the words present, then the read words. [Note that even though we have asked
her to quote the words if words are present, she is unable to do so here.] Coding: Words without
the ability to specify what they are or how they are present, three simultaneous words but not in
synch, words have location???; Reading; Typing???

3.4

[Laura is doing a statistics assignment involving coding on the program R.] At the

moment of the beep, she is (80%) wondering
better for importing SPSS files [Perhaps interestingly, she has already started to import the
Foreigner package, though she has not yet arrived at a conclusion as to whether Foreigner is
better]. This is a thinking/wondering without words (though the idea of Haven vs. Foreigner is
clearly present), pictures, or other symbols. Separate and simultaneous in experience, she (20%)
is thinking that she needs to type .spss instead of _sav [and, as a matter of fact, is making this
correction

is typing .spss

at the moment of the beep]. She thinks this concept clearly without

all of the words that form the concept present, however, the word .spss seems to be present
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how exactly is unknown. [Perhaps interestingly, ex

-p-

sunderstood to be a period, rather than a dot. Maybe this distinction is important, maybe not. We
were not sure.] Coding: U x 2, one U with possible word present, but the word is not articulated
and not understood in the we would have expected it (the word is .spss, understood to be period
spss rather than dot spss, but nothing is spoken or otherwise articulated)

[She had only four samples on day 3 because we did not send her a reminder about the interview
until late the night before.]

4.1

[Laura was reading an article and highlighting a sentence.] At the moment of the beep,

Laura was reading with comprehension [in that she visually saw the text on her screen and the
text she was reading was meaningful]. [There were no other experiences related to the reading
(no inner speaking, no words innerly present, no inner seeing, etc.).] The reading accounted for
approximately 90% of her experience. Simultaneously, Laura was also visually tracking the
portion of text being highlighted on her screen. The visual tracking accounted for approximately
10% of her experience. RTH took her to be saying that the reading and the highlighting were
mostly the same experience. There was also an aspect of dragging her finger [to highlight the
text] present in her experience [although it was not assigned a specific percentage aspect of her
experience nor was it asked how, if at all, the finger dragging and the highlighting were related
to one another]. Coding: Reading with comprehension, visual tracking (what she is highlighting)
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4.2

[Laura was watching a clip of a comedy show on youtube.] At the moment of the beep,

Laura is being carried along by the show

sentence is important, and that meaning is being transmitted through sound]. This accounts for
approximately 70% of her experience. Simultaneously, Laura is visually drawn to a hand gesture
a character in the show is making

she is noticing the gesture as part of the speaking but also

somewhat for its own sake. This accounts for approximately 20% of her experience. At the same
time, Laura is beginning to feel the humor of this expression [in other words, the emotion of
amusement], although she was unable to say how exactly the humor was present. This accounts
for approximately 10% of her experience. Coding: Watching TV mostly hearing; SA visual,
rising F

4.3

[Laura was reading and had just started a sentence.] At the moment of the beep, Laura

was feeling annoyance that the article is difficult. The annoyance was mostly mental, although it
is possible that there was some sort of bodily tension that was also present [Laura was unable to
confidently say where or how the bodily tension was present, and was also unable to say how the

annoyance accounted for approximately 60% of her experience. Simultaneously, Laura was
reading with some comprehension. This reading is similar to the reading in 4.1 other than the fact
that she was reading with less comprehension [due to the dense-ness of the paper; Laura still
understood the meaning of the sentences and words she was reading, but was not as clearly
understanding the overall concepts/arguments the paper was making]. The reading accounts for
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approximately 40% of her experience. Coding: F mental (but possibly bodily???) [described
with metaphor]; reading with some but not full comprehension

4.4

[Laura was listening to something on Soundcloud for the first time and was looking at the

squares under the audio file.] At the moment of the beep, Laura

inner speaking was as if Laura were speaking to herself out loud, although there was no
experience of mechanically producing the sound [i.e., moving her mouth, vocal chords, etc], and
no experience of any auditory aspect of the hearing [meaning that she has no experience of
hearing her inner speaking]. The inner speaking accounts for approximately 80% of her
experience. Simultaneously, Laura was seeing the cursor on her screen. This seeing accounts for
approximately 20% of her experience. [Laura
write them down, even though on several prior occasions we have explained why writing down
the words is important.] Coding: IS?? Or maybe words without the ability to specify what they
are or how they are present?

4.5

[Laura was watching a video in which the speaker in the video was making a sarcastic

commentary on something.] At the moment of the beep, Laura
tone of voice and understanding what the sarcasm is directed at [that is to say that this experience
is not just of hearing the tone of voice, but rather was about hearing the tone of voice and
understanding the target of the sarcastic tone]. The hearing accounts for approximately 70% of
her experience. Simultaneously, Laura is watching the video. This seeing accounts for
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approximately 30% of her experience. Coding: Watching TV mostly hearing, attending to the
tone of voice for its significance (SA????)

5.1

[Laura
ring

rather than a word-by-word-by-word hearing or hearing without comprehension). Perhaps the
words are simply rolling out and she hears them without any experience of creating them [even
though she is indeed the originator of the words] or perhaps she is also somewhat experiencing
the speaking, the production of the words. Coding: Hearing herself speak aloud, perhaps she is
also somewhat experiencing the speaking [We are not confident about the experience at 5.1]

5.2

[Laura

get the phrasing right [though no exact phrase, that is, no words, are present in her experience at
this moment. The experience is still about getting the phrasing right.] At the same time, she
(10%) notices she is hand-gesturing a lot [which is ironic given that this will be an online lecture
and her future audience will not see her gestures]. This is a cognitive recognition perhaps

noticed. AK wonders if perhaps these words were not present at all but, if the cognitive
Laura was

were somehow present, s
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innerly speaking even though there was no voice, the words never manifested as spoken. Coding:
Speaking aloud, words not particularly present, effortfully getting the phrasing right; Meta-meta
awareness cognition aimed at her gesturing; Words without the ability to specify what they are
or how they are present??

5.3

[Laura is scrolling on her phone. This is automatic, not in experience.] In her experience,

she hears people speaking [audio c

Coding: Hearing people talking but the words
are not recognized

5.4

[Previously, Laura had watched a video of a man speaking another language with a

of the beep, she (90%) innerly hears a man [in the dubbed voice she had heard previously] say
-hearing what she heard previously] and, as far as her
experience is concerned, it is an accurate re-hearing; it is exactly what she heard previously and
how she heard it. She knows
somehow also present to her at this moment; the words are not meaninglessly passing through
her experience. Maybe she also has a hint of a visual experience, an almost inner seeing of the
man [the man, the speaker of these words, she had seen on the video previously]. She could not
be confident she was seeing anything at the moment of the beep or was, in some non-visual way,
recalling the man. At the same time (10%), [her hands are cold because she is closing a bag of
frozen vegetables]. At least partially, this is a cognitive recognition that her hands are cold; that
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is, the inside surfaces of both hands [the parts touching the cold bag] feel cold, but it is not just
that her hands feel cold. She is also cognitively noting that her hands are cold. [It is Laura
impression that she is not in-tune with her bodily sensations and has to first recognize the
sensations cognitively/meta-awareness-ly notice it before she actually feels the sensation. We
encouraged her to bracket this theory and we actually find a contrary example in 5.5] Coding: IH
(of words clearly recognized), ISee???, cognitive recognition/meta-awareness of sensory
process; SA???

5.5

Laura is reading a text from an Internet friend (that is, someone she never spoken to in

voice. There is a sense of a voice, a voice she knows to be male but that has no actual auditory
qualities (pitch, tone, volume, etc) that signify male or any other characteristic for that matter.
Thus, this sense of voice approaches an inner voice but has no vocal characteristics and is not
exactly innerly heard. There is a distinction for Laura
At the same time, she feels a
dull ache [she has a headache] in her forehead, a localized region about the size of a golf ball in

Laura feels this bodily sensation without an accompanying cognitive recognition, cf. 5.4. She
suspects she already had the cognitive recognition before the beep and thus, was able to feel the
Coding: similar to Words without the ability to
specify what they are or how they are present; Spoken to me but not in a voice (not IH); SA
bodily specific
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5.6

Laura is looking up from her computer to look at the TV above. She sees a blur of

motion, the result of this moment of transition in looking. It is not merely that she sees nothing;
she sees a blur; she is not attending to anything in particular but is experientially still holding in
vision the computer and TV and everything that blurs together in-between the two. [There is
[RTH notes that this is a fairly unusual kind of
experience in that most people do not experience the visual transition between experiential
resting places.] Coding: Seeing the blur of transition

[Laura was sick on day 6 which may have influenced her experience.]

6.1

Laura (90%) feels pain, a sinus headache, on the right side of her face from her hairline to

just below her right ear. It seems that she is more than just feeling this sensation

she is also, in

some way, reacting to the pain. Perhaps this is like a meta-awareness, noticing herself to be
feeling pain, but we could not be sure. Much less salient (10%), she feels waterlogged in the
bridge of her nose [she has just done a sinus rinse]. Coding: SA bodily x 2, one with a metaawareness?

6.2

[Laura is reading something on her computer screen. Her eyes are aimed at the screen but

she is not seeing it.] Rather, she (90%) is reading with comprehension but with no experienced
seeing. However, there seems be somewhat more than simply reading with comprehension;
there is a coming towards her feeling or sensation of the words but yet, it is not the words
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feels or senses the words coming toward her/through her; Laura experiences the words
ld [she does not see them] and then comprehends the meaning of the
words [that is, the words themselves are not present even though it is the words that seem to be
coming toward her]. At the same time, but much less salient (10%), she feels
congestion/pressure inside her head just behind and below her right ear [the result of an ear
infection]. Coding: Words without the ability to specify what they are or how they are present;
read words come at her not seen, but then comprehended; SA bodily

6.3

[Laura is typing a fiction story. Typing is ongoing but automatic, not at all in her

experience.] In experience, she sees/apprehends/acknowledges the story unfold as it appears on
the screen. Even though she is the originator of the words, she has no
awareness/notion/presentiment of what she is typing as she does so; rather, she sees the story
unfold in front of her [as the words appear on the screen], is tracking the story as it appears. This
is somehow different than reading; she is acknowledging the story, is tracking the story
somehow, but is not simply reading the words. Coding: Typing but no experience of typing or of
seeing the words. It is not the words, it is not the meaning of the words, it is not the visualization
of the story, it is the story. She experiences the story.

6.4

[Laura

fogginess was not explicitly present in the experience. She is watching a show on her computer.]
She hears words (or perhaps hears something like background noise) coming from the show but
does not apprehend their meaning, is not comprehending, does not care about whether what she
hears is words or meaning. This is more than just a hearing
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she simultaneously is vaguely

aware that she is zoned out, or slightly aware that she is hearing without comprehension. This is
not quite U, more a slight meta-awareness. Coding: Words not comprehended. Slight metaawareness that she is hearing without comprehension. Mental fog??

6.5

[Laura is with her mouse clicking on the comments button.] Laura sees on her computer

screen her mouse moving, clicking a comment stream, and expanding to reveal the comments.
[That is, she is seeing the unfolding of what she herself is, in fact, doing, but the physicality of
clicking, the anticipation of the comments, etc. are not in her experience.] Coding: Seeing

6.6

[Laura
and she hears

sound but the sound is meaningless, is just noise. [In contrast to 6.4 during which she was
hearing and aware of herself as hearing; at 6.6 she is simply hearing and the hearing is even less
articulated]. [She is, in fact, looking at the computer screen, but does not see it at this moment.]
Coding: Hearing (meaningless)

7.1

[Laura is looking at her lab Google calendar.] At the moment of the beep, she (60%) is

drawn to the contrast between the light green (of one event) and dark blue (of another event)
[which are, in reality, two side-by-side, somewhat overlapping squares on the calendar, though
her experience is not about the squareness or even about the eventness or even about the colors
themselves.] Her experience is of the color contrast (or perhaps the brightness contrast). At the
same time, she recognizes in some cognitive way that the events [not specified in experience] are
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overlapping in time, that they are scheduled in the time same time slot. Coding: SA visual
contrast, cognitive recognition

7.2

[Laura is fixing a line of code on DataCamp. Before the beep, she had decided how she

would re-write the code and is now doing so.] Mostly (80%), her experience is on idle, is
automatic. That is, she has set herself to a task (correct this line of code) and is doing it without it
in awareness. [AK: Perhaps this 80% is nothing in experience? CK: it is also possible that the
80% is just on skillfully but mindlessly typing (which could very well mean the same thing as
nothing in experience); either way, it was pretty clear that the typing was not something directly
apprehended in experience] Somewhat in experience (20%), Laura is watching the code as it
appears on the screen. She sees only a small portion of the screen: she is seeing the new part of
the code, the part she is currently typing. Perhaps she is looking intentionally at the code,
checking for accuracy but, if so, this is minimal in experience (perhaps a quarter of the 20%).
[And though she is the agent of the typing, there is no agency to her experience. She sees code
appearing regardless of who is writing]. Coding: Nothing (mostly), seeing maybe with
intention???

7.3

[Laura is playing a video on DataCamp. Though her eyes are aimed at the video, she does

not see it at the moment of the beep.] She hears the video and comprehends a little of it. That is,
the video is not just noise; she is attending somewhat, though not much, to the meaning of what
and
there; these pieces are not words but rather, are apparently something more like little bits of
concepts. Though she is grasping pieces of the meaning here and there, there is no specific
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concept or concepts in her experience at the moment of the beep and she is not comprehending
the overall arc of the video. She is getting a lesser gist of the video. [We noticed and Laura

much attending to. It was her impression that she had been more into and engaged with
something in experience before the beep.] Coding: Watching TV mostly entirely hearing, some
comprehension of the story/meaning

7.4

[Laura had just read on her computer about signing up for something.] At the moment of

the beep, she has gone back to the same sentence, and (20%) is visually scanning back over this
just-read part. At the same time, she is (80%) thinking something which is approximated as
Would it be worth it to sign up for this? The thought was specific, that is, it could not have just
as well been Maybe I should sign up for this or anything similar. Though she could not be sure
of [and did not take notes of] the exact words, Laura has the sense that words (somewhere in the
ballpark of Would it be worth it to sign up for this?) were present in this thinking, though what

definitively not words spoken, seen, or heard, and is apparently more than just words present.
Coding: U with some sense of words; visually scanning a sentence

[Laura noted that, even though she thinks words were present in some way, she did not write
them down. This has happened in sampling before and we have expressed our interest in
knowing the words if they are there. She acknowledged all of this and seemed perplexed as to
why she did not write them down given that she knows that we would ask what the words were.
She speculated that perhaps part of the reason why she does not write the specific words is
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because, in experience, the words

though present

are not specific somehow. We had a

longish conversation about fidelity, about the different ways that words are or are not present,
about reassuring Laura that we were not being critical. In general, Laura has an experience of
words that we are working on trying to grasp; and this is yet another example. This may have
been a turning point in our joint effort to understand the word phenomenon.]

7.5

[Laura is typing a sentence.] As she types, she mutters under her breath, apparently a

wording alternative to what she is currently reading on the screen, although the content of the
muttering, including whether or not there were words present in this muttering, is not clearly in
experience. The physical act of muttering is in experience and, somehow via the muttering, she
also gleans that what she has muttered flows better/flows more pleasingly as compared to the
sentence she has typed. Though the better flow comes from a different word, her experience is

about the meaning of the sentence, though the meaning may have been somewhat present to her.
Simultaneously and equally present in experience, she sees on the computer screen the sentence
she is typing and apparently in sync with the feel of the flow from muttering, she notices, in
some visual way, the preferable flow from the muttering as compared to the typing. Again, this
visual experience is not about seeing a discrepant word on the screen but about noticing in some
way the discrepant flow. Thus, there are two separate simultaneous coordinated experiences of
Laura trying to right the flow of what she is typing. Coding: Muttering with experience of the
physical act, not the words or meaning. Something about the flow of the muttering is better than
the words of the story, in two ways both of the muttering itself and of the visual sense on the
screen
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[7.5 is an interesting example to complement Laura
shows that not only is the experience of inner words difficult to apprehend and/or characterize;

experience

she is into how to type this sentence using words

and yet, words are not explicitly

describe.]

7.6

[Laura is staring at her phone, about to look up at the television.] Nothing or nearly

nothing is in experience. If anything is present, she is sort of seeing the phone screen and is
vaguely aware that her attention is moving to the TV. Coding: Nothing

8.1

Laura is watching water go down the sink drain. Mostly (80%), she is drawn to the sound

of the draining water, a sensory awareness. At the same time but less salient (20%), she is
watching with intention to ensure that the water drains [Prior to the beep, there was some
problem with it draining; this meaning is not at all present in the hearing at the moment of the
beep; it is implied in the watching]. Coding: SA sound, watching with intention

8.2

[Laura is drinking tea.] At the moment of the beep, she feels the water moving down her

throat. Though the water is her tea, her experience is of feeling water, not of feeling tea. Coding:
SA bodily

8.3

Laura is thinking in a not-very-clear, unarticulated way about how her friend is upset.

The content of the thought is not well-articulated
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it is generally about her friend and the fact

that he friend is upset but is in experience not more specific than that (e.g., including why her
friend is upset). As best we can say, this is a cognitive experience without words, pictures, or
other symbols [Laura noted that, thanks to discussions at previous interviews, she remembered to
write down that no words were present]. Included in the thinking, Laura recognizes or notices
that she is concerned for her friend. This, too, is a cognitive experience [as opposed to an
emotional experien
aware of herself as sort of listening to a video but not comprehending and is . That is, she has a
meta-awareness of herself as in this state of not really listening. Coding: Cognitive recognition
(not quite U); Meta-awareness of concern; Meta-awareness of listening but not comprehending

8.4

[Laura is typing a story.] Mostly (90%), the words wrapping him up [apparently words

she may or is currently writing in the story] are present in her experience, though not spoken,
heard, seen, or otherwise symbolized. She feels the words in the back top of her head; that is,
they seem to have a location. Wrapping him up is part of a larger sentence [and it is Laura
impression that, had the beep not interrupted her, the rest of the sentence would have eventually
been in experience. It was also her impression that earlier words of the sentence had been in
or
disappeared]. It was not entirely clear whether the words unfolded in Laura

-at-

a-time or presented as a chunk; it seemed to be somewhere in between unfolding and chunked.
Laura experiences the words with meaning; they are not merely connotation-free words; they are
understood to be part of the story. At the same time (10%), she is reading what she types on the
screen and is watching for/is sensitive to typos, errors, whether the words on the screen match
the words in her head (currently, wrapping him up) and maybe also the adequacy of her writing.
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[Note this is quite different from Laura
words were definitively present and writes down the exact words.] Coding: Words present with
location, reading with editorial intention

8.5

[Laura is watching TV while she eats dinner]. At the moment of the beep, she is

somewhat carried along by the TV show but somehow this is less than being carried
along/engrossed in the show; she is barely engaged, is barely attending to it. At the same time,
she feels or has a sense of herself as not mentally engaged [she called this her brain being
-awareness of her state at the moment. [AK notes Laura seems to have many
more meta- experiences than typical participants, has many perceptual experiences that, instead
of being straightforwardly perceptual (hearing, watching, etc.), are meta (aware of herself as
hearing, or aware of herself as watching, etc.).] Coding: Watching TV barely, meta-aware of the
blankness

8.6

[Laura

indeed the originator of the words, her experience is of hearing them [she said no different than
how she would hear if it were Dr. Hurlburt talking]. Less so (5%), she notices that her hand is
raised in a gesture [she is appa

Coding: Hearing words roll out;

Meta-awareness of gesture

Maya Samples
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1.1

[Maya is assembling a bedframe. She has the instructions and has just unzipped the bag

and] is looking at the pieces. At the same time, she is talking to a friend on speakerphone. She
has just burped and] at the moment of the beep,
Maya
be sure. It also seems that she is seeing the pieces of the bedframe [not merely that her eyeballs
are aimed at them without her experiencing it] though we could not be sure.

1.2

[Maya has been assembling a bedframe. She has been trying to fit a rod piece into the

frame but then wonders if maybe the two ends of the rod are different and therefore, she might
need to position it differently depending on the ends.] At the moment of the beep, she is trying to
figure out if the two ends of the rod are different. This is a visual sort of wondering; she is
looking at the picture of the rod on the instructions, specifically at the ends; she is not separately
thinking I wonder if the ends are different; she is simply looking at the ends and will notice if
they are different. [Though Maya was confused prior to the beep and her confusion spawned this
looking at the instructions, she no longer feels confused at the moment of the beep. Maya is able
to quite confidently make this distinction.] At the same time, music is playing and she may be
hearing it (30%).

1.3

[Maya is in the process of assembling a bedframe. She realizes that she started to build

the bedframe without first moving the couch out of her room and that, now, it may be more
difficult/too crowded to move the couch out. She imagines how her dad might react to this. Prior
to the beep, Maya was innerly seeing her dad come in the front door wearing his bright yellow
construction shirt. She sees him from where she is in reality, that is, her room.] At the moment of
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the beep, there are several possibilities: (1) the previous inner seeing of her father has passed and
now

whereas before she saw her father at a distance as if she was in her room, now it is as if she has
zoomed in and sees only his face from shoulders up possibly in motion as he says and she innerly

1.4

[Maya is frustrated by some aspect of assembling her bedframe.] As best she can say, she

feels frustrated at the moment of the beep. This may be both bodily and mental. As best she can
say, she feels frustration primarily in her hands [which are, in fact, doing some assembly at this
moment] though we did not leave the interview confident about these characteristics of the
frustration.

2.1

[Maya is making her bed. She wants it to just look right, and] at the moment, is focused

(maybe especially visually) on one corner, and is pulling her comforter over the corner so that it

to the floor, etc.]. RTH thought it was ambiguous whether this experience was primarily visual
on the corner, kinesthetic on the action, or visual on the overall look of the comforter. Coding:
Intentional doing

2.2

[Maya is about to write a recipe on a blank page in her notebook. Before she does so, she

is doodling, making a rudimentary drawing of a flower with loopy petals.] At the moment of the
beep, she is drawing the petals, making the loops. Drawing the petals is in experience
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not

merely automatic

attempt at making them messy-cute is part of

the drawing experience

not merely a fact of the universe. That is, this was not merely an idle

doodling action; she was intending to produce a messy-cute flower illustration. [Note: Though
2.1 and 2.2 both se
make sense to Maya to compare the two. They were apparently different enough as to not make
sense to compare.] Coding: Intentional doing [but Maya says this is not the same as 2.1]

2.3

[Maya is walking down a hallway. She has been researching soap and, sometime before

the beep, decided she wanted to buy glycerin soap.] At the moment of the beep, she innerly sees
[as if she has just walked inside the doors of the Whole Foods where she works] a basket of
items, including glycerin soap, and the interior of Whole Foods. She sees clearly a bar of
amber/yellow glycerin soap in a lavender casing, surrounded by several items, most of which are
ell what, exactly they are], and all are in a black,
rectangular grocery basket held by its handle in the crook of her right arm. Her arm is in the
seeing, as is the blurrily seen segment of Whole Foods--the green of the doors area, the produce
section to her left and the vitamin section to her right (all blurrily seen). The seeing is in motion
[The scene is weird to her on retrospect because it is the view that one would have walking into
Whole Foods, and yet the basket is already pretty full.] Coding: ISee (scene is
inconsistent/discrepant)

2.4

[In the interview, because Maya made a mistake in reading her noltes, we discussed

sample 2.5 before we discussed 2.4. Here, we put them in order as sampled (not in the order as
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discussed).] [Maya has been researching cleansing oils. She is interested in learning about
moringa oil and is on a webpage where she hopes she might find or hear something about
moringa oil. The webpage begins with some text, then has a video, and then continues with text.
She has started the video and, at the moment of the beep, two kinds of scanning are taking place.
She is not hearing the video with comprehension but is tracking it such that if she hears the word
past the video into the
next area of text (and no longer sees the video) and]is scanning through the (lower half of the)
text looking for the word moringa
looking for and will presumably stop if she sees it. [Though she is looking through text, she is
not reading, is not going word-by-word, or even comprehending.] Coding: Audio scanning for a
word, visual scanning for a word

2.5

[Maya is going to her pantry for some tea. She notices her pantry is messy/unorganized

and decides that she should buy a tea box to organize things.] At the moment of the beep, she
(80%) innerly sees a glass tea box with gold lining [apparently how she thinks or hopes her tea
box will look when she gets it organized]. The box is closed but she can see through it. Inside are

instead, her experience is centered on the lavender tea bags inside. The lavender tea bag is, in
reality, her sleeping tea, but at the moment she does not see her sleeping tea; she sees lavender, is
drawn to the lavender color [regardless of what the color signifies, i.e., tea]. She sees this all
from slightly above. At the same time, music is playing in the background and she hears it
(20%). Coding: ISee, SA in ISee of color, hearing
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2.6

[Maya has just pulled out of her driveway and is immediately turning left. Just before the

beep, she noticed a parked silver car and became confused

n the same silver

and she continues to be in a state of confusion, is trying to figure it out, yet she does not feel
confused at the moment.] At the moment of the beep, she is simply looking confusedly at the
parked silver car. Coding: Mental confusion without a feeling of confusion

3.1

[Maya is listening to a podcast. Sometime before the beep, the host said something about
e beep, Maya

hearing) the podcast, but rather] innerly sees people at a fancy cocktail party [this presumably

anything about a party.] She sees from the perspective of being amidst the party [though she does
not feel herself to be at the party] generic, undifferentiated men and women talking, holding
champagne glasses. Some of the women are wearing sparkly dresses and perhaps Maya is
particularly drawn to the sparkliness [unclear to AK whether this was SA RTH thought SA for
surebut the sparkliness was clearly one of, if not the most, important visuals within the scene];
she sees orbs of light, a reflection or distortion of the sparkle created by the jewels on the
dresses. The people do not have faces and are cut off arbitrarily but abruptly around their
mouths/ear line such that she can still see things like earrings and chins but does not see

more into their bodies

but the heads and faces are not merely in the not-well-seen periphery

they disappear abruptly. Maya sees the cocktail party in realistic color, in motion, and with
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sound. That is, she hears people talking (nothing specific), the sound of chatter. Coding: ISee
(with sound, arbitrary cutoff), skillful, SA?

3.2

Maya is listening to a video while she sweeps her kitchen. At the moment of the beep,

mostly (60%) she is trying to sweep the crumbs and trash into a neat pile on a single square of
tile. Her experience is of the task without specific attention paid to any particular crumb or piece
of trash, etc. At the same time, [the video has just referred to a family who moved to the woods
Maya
to be a big, blue trash container like you would find at a construction site. Probably she innerly
saw this big blue container before the beep. However, she did not believe that they meant this
kind of big blue trash container, so she imagines the family living in what she called in the
she
may have meant something close to a portable-small-living-structure-that-may-be-like-a-tarileror-may-be-like-a-continaer-whatever-that-isinnerly sees a dry wooded area with dry pine needles all over the ground and scarce pine trees.
She sees the <trailer> in an open clearing except she does not actually see the <trailer>; that is,
she sees clearly the open clearing and she sees the <trailer>
but yet the <trailer> is not actually innerly seen. [AK and RTH noted after the interview that this

while also not seeing it.] Coding: ISee; the central feature is imagelessly seen, skillful, Doing
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3.3

[Maya
e innerly sees the

cover and post come together; that is, she innerly watches what is transpiring behind the back of
her ear, viewed from the back [which she cannot actually see]. This is in sync

the actually clip

and post come together as this inner seeing of the clip and post coming together appears. She
sees this clearly, sees the back of her ear, the post and the clip, but she does not see any fingers.
In her inner seeing, the clip and post are somehow coming together without any fingers actually
guiding them. Coding: ISee skillful

3.4

[Maya is driving through the neighborhood where she grew up.] She is recognizing that

the neighborhood looks different than it did during her childhood and simultaneously thinks
something like This looks rough, it didn

This

thinking is without words, pictures, or other symbols. [In the interview, Maya describes this as
sad or nostalgic somehow emotional, yet there is no emotion ongoing at the moment of the
beep.] Coding: U, emotion implied (nostalgia) but not felt

3.5

[Maya is looking at a cart in the PetSmart parking lot. Perhaps she sees it at the moment,

underneath the basket. ]Maya is mostly (70%) wondering why the cart is shaped like this, what it
could be used for, maybe for a sack of dog food or a cage. This thinking is without words,
pictures, or other symbols. At the same time, she innerly sees the cart [exactly the same,
including the positioning/orientation, as the one she is looking at] with a cage in the large open
area under the basket. The cage is blue plastic (or maybe metal) with rounded edges and a black
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door with metal bars. The cart is still, is surrounded by a white background. [She was confident
that the background is white, not missing.] Coding: U, ISee skillful, white background

3.6

Maya is at Ross shopping in the furniture section. [She has been thinking she should shop

for a desk and] at the moment of the beep, is mostly thinking that wants to be sure the desk is not
bulky is clearly present, the
center of this thinking, and it has a negative valence (Bulky is bad). At the same time, she (10%)
sees her room clearly but with very few details. She sees the colors, the beige walls, but no
furniture or anything else. [She will soon see a desk in an empty part of her innerly seen room;
that is, this inner seeing is apparently an incipient inner seeing that is specific but not yet
complete. She knows it will be the desk that she is currently considering at Ross, but she does
not yet see it. Coding: U with negative valence, ISee skillful (incipient)

4.1

[Maya just asked her brother what is in his backp

Diary of a Wimpy Kid books.] At the moment of the beep, she innerly sees a blue Diary of a
Wimpy Kid book with a white design in the middle (something like a torn-out notebook page,
which is characteristic of this book series) which has in it a stick figure. Her experience is
centered on (60%) the whiteness and (40%) the stick figure; she is particularly into the bright
whiteness as a color regardless of its meaning/connection to the book. The book has other
details, a

Coding: ISee, SA in the ISee of color

or brightness
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4.2

[Maya is in the car with her sister. They are listening to a song, part of which includes a

humming sound that Maya is confident is humming yet her sister thinks is buzzing.] At the
moment of the beep, Maya is innerly sees but does not see a bumblebee <<<FYI I have called
this imageless seeing, which is perhaps not a felicitous term but the best I have arrived at>>>.
That is, this is a visual experience, but the thing seen (the bee) has no visual details; she sees it
Maya feels herself in transition, feels her experience
moving from thinking about buzzing to something else. It is not necessarily that her experience is
transitioning into clearly seeing the bee

but, as far as her
something, anything. Coding: imageless seeing,

transition (incipient)

4.3

[Maya is in the car listening to music with her sister. A song has come on and, sometime

beep, she is, in fact, reaching for the skip button to change the song, yet her experience is of
watching her finger move towards the button. [That is, even though she is the agent of this
movement, there is no agency in experience; she is watching her finger as she would watch
someone

short beep sound her

radio makes when skipping songs.
experience the motion), Waiting expectantly

4.4

[Maya is driving, and her GPS has just instructed her to turn left on Swenson, which is

curious to her.] Most salient, she doubtfully thinks something like Maybe that way is faster? No.
This thinking is without words, pictures, or other symbols
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her. Simultaneously but somewhat less salient, she feels flustered which, as best she can say, is a

lot of different directions, in an uncoordinated way. Simultaneously and least salient, she innerly
sees the intersection where she will turn, including the green street sign. However, she innerly
sees the intersection from a different perspective, as if looking at it from the south when, in
reality, she is coming from the north. Additionally, in her inner seeing, the intersection is far
away from her, seen from a perspective as if she was already some distance ahead and in a
different lane [she will, in fact, soon be this close to the intersection but is not at the moment of
the beep]. Coding: U, F bodily, ISee clear even though a small portion of inner experience, ISee
is not what would seem natural skillful??, [Her ISees are autonomous]

4.5

[Maya is standing in the shade at a crosswalk

the shade is cold. She is crossing her arms

tightly in an attempt to get warm.] In experience, she feels her body, mostly her ribs, and expects
to soon feel warmth [the result of her crossing her arms]. [She does not actually feel warm at the
moment of the beep]. Note that, as in 4.3, Maya is, indeed, the agent of the arm-crossing yet this
is not in experience; instead, her experience is of the result of the doing. She is, again, the
recipient.
Waiting expectantly for an incipient sensation

4.6

[Maya is walking down

moment of the beep, she smells paint. There is nothing else in experience. Coding: SA smell
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5.1

[Maya is watching a video about OCD on her phone. The speaker has a British accent

and is talking about anti-bacterial wipes.] At the moment of the beep, she (60%) innerly hears
th

rep) and is drawn to the British accentedness of the

speaking. The way it sounds is this focus of this inner hearing (SA). At the same time, she (30%)
innerly sees the word anti- (including the hyphen) in white letters against a blue background. The
words are in a typical computerin experience, the innerly seen word anti- is seen only once.] Also at the same time, she (10%)
sees the yellow anti-bacterial wipes on the video and is drawn to the bright yellow color of the
wipes. That is, the center of this seeing is of the color, not the wipes (SA). Coding: IH, SA sound
of innerly heard word, ISee of word, SA color

5.2

[Maya

eyes to show her the swelling.] At the moment of the beep, Maya
eyes. Simultaneously, she (30%) innerly sees a tincture bottle of Las Vegas Allergy Drops and is
mostly drawn to the gold color of a gold block on the label of the bottle (SA). She sees an amber
tincture bottle with a black top and white label with the words Las Vegas in big letters and a gold
strip near the bottom of the label (the same strip from which she is drawn to the color) with
words in it, though she does not know the words. Also in experience, she (20%) is thinking that
she should tell her aunt about these drops [though she does not actually end up doing so]. She
thinks the idea or concept that she should tell her aunt; there are no words, pictures, or other
symbols [she began by saying that the thinking must be in words but then believably determined
that no words were present, only the concept]. [Note that there are two simultaneous seeing
experiences, one external and one internal.] [Perhaps interestingly, Maya believed that part of

284

why she did not think in words or in a voice was because she did not actually end up saying it to
her aunt. It was her impression that, if she was really going to say it to her aunt, she would have
had to translate the idea into Spanish (her aunt apparently speak Spanish) and, if she had had to
translate, she suspects she would have had some inner experience of the Spanish words prior to
speaking them aloud. Maya is bilingual, more proficient in English.] Coding: Seeing, ISee, SA in
ISee, U

5.3

[Sometime before the beep, Maya

she plans to have with one of her clients. Maya does not know what said client looks like but has

he perspective of the
doorway; it does not feel like Maya is present in the inner seeing but yet it is more than just a
perspective; she feels like she has some agency within the inner seeing such that if she looked
up, she would see the ceiling or if she looked down, she would see the floor. Thus, it is
somewhere between being there experientially and just seeing from the perspective as if she were
there. She sees her mother seated on the right and the client on the left with a coffee table
between them. They are not looking directly at each other and both have their hands in their laps.
She knows they are talking though she does not see or hear them talking. She sees the stairs to
the right of them and a big wooden door to their left. She sees a big window straight them. The
room is dark but light is coming in from the window. This seeing is not very clear even though it
is quite detailed. Her mother and the client have few details, are more like the shapes of people.
The seeing is out-of-focus, blurred. [Maya
her contact lenses.] The scene Maya
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chairs or this placement or configuration of chairs and coffee table. Coding: ISee skillful, not
very clear even though detailed

5.4

[Maya is at T.J. Maxx shopping for a plant holder. She has come across one with a white

rounded bottom. She is looking down at this white plant holder but no longer sees it at the
moment of the beep [RTH remembers that hse continues to see it at the moment of the beep.] At
the same time [as RTH recalls it], she innerly sees the white round-bottomed planter (just like the
real one in T.J. Maxx) in her room with her palm plant in it [thus, she is apparently illustrating
her shopping task, what the palm would look like with this planter]. She is drawn to the green
color of the palm leaves and also the showering-down shape of the palm branches. These sensory
aspects are perhaps the most central in her experience. In both the [real] and inner seeing, she is
looking at the planter from above, is looking down at it. In the inner seeing, she sees from the
perspective of being on her bed and maybe also sees the corner of her comforter and the door
frame, though, she does not feel herself there in the inner seeing. Like 5.3, this is more than just a
point-of-view but less than being there. Coding: ISee skillful, SA in ISee of shape and color

5.5

[Maya is talking to her mom about how Maya, as a child, used to eat the cilantro sprigs

out of the cup of water and fresh cilantro her mom kept in the fridge.] At the moment of the beep
she innerly sees simultaneously and separately (1) the kitchen of her childhood apartment and (2)
the cup of cilantro in the door of her refrigerator. She sees the kitchen from the point of view of
looking straight at the kitchen from an adjacent room or hallway but she does not feel that she is
there in the seeing. The kitchen is dark with some light coming in through a window.
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Simultaneously and separately, she innerly sees the cup of cilantro. However, in this seeing, she
is there. She has imaginarily opened the door of the refrigerator [not clear if she experienced
herself doing this at or before the beep] and is now looking inside. She sees the cup of cilantro on
a low-ish shelf at the height a 4 or 5-year-old might stand. Perhaps in this imaginary seeing,
Maya is 4 or 5-year-old Maya, though she and we could not be sure. She definitely sees from the
perspective of a small person. [Perhaps these two images unfolded in some way

first seeing the

kitchen and then imagining herself at the refrigerator opening the door, but this unfolding was
not fluid, was not of her walking to the refrigerator, opening the door, seeing inside. If it did
unfold, it was more disjointed.] [Though Maya described this as a nostalgic remembering, she
does not feel nostalgia or any other emotion at the moment.] Thus, at this moment, Maya has two
simultaneous but separate inner seeings, one of which she is in. Coding: ISee x 2 (simultaneous
and separate) one which is a view, one in which she is in at the height of little Maya. Emotion
implied (nostalgia) but not felt

5.6

[Maya is walking down a hallway. On one of the walls beside her is a collection of

photographs under the heading Board of Regents.] At the moment of the beep, she is yawning
[which has caused her eyes to partially close or squint] and is trying to see the wall. Perhaps she
is mostly trying to see the faces of the people in the photographs, though this was not definitive.
At the same time, she may be drawn especially to the red color of the letters of Board of Regents.
Coding: Yawning, trying to see, SA?? color

6.1

[Maya has misplaced her to-

-tracing her
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room, in the laundry room, and so forth.] At the moment of the beep, she (80%) wonders
whether she may have left the box on top of her car. This is a cognitive wondering
cognizing about her box on top of her car

she is

though not in words, pictures, or other symbols.

Simultaneously she (20%) innerly sees the cardboard to-go box on top of her car parked in her
driveway. She sees the side of the car. She sees most, but not all of her car: She does not see the

including the wheels) of the car. She sees a pine tree behind the
car. [Before the beep, this seeing had been clearer. She has seen it becoming less and less clear
and] at the moment of the beep, sees it vaguely or indistinctly [as compared to before]. We were
careful to discern that the wondering was separate from the inner seeing; that is, the wondering
was not simply implied in the seeing; there was a separate, cognitive experience. Coding: U, ISee
stream of seeings, seeing fading (incipient)

6.2

[Maya s younger brother is telling her about doing an experiment he did at school. He is

still talking, but she no longer attends to him. Instead,]
classroom set up for an experiment. She sees two rows of desks facing each other, no people, no
chairs, a whiteboard in the front of the room. If there are any details on the walls or whiteboard,
she does not attend to them. On some of the desks (maybe every third desk or so) are glass
chemistry beakers and rolls of paper towels. [Perhaps interestingly, the details of the classroom
Maya sees are actually from her own 5th grade classroom and not

what she remembers of her 5th grade classroom.] Coding: ISee skillful (using wrong details)
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6.3

[Maya is thinking about moving out.] She is on her way out of her house and is (50%)

looking around, checking to make sure that everything is in order to leave (e.g., lights off, doors
closed, etc.). She is (40%) thinking about how people may be looking for roommates since the
school year is ending. There are no words, pictures, or other symbols in this thinking. At the
same time, she (10%) innerly sees a Facebook page [a page devoted to subletting apartments
near UNLV], particularly the blue header and background of the page and not much else. That is,
aside from the Facebook blue color, there are no details to the page, it is completely
undifferentiated. She is drawn to the blue color for it sensory qualities not for its Facebook-ness.
Coding: Checking surroundings, U, ISee no details , SA in ISee of color

6.4

[Maya
who could be calling her from Silver Springs, Nevada.]

At the moment of the beep, mostly (70%) she is drawn to the smooth motion of the grey and
white gradient on her iPhone slide to unlock button. This is a sensory awareness: She is drawn to
the smooth moving of the grey and white, not to anything about the unlock button. At the same
time, (30%) she innerly sees the town Silver Springs, a small town with dirt landscape. She sees
one house with stained glass windows and dirt all around it. There is a dirt road near the house
Maya is seeing is a
house and sign near Tonopah, NV, but as in 6.2, her experience is of seeing Silver Springs which
just happens to be populated by what she knows of Tonopah.] [At the end of the interview for
this beep, Maya was not confident that both the phone screen and inner seeing of Silvery Springs
were simultaneously present.]
understanding)
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6.5

[Maya is pushing open a door.] She feels equally the heavy door itself and the heaviness

of the door pressing on, mostly, her hands and wrists. Coding: SA weight

6.6

[Maya had just told her friend about how she gets soap for free from work. She is now

remembering filling the soap dispensers at work yesterday.] She innerly sees two separate
simultaneous seeings: (1) a metal shelf tilted upward holding two stacks of different-scented
soaps. This shelf is rusted where the bottom soap meets the melted [This is, in fact, the state her
work soap dispensers have been in and she and her co-workers have attempted to remedy the rust
by putting wax paper between the soaps and metal.] Separately and simultaneously, she innerly
sees the metal shelf [apparently the same metal shelf as in the other seeing though seen separate
from the first seeing, not overlaid or conjoined] with soap but, in this seeing, with two pieces of
wax paper between the soap and the metal shelf. She notices the unevenness of the wax paper
(the edges
yesterday]. Coding: ISee x 2 (simultaneous), SA?? visual in one of them

7.1

[Maya was searching for classes on myUNLV. She had just selected search criteria and

pressed enter.] At the moment of the beep, [the class list was populating on the screen]. Her eyes
were shifting from looking at the right side of the screen [the upper corner where a circular
loading icon had been just before the beep] to the left side [where the classes were showing up].
She saw the white webpage [that is, she saw the webpage but, as far as her experience was

s is, in fact, the icon that had been on the screen
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just seconds before and she is now seeing it in her imagination even though it is no longer on the

Maya. There was something visually overwhelming about everything happening in this
experience the visual field moving quickly right to left, the windows emerging on the screen) and
word)

feeling and it was also not meant to convey any negativity. She was consistent that the
overwhelmingness was present but it was difficult for us to understand. Coding: Seeing incipient,
ISee, Visual overwhelmingness (not negative/catastrophic)

7.2

Maya was watching (mostly listening to) a show on her phone. Mostly (70%), she hears

At the same time (30%), she innerly sees a tweet [similar to the way news programs often
display tweets]. She sees a white box with a profile picture in the upper left corner and text in the
main of the box. The text is undifferentiated; she

tan skin but few, if any, other details of him. He is against a light blue background. Coding:
Watching TV mostly hearing, ISee few details, skillful

7.3

[Maya is thinking about how she sometimes has to ask a co-worker for assistance when

herself in such a situation. She sees herself, a co-worker, and a female customer in an aisle at
work. She is on the left holding vitamins, her co-worker on the right explaining something to the
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customer, and the customer across from them standing beside her cart. They are all facing each
other. This seeing is mostly clear but the people lack some details; that is, the woman is older,
has dirty blonde hair, is about Maya
features are indistinct. Same level of clarity for innerly seen Maya and her co-worker. She sees
from the perspective of behind and to the left (such that she sees the back right of the innerly
seen Maya). [She does not feel this observer self in the seeing; this is simply a view or
perspective. There is just the one seen Maya in the seeing; there is not also the observer Maya].
They are in the vitamin aisle and she sees shelves of vitamins beside them. The vitamins are not
seen clearly yet she knows they are vitamins. [Maya finds it awkward when she has to ask coworkers for help.] And, at the moment of this beep, she feels awkward as would the innerly seen
Maya [who has had to ask a co-worker for help]. Maya was confident there was a feeling
ongoing at the moment; it was partially bodily (something like a should I move closer to hear
better? Should I move father away so as not to intrude?) and partially mental. Note that this is a
vicarious feeling; Maya feels awkward as would the innerly seen Maya. Coding: ISee self from
external perspective; few details in people, F partially bodily partially mental, vicarious for
herself

7.4

Maya is rubbing oil on her face, is attending mostly to her hands and where they put the

oil (she is intentional about where she puts the oil). [Thus, this is not a sensory experience of
feeling the oil or the rubbing; it is about her hands carefully applying]. Equally present and
simultaneously in experience, [she had been thinking about possibly returning a different oil
because it had caused her skin to break out] and now thinks that she should return the oil. This is
no longer a thought process but rather is a cognitive recognition at the end of a thought process.
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The thinking portion is gone; now she is noting or acknowledging her decision. This is decidedly
cognitive. [Maya, with heavy subjunctification, mentioned that this may have been visual (also
seeing the oil) but we determined in the interview that it was not at all a visual experience, rather,
she knew which oil she was referring to and that knowing was present in the cognition but not
seen.] Coding: Intentional doing, cognitive recognition

7.5

[Maya is listening to music while she gets ready in the bathroom.] At the moment of the

beep, she sees her eyebrows in the mirror and is mostly (60%) thinking that she should leave to
go get her eyebrows done. This is not a full-blown thought process but rather, like 7.4, is a
cognitive recognition that she should leave, is a cognitive acknowledgement that she will now
leave. At the same time (40%), she is mumbling and swaying/bouncing along with the music.
She is more into the bouncing/swaying, is feeling her whole body moving with the music. She
hears the music but she hears her own mumbling-singing more than she hears the artist singing.
Coding: cognitive recognition, SA bodily

7.6

[Maya is getting her eyebrows threaded.] At the moment of the beep, she mostly (50%)

feels the strings twist and move up alongt her skin. Also simultaneous in and perhaps part of or
related to the string-senesation experience, she (20%) is thinking that the beautician is
approximately here-ish on her eyebrow (here-ish referring to the spot where she feels the
threading, approximately the middle of her upper right eyebrow). The concept which, if put in
words would be something like She must be right here, is clearly present as an idea or concept
without specific words, pictures, or other symbols. That is, unlike 7.4 and 7.5 which were
cognitive recognitions, 7.6 is an unsymbolized thought, there is the presence of a specific idea, as
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opposed to only a recognition/acknowledgement/understanding of some idea already considered.

and the l tiny hairs around her eyebrows being pulled [though she hears the sound of the hairs
being pulled, she does not also feel those hairs being pulled at this moment]. Coding: SA tactile,
SA hearing, U

8.1

[Maya is thinking about a conversation she had with a friend earlier about his podcast.]

At the moment of the beep, she is mostly (50%) innerly seeing a sound studio dimly-lit with dark
red walls. She sees from the perspective of the control room, is looking through a big rectangular
window with a black frame into the studio. She sees a circular microphone on the other side of
the window. Simultaneously, she is (10%) thinking broadly about what it would be like if she
started a podcast: Would it be music or talking? Who would be her guests? How would her

[or maybe sisters
which might include sorority sisters but is not only referring to sorority sisters. Maya is confident
she is innerly speaking, is producing the words, but was not entirely confident that the inner

not attending very much (or at all) to the voice or the hearing of it; her experience was of innerly
speaking. Coding: ISee, IS, U

8.2

Maya is watching Modern Family on her iPhone, is somewhat (20%) carried along

by/following the show. More so, (80%), she is picking a small piece of skin on her fingernail:
0%), is with her thumb and pointer
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fingertips [of her picking hand] doing the picking (35 of the 80%), and feeling the skin being
picked [on her other hand] (25 of the 80%). Coding: Watching TV, intentional doing, SA tactile

8.3

[Maya is driving. At the m

are on and, outside awareness, she is analyzing the situation, trying to figure out if the bus will
move soon or if she should change lanes. She must decide quickly because her turn is just ahead
of the bus.] In her experience, she sees the lights (at least five of them, maybe there are more
than five, she is not sure), which are bright [though he is not particularly drawn to their
brightness or color or any other sensory quality]. Coding: Seeing

8.4

[Maya is positioning sun blinds on her windshield. In trying to do so, she actually just

punched herself on her left cheek with her fist.] At the moment of the beep, she (50%) feels, is
aware of, the region of her cheek where she just felt the punch. [She does not feel pain or the
sensation of being punched, but she is aware of the region where this occurred.] At the same time
and equally present (50%), her body is twisted and extended with her right hand pulling the visor
down to secure the blind and her left hand holding the blind against the window. She feels the
entire bodily coordinated effort her but mostly is attending to the visor, is anticipation feeling it
secured. That is, even though she is, in fact, the one pulling down and securing the visor, her
experience is not of her as the agent; her experience is of anticipating the thing that will come
[thanks to her doing].
the motion), Waiting expectantly
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8.5

[Maya is shuffling through a rack of clothes. She notices she skipped a shirt somewhere

in the mix and is now trying to disentangle the hangers so that she can see the shirt she missed.]
She is mostly (70%) feeling the hangers as they untangle, as there is more room to move them

is pulling on them haphazardly not from the hooks but from the sides. Like 8.4, her experience is
ing the feel of the hangers untangled. At the same
time (30%), she hears the click-clack of the hangers hitting against each other. Coding: Sensing

8.6

[Maya is shopp

crop top maybe, with thin straps and two pieces of fabric hanging.] At the moment of the beep,
ing-to-figureout was present to her was never fully clear to AK. Maya considered that she might have been
innerly seeing the shirt in her approximation of how it must be worn but then pretty confidently
ing up the shirt] and sees the whole thing
the washed out color of the inside of the shirt, the two pieces of wrinkled fabric hanging down

be the wrinkled pieces of fabric. Coding: Seeing, ISee?????

Ingrid Samples
1.1

[Ingrid was driving to Tecopa Hot Springs.] In the vicinity of the beep, a car had passed
And then there
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was one [a reference to Genesis from the Bible
Genesis or elsewhere in the Bible

RTH does not think this phrase appears in

that is, he thinks that Ingrid was mistaken in her reference.

However, it was clear that Ingrid herself understood it to be a Biblical reference spawned by

the moment of the beep

perhaps most likely the thought which Ingrid was fairly certain [RTH

observes that Ingrid was initially fairly certain, but later in the interview it was this certainty that

1.2

[Sometime before the beep, Ingrid had been driving very fast (115 mph [RTH did not
-lane road and had to

brake abruptly to make a turn. She realized after that turn that she was driving too fast.] At the
moment of the beep, [she was preparing to pour herself a kefir drink though this was apparently
not in experience.] Instead, there were many possible things in experience, perhaps [RTH thinks

same way that we do.] all simultaneously: her focusing on the road/telling herself to be focused
on the road (perhaps innerly spoken though, after we raised the possibility that thoughts do not
have to be in an inner voice, she stated
weather, the cloud; her looking at the lines on the road.

1.3

[Ingrid was at Tecopa Hot Springs. She may have already been in the hot springs once

and] was, at the moment of the beep, getting back into the water. [Ingrid described many aspects
of this experience and, partly due to time constraints, it was never clear what was context, what

297

was in-experience, and what was at the moment of the beep. She seemed to be interpreting the
moment of the bee

loving kindness; experiencing the silence, healing, beauty, aloneness of her surroundings; feeling
the water as she got in it; feeling the balancing as she walked in the water; some spiritual
experience; and maybe more.

2.1

[Ingrid was in bed and did not want to get up for the day.] At the moment of the beep, she

was thinking about her schedule for the day. There was a jumble/cluster/cloud of different
thoughts (about her appt. at 12:30, about her DES appt. at noon, about ordering oils, and possibly
more). [AK maintains some skepticism as to whether these thoughts were specified in her
experience or if she had a more general experience of thinking about her day without such

to this effect.] None of the thoughts were in words or pictures

the ideas were present.

[It took us a long time in the interview to establish the moment of the beep, much longer than is
typically needed.] Coding: U??? [Lots of reasons to be skeptical]

2.2

[Before the interview for this beep, Ingrid

Ingrid

was confident that something was present in her experience at the moment of this beep but, for

it surprised her, and that when she tried to grasp
what had been ongoing, it disappeared. That was troubling to her

perhaps a sign of memory

loss. RTH suggested it was likely procedural.] Coding: Something???
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2.3

As with 2.2, Ingrid was confident that something was present in her experience, but she

was unable to remember it. [At this beep she may have been half-asleep, likely contributing to
her inability to remember or apprehend or whatever the experience.] Coding: Something???

2.4

Same as 2.2 and 2.3. Coding: Something???

3.1

[Ingrid was on the phone with Hertz Rent-a-Car. They were discussing billing/insurance

for her rental car agreement.] At the moment of the beep, she may have been thinking I have to
stay on top of this billing.
her own voice, however, Ingrid only said that after Alek offered the possibility of inner speaking,
and she did not seem to understand when we discussed the possible distinctions between a
thought (no words) and words (like inner speaking). [RTH agrees with the general sentiment,
but thinks that Ingrid was on the way towards describing inner speaking before Alek led her
there. He agrees that it is difficult to be confident that inner speaking was ongoing at the
moment of the beep.] Coding: IS?????

3.2

[Ingrid was looking through her therapy treatment plan. She was on a section regarding

the plan.] At the moment of the beep, she was writing not wanting to be with people. She was
also somehow thinking that this is not always true

she has, in the recent past, wanted to be

around people, for example, meeting and exchanging numbers with people at a horse show, and
going to yoga. Perhaps that thinking was complex
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including some remembering of the horse

show incident and yoga, or perhaps that was merely context and not at all in direct experience at
the moment. She may have also been feeling fear somehow, maybe a restricted feeling in a
column deep in her torso and upper chest [again, she did not describe these bodily details until
we offered the possibility of a bodily-experienced feeling, though she did, first, gesture to her
torso when describing the experience.] As with the horse show and yoga memory, it is possible
this fear was only context (part of the reason why she does not want to be with people), but we
could not be sure. [She had difficulty cleaving to the moment of the beep: her talk referred
probably to minutes rather than at the moment.] Coding: Maybe somehow thinking, maybe
somehow feeling bodily [This is a good example of the best she can do]

3.3

[Ingrid was trying to find the new number for the UNLV dental office, which had re-

located to the medical
Ingrid

-connect with the old dental
in, not

really the experience. AK realized it is possible that Ingrid has mostly been describing the tasks
she is engaged in, cf. 3.1, instead of experience.] Coding: Probably an account of the task, rather
than experience??

3.4

[A potential client had texted Ingrid to schedule a massage. She called him back and

described her massage services to him. They had just hung up.] At the moment of the beep, more
feeling than thinking (more an emotional experience) that he seemed like a nice guy and she
hoped the appt would be confirmed. How she experienced this was never clear. It was difficult
to be confident about when in relation to the beep these experiences occurred, or whether they
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were overall characterizations rather than descriptions of experience. Coding: Probably an
account of the task, rather than experience?? [Probably no experience, and no way of knowing

3.5

[Ingrid had just texted a former massage client to wish her happy birthday. She saw in

their stream of text messages that, last year when she said happy birthday, the woman did not
respond.] As best we could say, Ingrid felt sad/a loss [because she could not be sure the woman
would see the text

[Again, it was

possible this is only context and not a description of Ingrid

]

Coding: F?????; probably an account of the task

4.1

Ingrid was scrolling through pictures of her Facebook friends. As best we could say, her

experience was of visually scrolling (perhaps with some sensitivity/intention to focus on friends

list of friends to see who she currently has prioritized as the 30 frien
timeline. She wanted to add her friend Francine and would have to remove someone else to do
so.] Coding: Visual scrolling; what of that was in experience is questionable

4.2

[Prior to the beep, Ingrid had gotten a call from a potential customer interested in her

massage services. This customer had made some bizarre requests/insinuations including asking if

describe this) and asking Ingrid if she would wear a certain nail polish to the massage (which
Ingrid
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Ingrid
k off

--

Ingrid believed there was a lot of stuff ongoing in her experience at this

moment but that stuff was very difficult for us to describe. She pretty consistently described her
experience as being amazed and horrified at the man and his vulgarity and the fact that she has to
deal with such things, but how she experienced amazement/horror was never clear. Perhaps at the
moment of the beep, Ingrid
--

green toenail polish. [Both these inner hearings and the inner seeing should be regarded with
skepticism; it took us a long time in the interview to arrive at such details and only after
interviewers offered inner hearing and inner seeing as possible phenomena.] Coding: A lot of
hat was in
experience. You should know whether you're seeing an image or not, and whether it is of the top
portion of the green toenail or not]

4.3

[Ingrid was or had just been looking at pictures of her friend Christine who lives in

Holland.] At the moment of the beep, she was hoping that Christine was doing well/better than
before. Ingrid apprehended this as her sending well wishes/hope/power to Christine, as if to
engulf Christine. This was a feeling of power from Ingrid

[As best

Alek could understand, this was on the spectrum of emotional experiences]. Coding: F???? [An
abstraction masquerading as experience??]
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5.1

Ingrid was picking up a bank envelope and perhaps also perhaps simultaneously thinking

that she needs to go through this mail soon. Perhaps the thinking was triggered by or otherwise
after the beep. Perhaps the needing-to-check-the-mail was implied in the picking up the
envelope. Perhaps nothing was in experience. [Maybe this last sentence would be better written
Coding: No experience? Thinking???

5.2

Ingrid was checking her phone calendar to reschedule a massage client. Ingrid provided

lengthy context for this beep and perhaps some of that was in experience including: the date of
November 29th
having to wait so long for the appointment. It was difficult or impossible to discern which of this,
if any, were present at the moment of the beep. Coding: No experience? [This is a good example

speculation that there is no experience to say anything about]

5.3

[Ingrid was making fresh lemonade.] At the moment of the beep, she was pouring hot

water over the squeezed lemon. She was probably simultaneously thinking something like That
, but how that thinking was present was not
clear. [This was the clearest experience of today]. Coding: U??? [This is the clearest example

experience (this is the clearest on the last day), or maybe this is the last wisps of experience.]

5.4

[Ingrid had called Bank of America trying to reach customer service.] At the moment of
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feeling irritated [by the automated system] but how this feeling was present, if present, was not
clear. [After the beep, she thought Why has everything become so difficult?] Coding: F????????

5.5

Skipped because Ingrid was on the phone with Bank of America

5.6

[Earlier that day, a potential massage client had texted Ingrid inquiring about

availability.] She was at the moment of the beep crafting a text message to this client, arranging
the dates and times she was available to send to him. Though her text was in words, those
specific words were apparently not present in her experience. [After the beep, she thought I hope
he confirms for a two-hour appointment.] Coding: No experience???

[Due to time constraints, we did not discuss beeps 5.7 and 5.8 but had Ingrid give us a brief
description of each]:
5.7

wondering if her credit card was a rewards card or not

5.8

watching the news about lottery winners
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